McAfee v. State, No. 10-04-00141-CR (TX 4/26/2006)
| Decision Date | 26 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-04-00141-CR.,10-04-00141-CR. |
| Parties | REGINALD D. McAFEE, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Before Cheif Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and, Justice REYNA.
McAfee appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a) (Vernon 2003). We affirm.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. In McAfee's first issue, he contends that the evidence of his identity was legally insufficient. "When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Sorto v. State, 173 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Wilhoit v. State, 638 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155, 158-59 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). "[T]he standard of review on appeal is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases." Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Id. "The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain [the] appellant's conviction is determined by evaluating the probative weight of all the evidence that the trial judge permitted the jury to consider, including erroneously admitted evidence." Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); accord Gardner v. State, 699 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
McAfee points to the absence of direct evidence. For example, investigators did not find McAfee's fingerprints at the scene of the robbery, eyewitnesses did not identify McAfee, hair in a mask and gloves used in the robbery did not match McAfee's, and McAfee was not in possession of property stolen in the robbery. The State points primarily to the following evidence. McAfee was acquainted with his accomplices, including one of them from work. The robbers used rubber gloves from their common employer, and the gloves were found in the getaway car and near McAfee's residence. The getaway car, found abandoned near McAfee's residence, had McAfee's fingerprints on it, and contained currency stolen in the robbery and a pistol, with McAfee's DNA on it, used in the robbery. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict of guilt, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that McAfee committed the offense as charged. We overrule McAfee's first issue.
Motion to Suppress Evidence. In McAfee's second and third issues, he complains of the trial court's overruling McAfee's motion to suppress evidence. "Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "An appellate court reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 402 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004); accord Corbin v. State, 85 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court should afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of the historical facts, especially when that determination involves an evaluation of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses." Masterson v. State, 155 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006); accord Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Statement. In McAfee's second issue, he contends that the trial court erred in overruling McAfee's motion to suppress evidence of McAfee's recorded oral statement. McAfee argues, "Upon being asked by [Bryan Police Department Detective Angel] Martinez whether he was willing to waive his rights, appellant responded on three separate occasions: `No, sir,' `Nope,' and `No man ain't.'" (McAfee Br. at 17 [(quoting State's Ex. D3, at 4)].)1
"No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979) (quotingMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)); see Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Yet the Fifth Amendment does not "require law enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or equivocal reference to" the privilege. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); see Lemmons v. State, 75 S.W.3d 513, 519-20 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. ref'd).
McAfee points to the following part of the interview of McAfee by Detective Martinez:
McAFEE, REGINALD: WHATEVER. (RUSTLING NOISE) NOPE.
[sic] (State's Ex. D3, at 4-5 (ellipses in orig.).) McAfee contends that officers should have ceased the interrogation when he said, "No sir."
The State points primarily to the following:
[sic] (State's Ex. D3, at 5-6 (ellipses in orig.).)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the interrogating...
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