Keane v. Auditor of City of Boston

• Citation: 402 N.E.2d 495,380 Mass. 201
• Parties: , 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2493 Thomas KEANE et al. v. AUDITOR OF the CITY OF BOSTON et al. 1
• Decision Date: 24 March 1980
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

Page 495

402 N.E.2d 495

380 Mass. 201, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2493

Thomas KEANE et al. v. AUDITOR OF the CITY OF BOSTON et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 11, 1980.

Decided March 24, 1980.

Francis J. DiMento, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Paul T. Edgar, Boston, for Arthur Mason, intervener.

Kelam S. Derderian, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Belmont, and Joseph W. Glannon, Brighton, for Walter W. Merrill and another, submitted a brief.

Before QUIRICO, BRAUCHER, KAPLAN, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The plaintiffs, court officers of the Superior Court and various Municipal and District Courts in Suffolk County, ² commenced this action on July 27, 1978, in the Superior Court in Suffolk County. Their complaint, as amended, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the auditor and collector-treasurer of the city of Boston. Those officials allegedly denied the court officers the benefit of a pay increase approved in the Boston city council's June 14, 1978, order of amendment to Schedule B of the classification and compensation plan for the officers and employees of Suffolk County (hereinafter "order"). ³ The plaintiffs prayed inter alia, for declarations that this order was valid; that St.1977, c. 278, was a nullity; and that St.1977, c. 278, and St.1978, c. 478, were unconstitutional, as applied to the plaintiffs. A judge of the Superior Court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from interfering with the operation of the order. On August 4, 1978, the motion to intervene of Edward F. Hennessey, Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, was allowed. On August 9, 1978, upon the petition of the Chief Justice, a justice of the Appeals Court vacated the preliminary injunction and issued an order restraining the defendants from paying the increased compensation for payroll periods commencing on or after August 9. Chief Justice Hennessey moved on August 25, 1978, to substitute Arthur M. Mason, Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court, as intervenor-defendant. On September 11, 1978, after hearing, the judge granted the Chief Justice's motion.

The parties submitted a statement by which the parties agreed to some of the facts in issue on February 9, 1979, and the case was tried on February 28, 1979. The judge filed a memorandum of decision and order for judgment on March 14, 1979. On the same day, the court entered judgment that the Suffolk County order is null and void and St.1977, c. 278, and St.1978, c. 478, are constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs appealed, and we transferred their appeal here sua sponte. We affirm the judgment.

The parties' statement of agreed facts asserts in part: "10. On September 9, 1963, pursuant to G.L. c. 35, § 48-56, the Boston City Council Adopted Schedules A and B of the Classification and Compensation Plans for the officers and employees of Suffolk County, which Schedules were approved by the then Mayor on September 12, 1963, and which Schedules were from time to time thereafter amended. 11. As of June 14, 1978, Court Officers of Suffolk County had no collective bargaining agreement in effect. 12. On June 14, 1978, the City Council voted to amend by order said Schedule B so as to upgrade all Suffolk Court Officers, including plaintiffs, two compensation grades, effective retroactively to June 1, 1978. . . . 13. The Mayor of the city of Boston signed the Order . . . ." In addition, the statement indicates that "8. As of July 1, 1978, the employer of judicial employees was designated by statute to be the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court. 9. The position of Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court of Massachusetts was not filled until August 11, 1978."

At trial, the plaintiffs' evidence showed that before July 1, 1978, the city of Boston (Suffolk County) paid the plaintiffs. The Commonwealth did not reimburse the city. On the first pay day after the order of amendment was enacted, the city payroll division refused to accept the plaintiffs' payroll which included the raises at issue. At trial, the plaintiffs called Michael F. Flaherty, Chairman on the part of the House of the Joint Legislative Committee on the Judiciary, to testify about the legislative history of St.1977, c. 278. The judge excluded the testimony as immaterial. The plaintiffs made an offer of proof. Also over the plaintiffs' objection, the judge admitted various documents tending to show a history of collective bargaining between Suffolk County and unions representing its court officers. Other challenged documents tended to show that, after June 14, 1977, the county ceased bargaining and the Chief Justice began bargaining.

