Munson v. Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co.
| Decision Date | 13 September 1943 |
| Citation | 314 Mass. 485,50 N.E.2d 633 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | WARREN ALBERT MUNSON v. BAY STATE DREDGING & CONTRACTING CO. |
October 6, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE LUMMUS, QUA, DOLAN, COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Motor Vehicle Registration. Negligence, Contributory, Violation of law Motor vehicle. Evidence, Presumptions and burden of proof. Pleading, Civil, Answer. Practice, Civil, Appellate Division appeal; New trial; Findings by judge. Error, Whether error harmful. Words, "Mistake."
An allegation of contributory negligence in the answer in an action for personal injuries and damage to the plaintiff's automobile sustained in a collision on a public way with an automobile of the defendant permitted the defendant to show that at the time of the collision the plaintiff's automobile was being operated without lawful registration.
An appeal from a final decision by an Appellate Division dismissing a report of a new trial of the action which had been ordered by it in a previous decision brought both decisions to this court for review.
On appeal from a final decision by an Appellate Division dismissing a report of a second trial erroneously ordered by the Appellate Division when there had been no error at the first trial, the party prevailing at the first trial was entitled to reversal of both decisions and to judgment on the finding at the first trial.
On certain evidence and subsidiary findings by the judge in an action where the only issue was the validity of the registration of the plaintiff's automobile, a general finding for the defendant imported findings that the plaintiff's place of residence had been misstated in his application for registration and in the certificate thereof and that the misstatement was not a "mistake" within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section
9, as amended by St. 1934, c. 361.
A defendant seeking to establish want of registration of the plaintiff's motor vehicle in an action for injuries resulting from its collision with a motor vehicle of the defendant had the burden of proving that a misstatement of the plaintiff's place of residence in his application for registration and in the certificate thereof was not a "mistake" within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 9, as amended by St. 1934, c.
361.
A statement in an application for registration of an automobile and in the certificate thereof, that the applicant's place of residence was at an address in Cambridge at which his estranged wife lived and he received his mail and through which he could always be located, whereas in fact he lived in a rooming house in Boston from which he was frequently absent on business, was a misstatement which properly could be found not to be a "mistake" within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 9, as amended by St. 1934, c. 361.
A misstatement of the applicant's place of residence in an application for registration of a motor vehicle and in the certificate thereof, if not a
"mistake" within G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 9, as amended by St. 1934, c. 361, as a matter of law invalidates the registration notwithstanding the facts that the applicant's name and "address" are correctly stated and that the misstatement does not interfere with the easy identification of him and of the vehicle.
Refusal of a request by the plaintiff setting forth correctly a statement of law relating to a material matter was not prejudicial error where a finding for the defendant made by the judge on another ground determinative of the case was warranted.
TORT. Writ in the District Court of Chelsea dated November 4, 1936. The case was heard at the first trial by Crowley, J.
In this court the case was argued at the bar in October, 1941, before Field, C.J., Donahue, Qua, Cox, & Ronan, JJ., and afterwards was submitted on briefs to all the Justices.
P. S. Ratzkoff, for the defendant. N. H. Ponn, for the plaintiff.
This is an action of tort for personal injuries and damage to an automobile, sustained by the plaintiff on July 9, 1936, when his automobile in which he was riding on Preble Street in Boston came into collision with an automobile owned by the defendant and operated by its servant. There was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's servant, and the defendant offered no defence on that question. In its answer the defendant did not set up want of legal registration of the plaintiff's automobile, but did set up his contributory negligence. Since it is a misdemeanor for the resident owner of a motor vehicle to "permit the same to be operated upon or to remain upon any way unless such vehicle is registered in accordance with this chapter" (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 90, Sections 9, 20), and a violation of that statute is evidence of negligence which can be found to be contributory, the answer opened the defence of contributory negligence in permitting the plaintiff's automobile to be operated on a way without lawful registration. MacDonald v. Boston Elevated Railway, 262 Mass. 475 , 476. Capano v. Melchionno, 297 Mass. 1 , 16, MacInnis v. Morrissey,
298 Mass. 505 , 509. VanDresser v. Firlings, 305 Mass. 51 , 56. Burns v. Winchell, 305 Mass. 276 , 277, 278. Conningford v. Cote, 308 Mass. 472 , 475, 476. Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269 , 274. "Where, as here, absence of legal registration could be shown under the pleadings as evidence of contributory negligence -- as well as in cases where it is specially pleaded -- the burden of proving that the motor . . . [vehicle] was not registered as required by law was on the defendant." Burns v. Winchell, 305 Mass. 276, 278. LeBlanc v. Cutler Co. 305 Mass. 283 , 285. Dunn v. Merrill, 309 Mass. 174 , 175. Russell v. Holland, 309 Mass. 187 , 190.
