Larson v. Fidelity Mutual Life Association
| Decision Date | 06 January 1898 |
| Docket Number | 10,876 - (208) |
| Citation | 73 N.W. 711,71 Minn. 101 |
| Parties | LOUIS E. LARSON v. FIDELITY MUTUAL LIFE ASSOCIATION |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $10,000 for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment. The case was tried before Smith, J., and a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $300, upon which judgment was entered. From this judgment defendant association appealed. Reversed.
Malicious Prosecution -- Unauthorized Act of Agent of Insurance Company -- Liability of Company to Plaintiff.
The defendant appointed one C. its agent for the district of Minnesota for the purpose of procuring, in person and through agents (to be appointed by himself), applications for insurance on the lives of individuals, and forwarding the same to the company for approval or disapproval, and, if approved and policies be issued thereon, collecting and paying over the dues or premiums to the company. It was expressly provided that he should be responsible for the acts and doings of such agents as he should appoint. Maliciously and without probable cause, he procured the arrest and imprisonment of one of the agents of his own appointment for the crime of embezzling the funds of the defendant. The defendant never authorized, participated in or ratified such arrest and imprisonment. Held, that the defendant was not liable.
Malicious Prosecution -- Principal and Agent -- Tort Committed for Purpose Personal to Agent.
A principal is liable to third persons for the torts of his agent when committed in the course and within the scope of the agency, although the principal never authorized participated in or ratified the tort; but he is not liable where the tortious act was committed, not in furtherance of the principal's business, but for a purpose personal to the agent himself.
Malicious Prosecution.
Even if the act of the agent might otherwise have been in the course and within the scope of his agency, yet, as he had a purpose personal to himself because of his liability to the defendant for the acts of his subagent, it must be presumed that he instituted the criminal proceedings to subserve that purpose.
Haynes & Chase, for appellant.
The implied authority conferred upon an agent is necessarily restricted to the transactions pertaining to the business of the principal in which the agent engages and, if he exceeds that authority, the principal is not bound. Beebe v Equitable, 76 Iowa 129; Stewart v. Woodward, 50 Vt. 78. Even if Crawford, in instituting criminal proceedings against the plaintiff, was acting within the scope of the authority delegated to him to collect and forward premiums, and he instituted such proceedings for the purpose of collecting a debt due the company, and therefore in furtherance of the company's interest, still the company would not be liable for any illegal acts of his in connection with the collection not expressly authorized. Murrey v. Kelso, 10 Wash. 47; Callahan v. Hyland, 59 Ill.App. 347; Carter v. Howe, 51 Md. 290; Tolchester v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 313; Central v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394; Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383; President v. Green, 86 Md. 161; Cleveland v. Koch, 37 Ill.App. 595; Dally v. Young, 3 Ill.App. 39; Govaski v. Downey, 100 Mich. 429; Pressley v. Mobile, 15 F. 199; Mali v. Lord, 39 N.Y. 381; Morton v. Metropolitan, 34 Hun, 366; Norman v. Manciette, 18 Fed. Cases, 307; Allen v. London, L.R. 6 Q.B. 65. The evidence shows that Crawford instituted criminal proceedings, not to collect a debt due the company nor in furtherance of its interest, but to collect a debt due himself and for his own individual benefit.
Smith, Pulliam & Smith, for respondent.
Smith v. Munch, 65 Minn. 256; Brazil v. Peterson, 44 Minn. 212; Potulni v. Saunders, 37 Minn. 517; Mulvehill v. Bates, 31 Minn. 364; Ellegard v. Ackland, 43 Minn. 352; Mozier v. St. Paul, 31 Minn. 351; Cooley, Torts, 119-121, among other authorities, were cited.
This was an action for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment against the defendant association and its co-defendant and agent, Crawford. The prosecution which resulted in plaintiff's arrest and imprisonment was instituted by the complaint of Crawford charging the plaintiff with the crime of embezzling $100, the money and property of the association. It is conceded that the plaintiff established a cause of action against Crawford, the only question raised by the appeal being whether, on the facts, the association was liable for the acts of its agent.
As all that bears on this question might have been included in a comparatively short bill of exceptions, it is to be regretted that we have been compelled to examine a record of 260 pages with but little aid from counsel by referring us to the places where the material evidence is to be found.
There is practically no conflict in the evidence. The appellant, a foreign life insurance company with its general offices in the city of Philadelphia, appointed Crawford its managing agent for the district of Minnesota, for the purpose of procuring, in person and through agents, applications for insurance on the lives of individuals, and forwarding the same to the association for approval or disapproval, and, if approved and policies be issued thereon, collecting and forthwith paying over such dues or premiums to the association as may be specified in the receipt accompanying such policies. In the appointment of agents he was to require them to execute the regular form of contract furnished by the association to its managing agents for that purpose. It was expressly provided that he should be responsible for the acts and doings of such agents. In the execution of this agency Crawford appointed plaintiff agent for Polk county, for the purpose of soliciting and procuring applications from individuals for insurance in the defendant association. Plaintiff accepted the agency and executed to the association a bond, with sureties, conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties.
While in the letters of appointment (Exhibit B), Crawford designates plaintiff as "my agent," and while plaintiff was under the direction and control of Crawford, who was responsible to the association for his acts, yet, as his appointment was authorized by the association, there can be no doubt that he was the agent of the association, so that it would be liable for his acts performed within the scope of his agency; and money which he collected for premiums on policies issued would be the money of the association, and not of Crawford individually. Plaintiff made his reports and accounted to Crawford, who in turn reported and accounted to the company.
Crawford claiming that plaintiff had appropriated to his own use moneys collected on premiums for policies issued, made the complaint already referred to, upon which a warrant was issued, under which plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned. While he was thus in custody plaintiff, under duress and for the purpose of obtaining his liberty, as he claims,...
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