Manselle v. Krogstad (In re Krogstad), A20-0076

• Decision Date: 21 April 2021
• Docket Number: A20-0076
• Citation: 958 N.W.2d 331
• Parties: IN RE Jeffrey KROGSTAD, M.D., et al., Petitioners, Darrell Manselle, Respondent, v. Jeffrey Krogstad, M.D., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

958 N.W.2d 331

IN RE Jeffrey KROGSTAD, M.D., et al., Petitioners,

Darrell Manselle, Respondent,

v.Jeffrey Krogstad, M.D., et al., Appellants.

A20-0076

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: April 21, 2021

Nathaniel A. Dahl, Derek I. Stewart, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Waite Park, Minnesota, for respondent.

Kenneth H. Bayliss, Steven R. Schwegman, and Michelle M. Draewell, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota, for appellants.

Mark R. Bradford, Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

Daniel J. Cragg, Vince C. Reuter, Eckland & Blando LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

OPINION

HUDSON, J.

Minnesota Statutes section 542.10 (2020), governs change of venue as of right. Appellants, the two defendants in this medical malpractice case, moved for a change of venue under Minn. Stat. § 542.10, which allows "several defendants residing in different counties" to compel the transfer of venue when the majority of them unite in the demand. The district court denied the motion, concluding that two defendants did not constitute "several defendants." The court of appeals agreed, and it therefore denied appellants’ petition for a writ of mandamus. We granted review to decide the meaning of the word "several" in Minn. Stat. § 542.10. We conclude that "several" means "separate," and therefore we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and grant the petition for a writ of mandamus.

FACTS

Darrell Manselle, respondent, obtained medical treatment from appellant Dr. Jeffrey Krogstad at a medical clinic operated by appellant Lakewood Health System. Manselle alleged that because Dr. Krogstad did not timely refer him to a specialist for treatment of a vascular condition in his left foot, Manselle suffered an avoidable partial amputation of his left leg. Manselle sued Dr. Krogstad and Lakewood Health for medical negligence. The clinic where Manselle obtained treatment from Dr. Krogstad is located in Todd County. Manselle is a resident of Kandiyohi County, as is Dr. Krogstad. There has been no finding concerning where Lakewood Health is located for purposes of venue.

Manselle sued appellants in Kandiyohi County, and both appellants joined in moving to transfer venue to Todd County under Minn. Stat. § 542.10.¹ Appellants also moved in the alternative for a change of venue, asserting forum non conveniens under Minn. Stat. § 542.11(4) (2020). The district court denied the change of venue on both grounds. The district court found that the second prong² of Minn. Stat. § 542.10 was not met, because two defendants could not be considered "several" defendants for purposes of this statute. The district court relied on dicta from a decision of the court of appeals, Riddle v. Ringwelski , 451 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Minn. App. 1990), to conclude that "several" generally means more than two.

Appellants then sought a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. In a published special term opinion the court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that two (and only two) defendants do not meet the statutory criteria of "several defendants" in section 542.10. In re Krogstad , 941 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. App. 2020). The court of appeals concluded that "several" must mean "more than two." Id. at 753. Specifically, after consulting various dictionaries, the court of appeals concluded that there was more than one reasonable interpretation of "several" and therefore the language of the statute was ambiguous. Then, relying on the canon against surplusage, it concluded that "[b]ecause ‘defendants’ is already plural, interpreting ‘several defendants’ to include two separate defendants would give no distinct meaning to the word ‘several.’ Only by interpreting it to mean more than two does ‘several’ have a distinct meaning from defendants." Id. at 753.

ANALYSIS

Minnesota Statutes section 542.10, in relevant part, provides:

If the county designated in the complaint is not the county in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose and if there are several defendants residing in different counties, the trial shall be had in the county upon which a majority of them unite in demanding or, if the numbers be equal, in that whose county seat is nearest.

(Emphasis added.) Determining the meaning of the emphasized text presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.³ Sumner v. Jim Lupient Infiniti , 865 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Minn. 2015). Our goal in statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Christianson v. Henke , 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Statutory interpretation begins by assessing whether the statutory language, on its face, is ambiguous. State v. Prigge , 907 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 2018). A word is ambiguous if it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." Rodriguez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 931 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have cautioned, however, that simply "[b]ecause a word has more than one meaning does not mean it is ambiguous. The sense of a word depends on how it is being used; only if more than one meaning applies within that context does ambiguity arise." Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. , 517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994).

In the absence of statutory definitions, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Alarcon , 932 N.W.2d 641, 646 (Minn. 2019). "We may consider dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of a statutory term." Id. Although the parties both contend that the word "several" is unambiguous, we are presented with three potential dictionary definitions of "several," with each party proffering a different definition in support of their position. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1652 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "several" as "[b]eing of a number more than two or three but not many .... Single; distinct ...."); cf. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1754 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "several" as "being more than two but fewer than many in number .... [I]ndividual .... [S]eparate"). Appellants’ position is that the best definition is "separate," which they suggest is functionally equivalent to "two or more." Respondent's position is that "several" means "more than two." Neither party advocates for adopting the third option, "more than two, but fewer than many," but appellants contend that this definition is the only alternative to their proposed definition. Appellants point out that all dictionaries include "more than two, but fewer than many" as one definition, and argue that respondent is surgically separating a clause to create an artificial and incomplete definition.

To resolve whether the statute is ambiguous, we first address respondent's contention—upon which the court of appeals based its holding—that the word "several" must mean "more than two," or the term would be superfluous because the Legislature already pluralized the word "defendants" in the text of the statute. If "several defendants" could apply to two defendants, the argument goes, then "several" would be unnecessary. This argument relies on the canon against surplusage, which states that as a general rule, "[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). Thus, each word must be given a distinct and non-identical meaning. State v. Thonesavanh , 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017).

Initially, we observe that the canon against surplusage, "like all other canons, ... must be applied with judgment and discretion, and with careful regard to context." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012). As Scalia and Garner explain, "Sometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of substance, either out of a flawed sense of style or to engage in the ill-conceived but lamentably common belt-and-suspenders approach." Id. at 176-77. In other words, context matters.

First, Section 542.10 begins with one long block paragraph, which lists several rules for transfer of venue in single-defendant cases, before switching mid-paragraph from the singular to address transfer of venue in situations involving multiple defendants. Even if we were to apply the canon against surplusage, we conclude that the word "several" serves multiple purposes in this context and is thus not superfluous. First, the text of section 542.10 refers to a singular defendant four times—in three of the instances referring to "the defendant," emphasizing the singularity—before switching to "several defendants." Including the word "several" serves the purpose of demarcating and drawing attention to this transition. The transitional function of the word "several" highlights another point in favor of appellants’ interpretation of the word as meaning "separate" or simply "more than one." It is most logical to read the word "several" as indicating a transition between the many rules for single-defendant cases and the rule for what happens in the case of more than one defendant. Even applying this canon would thus not compel us to adopt respondent's proposed definition outright.

Second, the Legislature has instructed us that "the singular includes the plural; and the plural, the singular." Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2) (2020). Under section 645.08(2), therefore, the phrase "defendants residing in different counties" could be interpreted to include "a defendant residing in a different county." It would not make sense to read this statute as "several defendant living in a different county." Under this canon, therefore, the addition of the word "several" clarifies that there must be more than one defendant living in a different county. Otherwise, assuming the singular includes the plural, this statute would...