At the first trial the judge found for the defendant. On a report, the Appellate Division decided that there had been prejudicial error in the denial of the plaintiff's request for a ruling numbered 10, and ordered a new trial. On the new trial, another judge found for the plaintiff. A second report, made by the latter judge, was dismissed by the Appellate Division, and the defendant appealed to this court. That appeal brought here all questions of law involved in either decision of the Appellate Division. The first question for us to consider is whether there was error at the first trial, for if there was none judgment must be entered upon the finding for the defendant made at that trial, and all subsequent proceedings become of no consequence. Weiner v. Pictorial Paper Package Corp. 303 Mass. 123 , 128, 129. Marquis v. Messier, 303 Mass. 553 , 555. See also Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597 , 600, 601; Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375; Holden v. Bloom, ante, 309.
At the first trial there was evidence of the following facts. The plaintiff lived in a rooming house at 4 Ringold Street in Boston, and never lived in Cambridge. But his estranged wife lived at 24 Windsor Street in Cambridge, and he received his mail at that address. He could have been located at any time through that address, for his wife always knew where he lived. His business took him out of town often. With the consent of his wife, he registered his automobile from 24 Windsor Street in Cambridge. Instead of using a garage, he parked his automobile in the street in front of her house in Cambridge, but at various times kept it in a garage in Cambridge. At other times he kept it at 4 Ringold Street in Boston. Apparently the judge was entitled to believe as much or as little of this evidence as he thought proper. The judge expressly found as follows: "I find that the plaintiff lived in Boston and that the car was garaged in Boston."
An application for the registration of a motor vehicle must contain "a statement of the name, place of residence and address of the applicant." G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 2. It is true that the main purpose of these requirements is to insure easy identification of the vehicle and its owner in case of accident. Di Cecca v. Bucci, 278 Mass. 15 , 16. Ricker v. Boston Elevated Railway, 290 Mass. 111 , 113. Broadmerkle v. Gorolsky, 293 Mass. 517, 518. Doyle v. Goldberg, 294 Mass. 105 , 107. Caverno v. Houghton, 294 Mass. 110, 112, 113. Lappanasse v. Loomis, 297 Mass. 290 , 292. Santa Maria v. Trotto, 297 Mass. 442 , 445. Sanjean v. Hyman, 302 Mass. 224 , 225. Bridges v. Hart, 302 Mass. 239 , 243, 244. Russell v. Holland, 309 Mass. 187, 192. Matherson v. Dickson, 310 Mass. 18 , 20. But the three requirements of name, place of residence and address are of equal importance under the statute, and no one of them may be ignored even though identification through the other two would be easy. Crean v. Boston Elevated Railway, 292 Mass. 226 , 227, 228. Brodmerkle v. Gorolsky, 293 Mass. 517, 518. Faria v. Veras, 298 Mass. 117 , 121. Gray v. Hatch, 299 Mass. 105, 106. A statement of these requirements is not on the same footing as a statement of some fact not expressly required by the statute itself. Dunn v. Merrill, 309 Mass. 174 , 176. Apart from the statutory provision as to "mistake," hereinafter discussed, these statutory requirements as to name, place of residence and address must be met, not only in the application made out by the applicant but also in the certificate of registration issued by the registrar of motor vehicles, or the registration is not lawful. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 2. Brodmerkle v. Gorolsky, 293 Mass. 517 , 518. Lappanasse v. Loomis, 297 Mass. 290. Faria v. Veras, 298 Mass. 117 , 121.
We interpret the evidence that the plaintiff's automobile was registered "from" his wife's house in Cambridge as meaning that that house was stated in the application and the certificate of registration as the place of residence as well as the address of the plaintiff....
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