We turn now to the plaintiffs' claims of error. The plaintiffs argue that the judge erred in granting Chief Justice Hennessey's motion to intervene. They contend that it was error to declare the order of the city council void and to rule that St.1977, c. 278, and St.1978, c. 478, are constitutional as applied to court officers. Finally, the plaintiffs attack the judge's exclusion of the testimony of Representative Michael F. Flaherty and the admission of the documents concerning collective bargaining.

The plaintiffs' attack on the standing of Chief Justice Hennessey is misplaced. The plaintiffs' only argument against intervention is the claim that, on the day he sought to intervene, August 4, 1978, the Chief Justice was not technically the plaintiffs' employer. Statute 1978, c. 478, § 74, effective July 1, 1978, replaced the Chief Justice, as the plaintiffs' employer, with the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court, but the Chief Administrative Justice was not appointed until August 11. The plaintiffs do not contend that the Chief Administrative Justice, had he been appointed, would have lacked sufficient interest to intervene under Mass.R.Civ.P. 24(a), 365 Mass. 769 (1974). Nor do they contend that any other party adequately represented the State employer's interest. As the employer under the earlier statute, Chief Justice Hennessey was the natural person to represent that interest until the new position was filled. He could not reasonably have waited to intervene until August 11 because of the pressure to contest the preliminary injunction promptly. As Chief Justice, he had ample authority to act. See, e. g., G.L. c. 211, §§ 2A, 3; G.L. c. 211B, § 7. Thus the motion to intervene was properly granted.

The plaintiffs' principal argument is that the Suffolk County order is not inconsistent with St.1977, c. 278. Before the Legislature enacted St.1977, c. 278, the county's representative negotiated collective bargaining agreements with court officers. G.L. c. 150E, § 1, as amended through St.1976, c. 480, § 20. Effective June 13, 1977, St.1977, c. 278, withdrew that power from the county and vested it in the Chief Justice. ⁴ The statute also moved the court officers from the category of county employees to the category of State judicial employees. Cf. Massachusetts Probation Ass'n v. Commissioner of Administration, 370 Mass. 651, 352 N.E.2d 684 (1976). However, St.1977, c. 278, did not provide for State funding of court officers' salaries. The counties continued making such payments. In fact, even when the comprehensive court reorganization plan was enacted, St.1978, c. 478, § 334, effective July 1, 1978, required counties to continue paying for maintenance and operation of the judicial system until the Commonwealth took over full funding. Statute 1978, c. 478, § 333, set up a timetable for the transition: the counties were to be reimbursed during fiscal 1978; the Commonwealth was to prepare a single State budget and assume full funding responsibilities beginning July 1, 1979. Statute 1978, c. 367, § 2, item 0315-0001, which contained an appropriation for reimbursing the counties for 1978 costs of court operations, including a proviso: "that the Suffolk county share of court expenditures shall not include the cost of any increase in compensation for existing positions or increase in the number of positions authorized subsequent to January first, nineteen hundred and seventy-eight, with the exception of such increase for which collective bargaining agreements have been signed prior to said January first, and raises which do not exceed the cumulative total of the raises granted state employees over the last three fiscal years."

The plaintiffs press two interpretations of this statutory arrangement. They contend that St.1977, c. 278, is a nullity because it was intended to be part of a comprehensive court reorganization plan that was not enacted until 1978. St.1978, c. 478. The delay was allegedly unexpected. The State did not take over funding of court officers' salaries in 1977. It follows, the plaintiffs argue, that the Chief Justice as public employer could not deliver on raises for which he bargained; his status as employer became meaningless when removed from the context of the comprehensive plan.

Second, even if the statute is not a nullity, the plaintiffs contend that the Legislature did not mean to exclude the possibility of unilateral county pay raises, because the Legislature ordered counties to continue paying court officers' salaries. Furthermore, St.1978, c. 367, § 2, item 0315-0001, shows that the Legislature knew of the raises here in question. Thus, the plaintiffs conclude, the counties could grant unilateral raises for as long as they continued paying the salaries.

The argument that the statute is a nullity runs counter to logic. A construction that would nullify a statute is not to be favored. See Hein-Werner Corp. v. Jackson Indus., Inc., 364 Mass. 523, 527, 306 N.E.2d 440 (1974). Furthermore, when it enacted the court reorganization plan, the Legislature left St.1977, c. 278, almost wholly intact. St.1978, c. 478, § 74. But the most telling indication that the plaintiffs' argument is wrong is G.L. c. 150E, § 7(c ),...