Michigan Afscme Council 25 v. Woodhaven–Brownstown Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2011
• Docket Number: Docket No. 299945.
• Citation: 809 N.W.2d 444,293 Mich.App. 143
• Parties: MICHIGAN AFSCME COUNCIL 25 v. WOODHAVEN–BROWNSTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

293 Mich.App. 143

809 N.W.2d 444

MICHIGAN AFSCME COUNCIL 25

v.WOODHAVEN–BROWNSTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT.

Docket No. 299945.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 12, 2011, at Detroit.Decided May 3, 2011.Approved for publication June 16, 2011, at 9:10 a.m.

Miller Cohen, P.L.C., Detroit (by Bruce A. Miller and Robert D. Fetter), for plaintiffs.

Clark Hill PLC (by Thomas P. Brady, Mark W. McInerney, Detroit, John L. Gierak, and Sarah A. Geddes, Birmingham) for defendant.

Before: SERVITTO, P.J., and HOEKSTRA and OWENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs Michigan AFSCME Council 25 and its affiliate, Local 3552, a labor union that represents noninstructional employees of defendant Woodhaven–Brownstown School District, brought an action in circuit court to enjoin defendant from privatizing custodial, facility maintenance, and transportation work performed by members of the bargaining unit pending resolution of plaintiffs' unfair labor practice charge before the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC). The circuit court granted a preliminary injunction. Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal and this Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, peremptorily reversed the circuit court's order. Mich. AFSCME Council 25 v. Woodhaven–Brownstown Sch. Dist., unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 3, 2010 (Docket No. 299945). Thereafter, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, our Supreme Court vacated this Court's order and remanded the case to this Court for “expedited plenary consideration.” Mich. AFSCME Council 25 v. Woodhaven–Brownstown Sch. Dist., 488 Mich. 974, 790 N.W.2d 831 (2010). We again reverse the circuit court's decision and vacate the preliminary injunction.

A court's issuance of a preliminary injunction is generally considered equitable relief. Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v. City of Pontiac, 482 Mich. 1, 11, 753 N.W.2d 595 (2008). “The objective of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final hearing regarding the parties' rights.” ¹ Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Mich. v. Dep't of Community Health, 231 Mich.App. 647, 655–656, 588 N.W.2d 133 (1998). A trial court's grant of injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mich. Coalition of State Employee Unions v. Civil Serv. Comm., 465 Mich. 212, 217, 634 N.W.2d 692 (2001). “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Saffian v. Simmons, 477 Mich. 8, 12, 727 N.W.2d 132 (2007); see also Pontiac Fire Fighters, 482 Mich. at 8, 753 N.W.2d 595. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Herald Co., Inc. v. Eastern Mich. Univ. Bd. of Regents, 475 Mich. 463, 467, 719 N.W.2d 19 (2006); Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Michigan, 231 Mich.App. 549, 551, 587 N.W.2d 821 (1998). Issues involving the proper interpretation of a court rule or statute are reviewed de novo as questions of law. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 484 Mich. 483, 495, 772 N.W.2d 301 (2009); Estes v. Titus, 481 Mich. 573, 578–579, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the parties' briefs on appeal include documentary evidence that was not presented to the circuit court. Enlargement of the record on appeal is generally not permitted. Amorello v. Monsanto Corp., 186 Mich.App. 324, 330, 463 N.W.2d 487 (1990). Because neither party moved to amend the record pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(4), we shall limit our review to the record presented to the circuit court at the time it considered plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. See Golden v. Baghdoian, 222 Mich.App. 220, 222 n. 2, 564 N.W.2d 505 (1997).²

The parties do not dispute that plaintiffs had a right to seek injunctive relief from the circuit court pending resolution of its unfair labor practice charge by the MERC. Under the public employment relations act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq. , a charging party may petition a circuit court for “appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, in accordance with the general court rules, and the court shall have jurisdiction to grant to the commission or any charging party such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.” MCL 423.216(h). Therefore, plaintiffs had the burden of showing that a preliminary injunction should be issued. MCR 3.310(A)(4). “Traditional equity principles are a circuit court's guide to whether injunctive relief is ‘just and proper’.” Local 229, Mich. Council 25, AFSCME, AFL–CIO v. Detroit, 124 Mich.App. 791, 794–795 n. 3, 335 N.W.2d 695 (1983).

