DelSanto v. Hyundai Motor Finance Co., No. 2003-227-APPEAL.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROBINSON, Justice.
• Citation: 882 A.2d 561
• Docket Number: No. 2003-227-APPEAL.
• Decision Date: 12 August 2005
• Parties: Donna DELSANTO, Administratrix of the Estate of Geraldine DelSanto et al. v. HYUNDAI MOTOR FINANCE CO., et al.

882 A.2d 561

Donna DELSANTO, Administratrix of the Estate of Geraldine DelSanto et al.
v.
HYUNDAI MOTOR FINANCE CO., et al

No. 2003-227-APPEAL.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

August 12, 2005.

Gerrick Van Deusen, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Robert J. Quigley, Jr., Providence, for Defendant.

Before: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

882 A.2d 562

OPINION

Introduction

ROBINSON, Justice.

In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Donna DelSanto, acting in her capacity as the Administratrix of the Estate of Geraldine DelSanto (DelSanto), appeals from the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hyundai Motor Finance Company (Hyundai), with respect to her wrongful death claim against that entity.¹

The factual background of this case, although tragic, is quite simple. (Indeed the parties are in agreement as to the facts that are pertinent to this appeal.) By contrast, the legal terrain that lies before us is more complex: there are several different statutes that are at least potentially implicated by this case, and harmonizing those statutes is a challenging task. We are nevertheless convinced that the statutory provisions relied upon by the parties can, in the end, be harmonized in a logical and intellectually honest manner.² For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Cranston on July 26, 1999. At the time of the accident, the decedent, Geraldine DelSanto, was a passenger in a vehicle being operated by her daughter, Patricia DelSanto. The decedent was killed when the vehicle in which she was riding was struck from behind by a vehicle owned by Hyundai, leased to one Doris White, and operated by one Joseph Gould.

Not long after the accident, on October 28, 1999, the plaintiff, Donna DelSanto, acting in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Geraldine DelSanto, executed a settlement agreement entitled: "Joint Prorata Tort-Feasor Release." By its terms, the agreement released Joseph Gould, Doris White, and White's insurer, Progressive Northern Insurance Company, from "any and all claims, actions, and causes of action * * * arising out of an accident that occurred at or near Elmwood Avenue, Cranston, RI on or about the 26th day of July, 1999." (Emphasis omitted.)

Approximately two years later, on October 16, 2001, plaintiffs commenced the instant action in the Superior Court.

Count 1 of the complaint asserted that the lessor, Hyundai, was vicariously liable for the wrongful death of Geraldine DelSanto because, when the accident occurred, Gould was negligently driving the leased vehicle with the lessee's permission.³ The basic premise of DelSanto's

882 A.2d 563

position was that, as the owner of the motor vehicle, Hyundai was jointly and severally liable for Gould's actions.⁴

Thereafter, Hyundai filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Donna DelSanto's execution of the October 28, 1999 release barred the wrongful death claim against Hyundai as a matter of law pursuant to G.L.1956 chapter 6 of title 10 (the "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act").⁵

The motion justice granted Hyundai's motion for summary judgment. She held that, pursuant to the provisions of G.L. 1956 (1994 Reenactment) § 31-33-6,⁶ Gould (who was driving the leased vehicle with permission) was an agent of the lessor, Hyundai, and that, as a matter of law, they constituted a single tortfeasor for purposes of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Continuing with her analysis, the motion justice concluded that, even though G.L.1956 § 31-34-4⁷ does not contain the same explicit agency language as § 31-33-6, these statutes must be read in conjunction with each other. She then proceeded to hold that, in view of her understanding of our reasoning in DiQuinzio v. Panciera Lease Co., 612 A.2d 40 (R.I.1992), "there is no direct liability for Hyundai, rather it is based on [Gould's] liability." The motion justice held that DelSanto's claim must fail, because the release which she signed on October 28, 1999, specifically released Gould and thereby, as a matter of law, released Hyundai. This appeal followed.⁸

882 A.2d 564

This matter first came before this Court in March, 2004, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised should not be summarily decided. At that time the Court concluded that cause had been shown, and therefore the matter was placed on the regular calendar for full briefing and oral argument

In an order that we issued on March 19, 2004, in which we indicated our desire for full briefing, we specifically requested that, among other issues, the parties brief the following question:

"whether the language of G.L.1956 § 31-34-4, providing that the owner and operator of `a for hire motor vehicle * * * shall be jointly and severally liable' for damages caused by the negligence of `any person operating the vehicle by or with the permission of the owner' is inconsistent with the language of G.L.1956 § 31-33-6 (providing that the driver of a vehicle who causes it to be operated upon any public highway `with the consent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, thereof, expressed or implied * * * shall in the case of an accident be deemed to be the agent of the owner, or lessee, or bailee, of the motor vehicle') and with the language of G.L.1956 § 10-6-2 (providing that a principal and agent are to be considered a single tortfeasor for purposes of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act)."

Thereafter, oral argument took place on December 9, 2004, and we now address the important statutory interpretation issues that this case implicates.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a motion justice's decision to grant a summary judgment motion on a de novo basis. Martellini v. Little Angels Day Care, Inc., 847 A.2d 838, 842 (R.I.2004); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d 856, 859 (R.I.1997). In carrying out that de novo review, this Court utilizes the same standards and criteria as were employed by the motion justice; and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I. 1996); O'Hara v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 574 A.2d 135, 136 (R.I. 1990). We will affirm a summary judgment if we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 750 (R.I.2004).⁹

Analysis

For plaintiff's claim against Hyundai to remain viable after the execution of the release document that included Gould among the releasees, plaintiff must establish that Hyundai was a joint tortfeasor. The plain fact is that Hyundai is not (and never was with respect to this case) a tortfeasor or a joint tortfeasor in either the usual sense or the legal sense of those expressions.¹⁰ Hyundai's liability, if any, would have come about because of a legal

882 A.2d 565

fiction imposed by statute...