Kelley v. Gordon
Decision Date | 18 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. CV–14–1082,CV–14–1082 |
Citation | 2015 Ark. 277,465 S.W.3d 842 |
Parties | Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellant v. Ulonzo Gordon, Appellee |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
This is an appeal from the Lee County Circuit Court's order granting appellee Ulonzo Gordon relief in his habeas-corpus proceeding upon finding that the holding of Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), which prohibited mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders, applies retroactively. On appeal, Wendy Kelley, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction (the State), argues that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller applies retroactively and that the circuit court's equal-protection/due-process ruling was erroneous. We affirm.
Id. at 1–2, 434 S.W.3d at 365–66. On August 23, 2013, without holding a hearing, the circuit court granted Gordon's petition, vacated and set aside Gordon's sentence, and reinvested the Crittenden County Circuit Court with jurisdiction to conduct resentencing proceedings. Id. The State appealed, and we held that while Gordon's claim was cognizable in habeas-corpus proceedings, the circuit court had not followed the procedures mandated by our habeas-corpus statutes and, as noted above, reversed and remanded. See id.
On remand, the circuit court entered an order finding probable cause to believe that Gordon was being held without lawful authority within the meaning of Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16–112–101 et seq. and issued the writ. The Director of the Arkansas Department of Correction filed a return, stating that Gordon was in his custody based upon Gordon's conviction for capital murder in Crittenden County Circuit Court Criminal Case No. 95–149. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 116–112–108(c)(2) & –109(a), the director attached copies of the judgment and commitment order and Gordon's institutional file. The judgment and commitment order reflects that the date the murder was committed was January 28, 1995, and that Gordon's date of birth is August 18, 1976.
At the hearing before the circuit court, at which Gordon was present, the parties presented evidence on the issue of Gordon's true date of birth. As the circuit court's finding that Gordon was born on August 18, 1977—not 1976, as reflected on the judgment and commitment order—is not challenged on appeal, it is not necessary to address the details of that evidence.
The circuit court also heard argument regarding whether Miller should be applied retroactively to afford Gordon relief. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ruled from the bench that Gordon was entitled to relief, and a written order was subsequently entered as follows:
The State now brings this appeal.
In Miller v. Alabama and its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the Supreme Court of the United States consolidated two cases for review of the constitutionality of mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for crimes committed by juveniles. The court summarized its decision as follows:
The two 14–year–old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more appropriate. Such a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile's “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change,” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026–2027, 2029–2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and runs afoul of our cases' requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties. We therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”
Id. at 2460. Notably, Jackson v. Hobbs was an Arkansas case on collateral review. On remand from the United States Supreme Court this court reversed the denial of Kuntrell Jackson's petition for writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ. Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906. We further remanded the case to the Jefferson County Circuit Court with instructions that the case be transferred to the Mississippi County Circuit Court and instructed that a sentencing hearing be held in the Mississippi County Circuit Court where Jackson was to have the opportunity to present for consideration evidence that would include that of his “age, age-related characteristics, and the nature of his crime.” Further, we rejected the State's argument that this court could sentence Jackson to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, and we instructed that his sentence must fall within the statutory discretionary sentencing range for a Class Y felony of not less than ten years and not more than forty years, or life. Ark.Code Ann. § 5–4–401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997).1
In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) ; (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906, implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller retroactive; and (4) there is no basis in state law to hold Miller retroactive. For its second point on appeal, the State contends that the circuit court's ruling regarding equal protection and due process was erroneous.
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