We decline plaintiffs' invitation to apply the standards adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ahearn v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 351 F.3d 226 (C.A.6, 2003), in considering whether to grant temporary injunctive relief to the National Labor Relations Board under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(j), to determine whether injunctive relief was appropriate in this case. Plaintiffs did not present this argument to the circuit court, leaving it unpreserved for appeal. See City of Riverview v. Sibley Limestone, 270 Mich.App. 627, 633 n. 4, 716 N.W.2d 615 (2006). Indeed, the circuit court applied the four-part test urged by plaintiffs below, except that it considered the likelihood of plaintiffs succeeding on the merits in place of the “futility” factor proposed in plaintiffs' motion. A party may not take one position in the trial court and then seek redress in an appeal on a contrary ground. Phinney v. Perlmutter, 222 Mich.App. 513, 544, 564 N.W.2d 532 (1997).

Moreover, we note that federal circuit courts disagree on the appropriateness of the standard for granting injunctive relief applied by the Sixth Circuit in Ahearn. See Muffley ex rel. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 541–543 (C.A.4, 2009) (adopting a traditional equitable test). In light of this Court's decision in Local 229, 124 Mich.App. at 794–795 n. 3, 335 N.W.2d 695, that traditional equitable principles apply, we agree that the circuit court applied the proper test for evaluating whether to grant a preliminary injunction. Nonetheless, we conclude that the circuit court failed to reach a reasonable and principled decision in its evaluation and application of the relevant factors.

When deciding whether to grant an injunction under traditional equitable principles,

a court must consider (1) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction will prevail on the merits, (2) the danger that the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, (3) the risk that the party seeking the injunction would be harmed more by the absence of an injunction than the opposing party would be by the granting of the relief, and (4) the harm to the public interest if the injunction is issued. [ Alliance for the Mentally Ill, 231 Mich.App. at 660–661, 588 N.W.2d 133.]

With respect to the first factor, we note that our Supreme Court has declined to consider a party's likelihood of success on the merits when the irreparable-harm factor was not established. Pontiac Fire Fighters, 482 Mich. at 13 n. 21, 753 N.W.2d 595. Therefore, we shall first consider the irreparable-harm factor.

The irreparable-harm factor is considered an indispensable requirement for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 8–9, 753 N.W.2d 595. It requires a particularized showing of irreparable harm. Id. at 9, 753 N.W.2d 595. “[I]t is well settled that an injunction will not lie upon the mere apprehension of future injury or where the threatened injury is speculative or conjectural.” Dunlap v. City of Southfield, 54 Mich.App. 398, 403, 221 N.W.2d 237 (1974); see also Pontiac Fire Fighters, 482 Mich. at 9 n. 15, 753 N.W.2d 595. The injury is evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances affecting, and the alternatives available to, the party seeking injunctive relief. State Employees Ass'n v. Dep't of Mental Health, 421 Mich. 152, 167, 365 N.W.2d 93 (1984). “Equally important is that a preliminary injunction should not issue where an adequate legal remedy is available.” Pontiac Fire Fighters, 482 Mich. at 9, 753 N.W.2d 595.

In finding a danger of irreparable harm in this case, the circuit court focused on the loss of health insurance benefits to members of the bargaining unit if they were to be laid off pending the resolution of the unfair labor practice charge. In State Employees Ass'n, 421 Mich. at 167 n. 10, 365 N.W.2d 93, our Supreme Court noted that certain circumstances, such as the loss of health insurance benefits, might be sufficient to establish irreparable harm to an employee affected by the loss of employment when there is a “serious immediate or ongoing need for medical treatment,” but the State Employees Ass'n Court was not presented with a request for injunctive relief on that ground. The plaintiff in that case was a discharged civil service employee who sought a preliminary injunction pending the resolution of a grievance procedure. She alleged that she would not be able to feed herself and her son if the defendant was not restrained from discharging her and stopping her pay. Id. at 167, 365 N.W.2d 93. The trial court took no testimony and admitted no evidence before granting the preliminary injunction. Id. at 168, 365 N.W.2d 93. In remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings, the Supreme Court held:

We do not hold that the absence of usable resources and of obtainable alternative sources of income with which to support one's self and one's dependents, coupled with the prospect of destitution, serious physical harm, or loss of irreplaceable treasured possessions, could never support a finding of irreparable injury in an appropriate case. We merely hold that the issuance of a preliminary injunction preventing discharge pending final decision in the civil service grievance...