Morgan v. State
| Decision Date | 03 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC20-641 |
| Parties | DARRYL LEN MORGAN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Direct Conflict of Decisions Pinellas County Second District - Case No. 2D18-4940
Howard L. "Rex" Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Maureen E. Surber, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit Bartow, Florida, for Petitioner
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, Carla Suzanne Bechard, Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Allison C. Heim, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent
We have for review Morgan v. State, 293 So.3d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), in which the Second District Court of Appeal held that an order granting a rule 3.800(a)[1] motion and determining that a sentence was illegal was not a final order but remained subject to reconsideration until a final order imposing a corrected sentence was entered. We accepted jurisdiction based on the Second District's certification of conflict. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Based on the nature of proceedings to correct an illegal sentence under rule 3.800(a), we agree with the conclusion reached by the Second District.
I
In 1979, Darryl Len Morgan was convicted-based on a nolo contendere plea-of second-degree murder for an offense committed when he was a juvenile. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Morgan, 293 So.3d at 1082. In September 2016 Morgan filed a rule 3.800(a) motion claiming that this sentence was an illegal sentence. Id. His claim relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and this Court's interpretation of Miller in Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016). Miller held "that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" 567 U.S. at 465. In Atwell, this Court held that the imposition on a juvenile of a sentence of life with the possibility of parole under "Florida's existing parole system" was "virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole" and was "therefore unconstitutional." 197 So.3d at 1041. Based on this case law, in January 2017, the trial court entered an order granting Morgan's motion, ruling that the life-with-the-possibility-of-parole sentence was an illegal sentence. Morgan, 293 So.3d at 1082. This order did not purport to vacate the sentence, but simply ordered that steps be taken to conduct a resentencing hearing.
That resentencing hearing was-at the repeated request of Morgan-delayed for an extended period until it was finally set to take place on August 17, 2018. Id. But the landscape of Florida law changed dramatically before the resentencing could occur. On July 12, 2018, State v. Michel issued, receding from Atwell and holding "that juvenile offenders' sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 25 years do not violate the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution as delineated by the United States Supreme Court." State v. Michel, 257 So.3d 3, 4 (Fla. 2018). Citing Michel, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting Morgan's rule 3.800(a) motion. Ultimately, the State's motion was granted, the prior order granting the rule 3.800(a) motion was vacated, and Morgan's motion was denied. Morgan then appealed to the Second District.
In the Second District, Morgan contended that the order entered in January 2017 determining his sentence to be an illegal sentence was final and that the lower court was accordingly without jurisdiction to reconsider that order. Morgan, 293 So.3d at 1082. Relying on its earlier decisions interpreting rule 3.800(a) in State v. Rudolf, 821 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Stewart v. State, 647 So.2d 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), the Second District rejected Morgan's argument. 293 So.3d at 1083-84. The court also cited the decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal in State v. Huerta, 38 So.3d 883, 884-85 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), and the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State v. Delvalle, 745 So.2d 541, 542 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), both of which held-like Rudolf and Stewart- that rule 3.800(a) proceedings are not final until a resentencing order is entered because prior to that point judicial labor is still required. 293 So.3d at 1084.
The Second District certified conflict with the decisions of the First District Court of Appeal in Jordan v. State, 81 So.3d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and Simmons v. State, 274 So.3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), the Fourth District in Jones v. State, 279 So.3d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Magill v. State, 287 So.3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), together with their progeny. 293 So.3d at 1086. Although all of these conflict cases addressed the same question concerning finality in rule 3.800(a) proceedings that is presented by the case now on review, they each relied on precedent from this Court interpreting the application of rule 3.850. Jordan relied on State v. White, 470 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 1985), which recognized the right of the state to appeal an order vacating a death sentence in proceedings under rule 3.850. Jordan, 81 So.3d at 596. Simmons, Jones, and Magill all relied on Taylor v. State, 140 So.3d 526, 528 (Fla. 2014), which in interpreting rule 3.850 held that "an order disposing of a postconviction motion which partially denies and partially grants relief is a final order for purposes of appeal, even if the relief granted requires subsequent action in the underlying case, such as resentencing." See Magill, 287 So.3d at 1262-63; Jones, 279 So.3d at 173-74; Simmons, 274 So.3d at 471-72.
The Second District concluded that because it "addressed rule 3.850 collateral attacks . . . rather than only illegal sentences under rule 3.800(a)," Taylor was not controlling. Morgan, 293 So.3d at 1085.
The Second District pointed out that Taylor's analysis relied on the provision of rule 3.850(f)(8)(C), which states that the "order issued after the evidentiary hearing shall resolve all the claims raised in the motion and shall be considered the final order for purposes of appeal," to support its conclusion that a resentencing proceeding after the granting of 3.850 relief was a new and separate proceeding. 293 So.3d at 1083 (quoting Taylor, 140 So.3d at 529). In distinguishing Taylor-as well as White-the court stated: "Unlike rule 3.850, rule 3.800 does not state that an order resolving 'all the claims raised in the motion' shall be a final order." Id. The court also observed that unlike rule 3.850 proceedings, which create a "new, separate proceeding" from the underlying criminal case, a rule 3.800 motion is "filed in continuation of the original criminal proceeding." Id. (quoting Rudolf, 821 So.2d at 386).
In support of its conclusion accepting the State's argument that reconsideration of the order granting Morgan's motion was proper, the Second District also relied on the provisions of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c), which authorizes the State to appeal orders "granting relief under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.801, 3.850, 3.851, or 3.853"-notably omitting any reference to rule 3.800. Morgan, 293 So.3d at 1084 (quoting Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(J)).
After the Second District decided Morgan, the en banc First District in Rogers v. State, 296 So.3d 500, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020), held that orders granting relief under rule 3.800(a) are "not final or appealable until resentencing has occurred"-thus aligning itself with Morgan () and receding from Jordan, Simmons and their progeny. But the law of the Fourth and Fifth Districts has remained in conflict with Morgan.
III
In his challenge to the Second District's decision, Morgan argues that the trial court order granting his rule 3.800(a) motion was a final order (even if not appealable) and was therefore not subject to reconsideration. In support of this argument, he relies primarily on our decision in Taylor, and contends that on the issue of finality there is no relevant difference between rule 3.850 and rule 3.800(a). Morgan emphasizes Taylor's statement that "postconviction proceedings and resentencing proceedings are separate, legally discrete proceedings." 140 So.3d at 529. He further reasons that judicial labor is complete once a court enters an order granting a motion under either rule 3.850 or rule 3.800(a), and that under either rule a resentencing proceeding is a distinct proceeding. Recognizing that rule 9.140(c)(1)(J) supports the conclusion that an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is not appealable by the State, Morgan nonetheless asserts that such orders are final. Morgan cites as supplemental authority State v. Jackson, 306 So.3d 936, 945 (Fla. 2020), in which we held that an order vacating a death sentence in a successive rule 3.851 proceeding was final and the sentence could not be "retroactively reinstated" based on a change in the governing law that occurred prior to resentencing.[2]
The State contends that the order granting Morgan's rule 3.800(a) motion was nonfinal and therefore was-as the Second District ruled-subject to reconsideration. The State responds to Morgan's reliance on Taylor by arguing that because rule 3.800(a) is "entirely different" from rule 3.850, Taylor's application of rule 3.850 is not controlling here. In distinguishing Taylor the State- like the Morgan court-points to Taylor's...
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