McQuillen v. Hufford
| Decision Date | 30 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV 19-0240 FC,1 CA-CV 19-0240 FC |
| Parties | IN RE the Matter of: Kelly MCQUILLEN, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Kyle HUFFORD, Respondent/Appellee. State of Arizona, ex rel., The Department of Economic Security, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Hildebrand Law, P.C., Scottsdale, By Michael P. Clancy, Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
Berkshire Law Office, P.L.L.C.., Tempe, By Keith Berkshire, Erica L. Gadberry, Co-Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant
Singer Pistiner P.C., Scottsdale, By Robert S. Singer, Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix, By JoAnn Falgout, Counsel for Real Party in Interest
OPINION
¶1 Kelly McQuillen (Mother) appeals the family court's judgment in favor of Kyle Hufford on Mother's petition for paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support, and its order denying her motion to alter or amend the judgment. Construing A.R.S. §§ 25-812 and -814 together, we hold that a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity filed with the state has the same force and effect as a court judgment and thereafter must control over all other presumptions of paternity identified within A.R.S. § 25-812(A). Because Mother failed to set forth circumstances justifying relief from the prior determination that Matthew H. (Voluntary Father) is the father of her minor child (Child), we affirm.
¶2 In October 2017, Mother petitioned to establish paternity, legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support for Child, born in 2014. Mother alleged Hufford was Child's biological father and requested genetic testing to confirm paternity. She also asked the family court to order Hufford to pay child support, both retroactive to Child's birth and into the future, as well as Mother's medical expenses related to Child's birth.
¶3 In the same petition, however, Mother admitted that Voluntary Father had voluntarily acknowledged paternity of Child in January 2016. Indeed, Mother and Voluntary Father both signed a form issued by the Arizona Department of Economic Security (ADES) entitled "Acknowledgment of Paternity" that identified Voluntary Father as Child's father. In the Acknowledgment, Mother and Voluntary Father affirmed under penalty of perjury that they signed voluntarily and understood that the Acknowledgment would result in a legal determination of paternity. They then provided the Acknowledgment to the Arizona Department of Health Services (ADHS), which amended Child's birth certificate to reflect Voluntary Father as Child's father and to change Child's last name accordingly.
¶4 Although genetic testing later confirmed Hufford is Child's biological father, Hufford moved for summary judgment, arguing Mother was precluded from seeking an order of paternity because Child already had a legal father. In her response, Mother asserted she and Voluntary Father had executed and filed the Acknowledgment of Paternity knowing it was false. Mother asked the family court to set aside the Acknowledgment on the grounds of fraud and then apply a presumption of paternity in favor of Hufford based upon the genetic test results.
¶5 After taking the matter under advisement, the family court granted Hufford's motion and dismissed the action against him. Mother moved unsuccessfully to amend the judgment, and then timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1)2 and -2101(A)(1), (2). See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C. , 240 Ariz. 420, 428, ¶ 14, 380 P.3d 659,667 (App. 2016) () (citations omitted).
¶6 Mother challenges the family court's entry of judgment in Hufford's favor, first arguing the court misapplied competing presumptions of paternity. We review both the grant of summary judgment and the interpretation of statutes de novo . Palmer v. Palmer , 217 Ariz. 67, 69-70, ¶ 7, 170 P.3d 676, 678-79 (App. 2007) (). The material facts are not in dispute. Accordingly, we will affirm if we find Hufford "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 79(a).
¶7 Resolution of this issue requires reconciliation of A.R.S. §§ 25-812 and -814 as they relate to an acknowledgment of paternity. As relevant here, A.R.S. § 25-812 allows:
the parent of a child born out of wedlock [to] establish the paternity of a child by filing ... with the clerk of the superior court, the department of economic security or the department of health services ... [a] notarized or witnessed statement that contains the social security numbers of both parents and that is signed by both parents acknowledging paternity or two separate substantially similar notarized or witnessed statements acknowledging paternity.
A.R.S. § 25-812(A)(1). "A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity made pursuant to this section is a determination of paternity and has the same force and effect as a superior court judgment." A.R.S. § 25-812(D).
¶8 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-814(A) :
Subsection (C) of A.R.S. § 25-814 provides:
Any presumption under this section shall be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. If two or more presumptions apply, the presumption that the court determines, on the facts, is based on weightier considerations of policy and logic will control. ...
¶9 Mother argues two competing presumptions of paternity exist under A.R.S. § 25-814(A) here — one that Hufford is the father under subsection (2) (genetic testing), and one that Voluntary Father is the father under subsection (4) (acknowledgment of paternity). See A.R.S. § 25-814(A). She argues the presumption of paternity based on the genetic test results has not been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and the family court erred in failing to consider which presumption was "based on weightier considerations of policy and logic" under A.R.S. § 25-814(C). Hufford argues the Acknowledgment of Paternity established Voluntary Father as the father of Child with "the same force and effect as a superior court judgment," A.R.S. § 25-812(D), such that the issue of paternity was not subject to balancing under A.R.S. § 25-814.
¶10 "Our goal in statutory interpretation is to effectuate the legislature's intent." Meno's Constr., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm'n , 246 Ariz. 521, 526, ¶ 16, 442 P.3d 828, 833 (App. 2019) (quoting SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 243 Ariz. 477, 480, ¶ 8, 413 P.3d 678, 681 (2018) ); see also Brummond v. Lucio , 243 Ariz. 360, 363-64, ¶ 13, 407 P.3d 553, 556-57 (App. 2017). "The best indicator of that intent is the statute's plain language, and when that language is unambiguous, we apply it without resorting to secondary statutory interpretation principles." Id. (quoting SolarCity , 243 Ariz. at 480, ¶ 8, 413 P.3d at 681 ). "When ‘statutes relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose[,] they should be read in connection with, or should be construed together with other related statutes, as though they constituted one law.’ " State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Pandola , 243 Ariz. 418, 419-20, ¶ 6, 408 P.3d 1254, 1255-56 (2018) ().
¶11 Any uncertainty about the effect of an acknowledgment of paternity is resolved by the legislature's directive that "[a] court decree establishing paternity of the child by another man rebuts the presumption." A.R.S. § 25-814(C). A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity filed with the state "has the same force and effect as a superior court judgment," A.R.S. § 25-812(D), and qualifies as a "court decree establishing paternity" for purposes of A.R.S. § 25-814(C). With this statement, the legislature has unambiguously expressed a preference for finality in paternity determinations — however obtained — that trumps any "weight[y] considerations of policy and logic" the parties might later advance in favor of another presumption. Indeed, a presumption of paternity has no logical effect when a child has a legal father established through the filing of an acknowledgment of paternity; the child already has a father. See Gutierrez v. Fox , 242 Ariz. 259, 269, ¶ 40, 394 P.3d 1096, 1106 (App. 2017) ().
¶12 Our interpretation does not, as Mother suggests, render A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(4) meaningless. As the statute makes clear, the mere execution of a document acknowledging paternity under that provision does not create a judgment; the acknowledgment must be filed with the state — through the clerk of the superior court, ADES, or ADHS — before it establishes paternity with "the same force and effect as a superior court judgment." See A.R.S. § 25-812(A) (...
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