Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1976
• Citation: 371 Mass. 186,356 N.E.2d 236
• Parties: , 14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 733, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,494 MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 236

356 N.E.2d 236

371 Mass. 186, 14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 733,

13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,494

MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued April 7, 1976.

Decided Oct. 13, 1976.

Marc S. Seigle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boston, for plaintiff.

Kalvin M. Grove, Chicago, Ill. (Robert A. Penney, Boston, with him), for defendant.

Before REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and KAPLAN, JJ.

QUIRICO, Justice.

This case raises the question, never before directly addressed by this court, whether the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission) has power to issue a subpoena duces tecum for the production of books and records during an investigation and before a finding of probable cause. We hold that, pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, §§ 3(6) and (7), the commission does have such power.

On June 10, 1971, the commission, of its own initiative, issued a complaint against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) pursuant to G.L. c. 151B, § 5, as amended through St.1969, c. 751, §§ 10--12. ¹ The complaint was accompanied by a letter addressed to Liberty Mutual indicating that the 'function of . . . (the) charge is to initiate an investigation.' The letter asked that a questionnaire relating to the matters under investigation be filled out and returned. On July 6, 1971, Liberty Mutual notified the commission that it would not respond to the questionnaire.

On September 7, 1971, the commission issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring Liberty Mutual to produce specified books and records ² 'for examination' by the commission 'relative to a matter under investigation or in question . . ..' On September 21, Liberty Mutual filed a petition with the commission to vacate the subpoena alleging, inter alia, that the commission was without power to issue such subpoena. After amending its complaint to state more specifically the alleged unlawful employment practices referred to in the original complaint, ³ the commission, on December 17, 1971, denied Liberty Mutual's petition to vacate, withdrew items six and ten from the list of material to be produced, and ordered the production of all other items for immediate inspection.

Liberty Mutual continued to refuse compliance with the commission's subpoena. As a result, the commission brought a 'Bill of Enforcement' on January 21, 1972, ⁴ pursuant to G.L. c. 233, § 10. After a hearing in the Superior Court, the judge entered an order and judgment denying the commission's 'Bill of Enforcement' in its entirety and quashing the subpoena duces tecum. The case is before this court on appeal from that judgment, it having been transferred from the Appeals Court to this court on our motion. G.L. c. 211A, § 10(A), inserted by St.1972, c. 740, § 1.

It is well settled that the commission, as a board created by statute (G.L. c. 6, § 56, and G.L. c. 151B, both as amended), has only those powers, duties and obligations conferred upon it by statute and those reasonably necessary for its proper functioning. Scannell v. State Ballot Law Comm'n, 324 Mass. 494, 501, 87 N.E.2d 16 (1949). Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 316 Mass. 136, 141, 55 N.E.2d 254 (1944), and cases cited. The power to issue a subpoena is one which the commission would not possess absent such statutory authority. See Donatelli, Bldg. Co. v. Cranston Loan Co., 87 R.I. 293, 297, 140 A.2d 705 (1958). See also Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 Mich.L.Rev. 187, 188 (1961). Accordingly, our inquiry must begin with the statutes creating the commission and vesting powers therein.

The commission is established by G.L. c. 6, § 56, as amended, and its functions, powers and duties, in so far as this case is concerned, are prescribed by G.L. c. 151B, § 3, as amended. Pursuant to the latter statute, the commission has the power '6. (t)o receive, investigate and pass upon complaints of unlawful practices.' It also has the power '7. (t)o hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths, take the testimony of any person under oath, and in connection therewith, to require the protection for examination of any books or papers relating to any matter under investigation or in question before the commission.' It is clear that the commission has authority to order the production of books and records during the hearing stage of the proceedings. The commission argues that this power extends to the investigatory stage, claiming that the language 'relating to any matter under investigation or in question' controls. Liberty Mutual argues that the subpoena power exists only 'in connection' with hearings, relying on that particular language of the statute. It is our duty to determine which reading, if either, of the two readings is correct.

