McCarthy v. Iowa Employment Sec. Commission

• Decision Date: 04 April 1956
• Docket Number: No. 48923,48923
• Citation: 247 Iowa 760,76 N.W.2d 201
• Parties: Howard R. McCARTHY, Appellee, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, and Hi Hat Bowling Alley, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 201

76 N.W.2d 201

247 Iowa 760

Howard R. McCARTHY, Appellee, v. IOWA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, and Hi Hat Bowling Alley, Appellants.

No. 48923.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 4, 1956.

Don G. Allen, and N. C. Quiett, Des Moines, for appellants.

M. H. Morrissey, Clarion, for appellee.

SMITH, Justice.

Section 96.5, Iowa Code 1954, I.C.A., provides: 'An individual shall be disqualified for (unemployment) benefits: if he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his employer, if so found by the commission.' It is in the chapter titled 'Employment Security.'

I. The language in some aspects is so clear we have heretofore referred to it as 'plain and unambiguous.' Iowa Public Service Co. v. Rhode, 1941, 230 Iowa 751, 298 N.W. 794, 796. And we have said it must be accepted as expressing the legislative intent. Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N.W.2d 211.

But 'plain and unambiguous' language must sometimes be applied in unusual circumstances, clearly not contemplated nor clearly covered when it was formulated. Whether the process be called 'interpretation' of the language, or merely 'application' of it to unforeseen facts, we must, if reasonably possibile, avoid a result clearly contrary to the avowed purpose of the entire chapter. We said in Wolfe v. Iowa Unemployment Compensation Comm., 232 Iowa 1254, 1257, 7 N.W.2d 799, 801: 'Each case of this character must turn upon its own facts.' And we have also recognized we must consider the entire act. Iowa Public Service Co. v. Rhode, supra. 'Doubtless the language must be construed in the light both of its context and its purpose.' Stromberg Hatchery v. Iowa Employment Security Comm., 239 Iowa, 1047, 1054, 33 N.W.2d 498, 503.

The facts here are not in dispute. Plaintiff was an employee of the Farmers Produce Company in 1953, was laid off when the plant was temporarily closed and was later re-employed and worked full time from July 8 to December 28, 1954, when the plant was again closed, and he applied for unemployment compensation.

During a part of this latter period he worked evenings (commencing in August) for Hi Hat Bowling Alley (two or three nights a week) for seven or eight weeks, as a pin-setter. He quit this extra, part-time job in October, 1954, because he found the combined jobs too heavy.

Both employers were covered under the 'Employment Security' chapter. No question is raised as to plaintiff being a full-time employee of the Produce Company from July 8 to December 28, 1954, and only a part-time employee of the Bowling Alley for the limited period. It is not denied he quit the night job voluntarily without good cause attributable to either employer. But he claims no compensation credit on account of his Hi Hat employment.

The Commission held his voluntary quitting of the evening job disqualified him for all benefits accrued under both employments up the that time. The trial court reversed the decision and this appeal results.

II. Code chapter 96, I.C.A. designed to be known and cited as the "Iowa Employment Security Law" (see section 96.1) sets out a complex and elaborate legislative program 'for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.' Section 96.2, Iowa Code 1954, I.C.A. It requires employers to contribute according to certain percentages of wages (not necessary to be described here), said contributions not to be 'deducted in whole or in part from the wages paid to' employees. Code section 96.7, subsections 1 and 2, I.C.A.

Code section 96.7, I.C.A. also provides subsection 3, par. a(1) for the Commission to keep separate account for each employer and for the determination of the amount of benefits charged against his account to be based on its benefit experience. We find no reason to hold that plaintiff's part-time evening employment with Hi Hat Bowling, or its discontinuance, had anything to do with or effect upon the amounts that would be payable to plaintiff by reason of his being an employee of Farmers Produce Company. His full time employer is not a party here.

Defendant Commission argues: 'Between the time that the Plaintiff-Appellee left his employment with the Hi Hat Bowling Alley (in October) and the cessation of his work for the Farmers Produce Company (December 28) he had not earned * * * sufficient credits to be paid unemployment benefits as of the time of his application therefor. His wage credits for this period, based upon his work for the Farmers Produce Company, still stands to his credit.' This pronouncement was presumably under Code section 96.4(5), I.C.A. If allowed it would wipe out all credits he had on both employments to the date of quitting his evening job and require him to commence all over with the Produce Company. It presents the one question on appeal.

We think the termination of plaintiff's work with the Bowling Alley should have no effect upon the record of his full-time employer.

III. No Iowa decision is cited which considers Code section 96.5(1), I.C.A. in its relation to the problem here. The meaning of the words 'voluntarily without good cause' has been discussed in their relation to various situations. See e. g. Wolf's v. Iowa Employment Security Comm., 244 Iowa 999, 59 N.W.2d 216; Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Comm., 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N.W.2d 211.

But we have here a different controversy. It concerns the meaning (or application) of the words 'his work' in the clause 'if he has left his work * * *', where the claimant has (as here) simultaneously had two jobs and two employers. If in such case he quits a comparatively minor evening part-time job but retains his regular full-time employment, has he 'left his work' within the legislative intent?

This subsection does not specify 'all his work'; but neither does it say 'any of his work' or 'part of his work.' It seems not to recognize that there might be more than one 'work' and two or more concurrent employers. Some construction or...