Mobile MRI Staffing LLC v. Meemic Ins. Co.

• Docket Number: 355162
• Decision Date: 20 January 2022
• Parties: MOBILE MRI STAFFING LLC, doing business as METRO MRI CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

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MOBILE MRI STAFFING LLC, doing business as METRO MRI CENTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 355162

Court of Appeals of Michigan

January 20, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Washtenaw Circuit Court LC No. 20-000783-AV

Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Servitto and Rick, JJ.

Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals by leave granted^[1] the circuit court order denying defendant's application for leave to appeal the denial of its motion for summary disposition in the district court because there was no "need for appellate review." We reverse.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 11, 2018, Sherita Minor was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Minor had no-fault insurance through defendant. On July 28, 2018, plaintiff took three magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans of Minor's back and charged $5, 000 for each MRI. The parties do not dispute that Minor assigned her rights to pursue and collect benefits for the MRIs to plaintiff. On April 3, 2019, defendant paid $1, 300 per MRI to plaintiff. On November 13, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in the 15th District Court seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits of the full amount billed for the three MRIs. Defendant moved in the district court for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on June 3, 2020, arguing plaintiff's complaint, which was filed more than one year after the MRI expenses were incurred, violated the one-year- back rule, ^[2] MCL 500.3145(1). A hearing was held in the district court on July 24, 2020. The district court denied summary disposition to defendant. Defendant applied for leave to appeal the July 24, 2020 order to the circuit court, which the circuit court denied because it was not persuaded that appellate review was warranted. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Michigan, a party may move the court for summary disposition in their favor. MCR 2.116(B)(1). Such a motion must be supported by depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3), (4).

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny summary disposition. Varela v Spanski, 329 Mich.App. 58, 68; 941 N.W.2d 60 (2019). The de novo standard of review means that we review the issues independently, without deference to the trial court's decision. Washington v Washington, 283 Mich.App. 667, 671; 770 N.W.2d 908 (2009), citing In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 243 Mich.App. 697, 714 n 33; 624 N.W.2d 443 (2000). A reviewing court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Dalley v Dykema Gossett, PLLC, 287 Mich.App. 296, 304-305; 788 N.W.2d 679 (2010).

The district court denied defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), ^[3] which allows a party to move for dismissal of an action where "[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim based on the factual allegations in the complaint." El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich. 152, 159 160; 934 N.W.2d 665 (2019), citing Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp, 475 Mich. 663, 672; 719 N.W.2d 1 (2006). "When considering such a motion, a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone." El-Khalil, 504 Mich. at 160, citing Bailey v Schaaf, 494 Mich. 595, 603; 835 N.W.2d 413 (2013); see also Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). However, "the mere statement of a pleader's conclusions, unsupported by allegations of fact, will not suffice to state a cause of action." ETT Ambulance Serv Corp v Rockford Ambulance, 204 Mich.App. 392, 395; 516 N.W.2d 498 (1994). "Summary disposition on the basis of [MCR 2.116](C)(8) should be granted only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery." Bedford v Witte, 318 Mich.App. 60, 64; 896 N.W.2d 69 (2016), citing Dalley, 287 Mich.App. at 305; see also Maiden, 461 Mich. at 119.

We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, including whether a statute applies retroactively. Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich. 417, 428-429; 818 N.W.2d 279 (2012); In re Estate of Moukalled, 269 Mich.App. 708, 713; 714 N.W.2d 400 (2006), citing Roan v Murray, 219 Mich.App. 562, 565; 556 N.W.2d 893 (1996). The de novo standard of review applies to our interpretation of both Michigan statutes and the Michigan Rules of Court. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Corby Energy Servs, Inc, 271 Mich.App. 480, 483; 722 N.W.2d 906 (2006); Webb v Holzheuer, 259 Mich.App. 389, 391; 674 N.W.2d 395 (2003).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

"The one-year-back rule is designed to limit the amount of benefits recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought." Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 491 Mich. 200, 203; 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). Before it was amended in 2019, the statute read:

An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced . . . . [MCL.500.3145(1) (emphasis added).]

MCL 500.3145 was amended by 2019 PA 21, effective June 11, 2019, and now states, in relevant part:

(2)Subject to subsection (3), if the notice has been given or a payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent allowable expense, work loss, or survivor's loss has been incurred. However, the claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1 year before the date on which the action was commenced.

(3) A period of limitations applicable under subsection (2) to the commencement of an action and the recovery of benefits is tolled from the date of a specific claim for payment of the benefits until the date the insurer formally denies the claim. This subsection does not apply if the person claiming the benefits fails to pursue the claim with reasonable diligence. [MCL 500.3145(2), (3) (emphasis added).]

The amendments to MCL 500.3145 were to be given "immediate effect." 2019 PA 21.

The Legislature's intent governs whether a statute applies retroactively or prospectively. Johnson, 491 Mich. at 429. "Statutes are presumed to apply prospectively unless the Legislature clearly manifests the intent for retroactive application." Id. For instance, in MCL 141.1157, the Legislature stated the amended act "shall be applied retroactively . . . ." MCL 141.1157. Retroactive application, on the other hand, is not common or presumed. As our Supreme Court explained in LaFontaine:

Retroactive application of legislation "presents problems of unfairness . . . because it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions." We have therefore required that the Legislature make its intentions clear when it seeks to pass a law with retroactive effect. In determining whether a law has retroactive effect, we keep four principles in mind. First, we consider whether there is specific language providing for retroactive application. Second, in some situations, a statute is not regarded as operating retroactively merely because it relates to an antecedent event. Third, in determining retroactivity, we must keep in mind that retroactive laws impair vested rights acquired under existing laws or create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past. Finally, a remedial or procedural act not affecting vested rights may be given retroactive effect where the injury or claim is antecedent to the enactment of the statute. [LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC, 496 Mich. 26, 38-39; 852 N.W.2d 78 (2014) (citation omitted).]

"Michigan courts have followed the general rule that the relevant inquiry in determining the applicability of a statute is the date on which the cause of action arose." Hill v Gen Motors Acceptance Corp, 207 Mich.App. 504, 513-514; 525 N.W.2d 905 (1994). "The substantive rights and liabilities of parties are determinable according to the law as it stood when the causes alleged by the plaintiff accrued." Jones v Williams, 172 Mich.App. 167, 171; 431 N.W.2d 419 (1988). Generally, a claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done. MCL 600.5827. The "wrong" is the date on which the plaintiff is harmed. Frank v Linkner, 500 Mich. 133, 147; 894 N.W.2d 574 (2017).

The issue in this case essentially boils down to whether the preamendment version of MCL 500.3145, or the amended version of MCL 500.3145, applies. If the preamendment version of the one-year-back rule applies in this case, then plaintiff's action must be dismissed as untimely. The claim accrued on July 28, 2018, when the three MRIs were taken, and plaintiff failed to file a complaint until November 13, 2019, over a year later. If, on the other hand, the amended version of the one-year-back rule applies, plaintiff's claim was timely and the district court did not err in denying summary disposition. The one-year period did not begin until April 3,...