McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr.
Decision Date | 27 December 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 85367–3.,85367–3. |
Parties | Glen A. McDEVITT, an unmarried man, Respondent, v. HARBORVIEW MEDICAL CENTER, a King County Public Hospital, and John Doe and Jane Doe; University of Washington dba UW Medicine/Physicians, and The State of Washington, a governmental entity, Petitioners. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael F. Madden, Amy Magnano, Bennett Bigelow & Leedom PS, Seattle, WA, for Petitioners.
Thomas Francis McDonough, Attorney at Law, Edmonds, WA, Mika N. Blain, Attorney at Law, Klamath Falls, OR, for Respondent.
¶ 1 In Waples v. Yi, 169 Wash.2d 152, 161, 234 P.3d 187 (2010), this court held that separation of powers principles invalidated the 90 day presuit notice requirement against medical malpractice defendants, as adopted by the legislature in RCW 7.70.100(1). The King County Superior Court then relied on Waples in invalidating RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to lawsuits against the State, including governmental agencies such as Harborview Medical Center. We reverse the King County Superior Court's denial of Harborview's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the legislature may establish conditions precedent, including presuit notice requirements, to inform the State of future cost and delay associated with court resolution of an issue.1 While recognizing the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity,2 we have often upheld similar procedural requirements for suit against the State (e.g., those codified in former RCW 4.92.110 (1977) and former RCW 4.96.020(4) (1993)). Thus, we hold that the presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to the State is a constitutionally valid statutory precondition for suit against the State because it was adopted by the legislature as provided in article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution.3
¶ 2 On July 9, 2007, Glen A. McDevitt was paragliding and crashed into tree branches that threw him onto a roof, chimney, and then the ground. He sustained a fracture to his left femur and underwent surgery at Harborview Medical Center on July 10, 2007. After surgery and upon discharge, McDevitt alleged in his first amended complaint that he “was taken off” anticoagulant medication. Clerk's Papers at 9. Harborview denied this allegation in its answer. On July 20, 2007, McDevitt went to the Emergency Room at Northwest Hospital because of significant swelling in his left leg, where he was diagnosed with deep venous thrombosis.
¶ 3 McDevitt filed his lawsuit against Harborview on July 20, 2010. Harborview moved for summary judgment based on the undisputed fact that McDevitt failed to comply with the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1). Harborview requested that McDevitt's lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. In response, McDevitt argued that our decision in Waples invalidated the presuit notice requirement against both private and public defendants. Harborview then argued that we did not have occasion to consider the constitutional validity of the presuit notice requirement as applied to lawsuits against the State. King County Superior Court denied Harborview's motion for summary judgment. Harborview petitioned this court for discretionary review, which was granted. McDevitt v. Harborview Med. Ctr., 171 Wash.2d 1012, 249 P.3d 1029 (2011).
¶ 4 The appropriate standard of review for an order granting or denying summary judgment is de novo, and the appellate court performs the same inquiry as the trial court. Sheikh v. Choe, 156 Wash.2d 441, 447, 128 P.3d 574 (2006). Additionally, constitutional questions are issues of law and are also reviewed de novo. City of Redmond v. Moore, 151 Wash.2d 664, 668, 91 P.3d 875 (2004).
¶ 5 Article II, section 26 of the Washington Constitution provides, “The legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the state.” This court has historically recognized that the legislature has the constitutionally sanctioned power to alter the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 291, 67 P. 583 (1902) ( ); Coulter v. State, 93 Wash.2d 205, 207, 608 P.2d 261 (1980) ( ). The legislature first exercised this constitutional authority to abolish state sovereign immunity in 1961 and subsequently amended its waiver in 1963. Former RCW 4.92.090 (1961). The current version of the statute reads as follows, “The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.” RCW 4.92.090. Subsequent court decisions read the waiver as also abolishing any derivative immunity previously available to local governmental entities. Kelso v. City of Tacoma, 63 Wash.2d 913, 916–19, 390 P.2d 2 (1964); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246, 252, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). The legislature later codified these rulings abolishing the immunity of local government entities in 1967. Former RCW 4.96.010 (1967).
¶ 6 In Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 818–19, 539 P.2d 845 (1975), we invalidated former RCW 4.96.020 (1967) as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Former RCW 4.96.020, which was passed under article II, section 26, required that notice of tort claims against the State be made within 120 days from the date the claims arose. See Hunter, 85 Wash.2d at 813, 818–19, 539 P.2d 845. Through this statute, the legislature essentially created a truncated statute of limitations of 120 days for tort claims against government entities. See id. at 813, 539 P.2d 845. Other potential plaintiffs, however, needed only to act against private defendants within the statute of limitations period of three years. Id. The court reasoned that this arrangement “produce[d] two classes of tort victims and place[d] a substantial burden on the right to bring an action of one of them.” Id. Thus, we ruled that former RCW 4.96.020 was unconstitutional on its face. See id. at 818–19, 539 P.2d 845.
¶ 7 As part of our reasoning in Hunter, we also noted that “[t]he unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity in the 1963 act thus clearly indicates that ‘the waiver of tort immunity is unbridled by procedural conditions pertaining to the consent to be sued.’ ” Id. at 818, 539 P.2d 845 (dictum) (alteration in original) (quoting Cook v. State, 83 Wash.2d 599, 613, 521 P.2d 725 (1974) (Utter, J., concurring)). This reasoning was not only unnecessary to the primary equal protection holding of the case, but subsequent decisions from this court have also allowed the legislature to establish certain conditions precedent before suit can be brought against the State. See Coulter, 93 Wash.2d at 207, 608 P.2d 261 ( ); Medina v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Benton County, 147 Wash.2d 303, 312, 53 P.3d 993 (2002) ( ); see also Debra L. Stephens & Bryan P. Harnetiaux, The Value of Government Tort Liability: Washington State's Journey from Immunity to Accountability, 30 SeattleU.L.Rev. 35, 42 (2006) () . Accordingly, the application of the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1), the statute at issue, against the State should be treated no differently.
¶ 8 In Coulter, which was decided in 1980, we distinguished Hunter and specifically noted that our decision in that case was based on an equal protection rationale, rather than on an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Coulter, 93 Wash.2d at 207, 608 P.2d 261. Additionally, we cited “the proposition that the abolition of sovereign immunity is a matter within the legislature's determination.” Id. (citing Haddenham v. State, 87 Wash.2d 145, 149, 550 P.2d 9 (1976)). There, former RCW 4.92.110 required that the plaintiff file a claim with the chief fiscal officer of the executive branch, and we reasoned that it is “clear that [the legislature] is providing ‘in what manner’ suit shall be brought against the State.” Id. (quoting article II, section 26). Ultimately, we decided that the presuit notification requirement of former RCW 4.92.110 was within the authority of the legislature to enact under article II, section 26.4Id. The same principle with respect to local government entities was also at issue in Medina v. Public Utility District No. 1. There, former RCW 4.96.020(4) required a 60 day presuit notice to local government entities in all tort actions. Medina, 147 Wash.2d at 308, 53 P.3d 993. We upheld this presuit notice requirement as being within the constitutional power of the legislature under article II, section 26.5Id. at 314–15, 53 P.3d 993.
¶ 9 Like Coulter and Medina, where presuit notice requirements were upheld under article II, section 26, the 90 day presuit notice requirement of RCW 7.70.100(1) as applied to state defendants should also be upheld under article II, section 26. In 2009, the legislature chose to exempt “claims involving injuries from health care” from the...
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