' In construing statutes, '(t)he general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated. " Board of Educ. v. Assessors of Worcester, --- Mass. ---, ---, 333 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1975), ^a quoting from Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, 326 N.E.2d 1 (1975). ^b Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934). Where there is a contradiction in the statute, '(i)t is our duty to interpret . . . (if), if possible, so 'as to make it an effectual piece of legislation in harmony with common sense and sound reason.'' Atlas Distrib. Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 354 Mass. 408, 414, 237 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1968), quoting from Morrison v. Selectmen of Weymouth, 279 Mass. 486, 492, 181 N.E. 786 (1932).

The statute in question G.L. c. 151B, 'in certain aspects lacks precision and verbal consistency.' LaPierre v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 354 Mass. 165, 174, 236 N.E.2d 192, 198 (1968). Where, as here, '(t)he draftsmanship is faulty, . . . the duty devolves upon us to give . . . (the statute) a reasonable construction.' Massachusetts Turnpike Authority v. Commonwealth, 347 Mass. 524, 528, 199 N.E.2d 175, 178 (1964). In doing so, we should take care to construe the statute to carry out the legislative intent, Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra,--- Mass. at ---, 326 N.E.2d 1; ^c Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation v. Assessors of Boston, 324 Mass. 32, 36, 84 N.E.2d 531 (1949), giving effect to all words in the statute but not overemphasizing any. Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Authority,352 Mass. 617, 618, 227 N.E.2d 357 (1967). See Commonwealth v. Mercy Hosp.,364 Mass. 515, 521, 306 N.E.2d 435 (1974). It is therefore necessary that we look to the intent of the Legislature in enacting G.L. c. 151B to determine whether the commission has power to issue a subpoena duces tecum during the course of an investigation.

General Laws c. 151B was enacted in response to the growing concern over the existence of discrimination in employment 1946 House Doc. No. 400. 'The law (was) based on the concept that opportunity for employment without discrimination is a civil right.' Governor's Committee for Racial and Religious Understanding, Public Policy Pamphlet 9 (Rev.1947), quoting from New York State Commission Against Discrimination, 'Inside Facts.' Largely, the purpose of the bill was to educate employers and employees and, through the existence of the law, to encourage an end to discrimination. 1946 House Doc. No. 400, at 6.

While the act stressed the use of 'education, persuasion, and conciliation' to eliminate discrimination, it nevertheless gave the commission considerable power to proceed where appropriate to ensure that efforts to eliminate discrimination would be successful. L. Mayhew, Law and Equal Opportunity 111 (1968). It was in this context that the power to investigate and process complaints was included among those granted to the commission.

The investigation of complaints 'is an important step in a longer process that may eventually lead to a formal hearing followed by findings and an order. G.L. c. 151B, § 5.' Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 95, 96 (1969). ⁵ Without adequate investigation, the commission's functions 'would be seriously hampered and the realization of the statute's broad and humane purposes would be materially impaired.' Ibid. Unless the commission has he power to obtain necessary information during the course of its investigations, the broad remedial purposes of the legislation cannot be effectuated, and the commission will be unable to function effectively. See Comment, 43 U.Colo.L.Rev. 345 (1971). Cf. Graniteville Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 438 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1971). A construction of the statute which leads to such a result is disfavored and should not be adopted. Stone, Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv.L.Rev. 4, 18 (1936).

It is clear that the commission has power to subpoena documents during the hearing stage. G.L. c. 151B, § 3(7). The question before us is whether that power also extends to the investigation. In light of the importance of the investigatory stage of the proceedings, ⁶ and considering the stated legislative policy that the act be 'construed liberally for the accomplishment of . . . (its) purposes,' G.L. c. 151B, § 9, as amended through St.1965, c. 397, § 7 we hold that the logical reading of G.L. c. 151B, § 3(6) and (7), when taken together, authorizes the commission to issue a subpoena duces tecum during the course of an investigation.

Our holding here is consistent with the conclusion reached by the Attorney General in his opinion on the subject. Rep. A.G., Pub. Doc. No. 12, at 95, 97 (1969). It is...