Owens v. District of Columbia, No. 08-CV-1647.

• Docket Nº: No. 08-CV-1647.
• Citation: 993 A.2d 1085
• Case Date: April 29, 2010
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

993 A.2d 1085

Rebecca OWENS, Appellant,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 08-CV-1647.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued March 24, 2010.

Decided April 29, 2010.

993 A.2d 1086

Thomas T. Ruffin, Jr., for appellant.

Richard S. Love, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KRAMER, FISHER, and BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Associate Judges.

FISHER, Associate Judge:

Granting the District of Columbia's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Superior Court dismissed appellant's suit (which alleged violations of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA)) because she had not filed timely notice of her claim as required by D.C.Code § 12-309 (2001). We agree that § 12-309 applies to suits for unliquidated damages against the District of Columbia under the DCHRA, and therefore affirm.¹

993 A.2d 1087

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Rebecca Owens alleged that, while employed at the Department of Mental Health (DMH), she was unable to work from March until September 2004 due to carpal tunnel syndrome. When she returned to work on September 20, 2004, she requested a reasonable accommodation, which the DMH denied. In November 2004, Ms. Owens complained internally about this denial, and asserted that her workplace duties and the authority she previously enjoyed had been revoked. The most recent instance of allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory action occurred when she requested a promotion, which the DMH denied on March 2, 2005.

On March 18, 2005, sixteen days after she was denied the promotion, Ms. Owens completed a DMH Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office complaint form. The EEO office finalized its report approximately ten months later and, shortly thereafter, on February 10, 2006, Ms. Owens filed an administrative complaint with the Office of Human Rights (OHR). The OHR dismissed the complaint as "not timely" on May 9, 2006. On July 19, 2006, Ms. Owens sent a letter to the Mayor (received at the Office of Risk Management (ORM) that same day) purporting to satisfy the statutory notice requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309 (2001). Ms. Owens filed this lawsuit alleging unlawful employment practices in violation of the DCHRA, D.C.Code § 2-1402.11, on July 20, 2006.

II. Section 12-309 Notice

A. Standard of Review

Compliance with § 12-309 is a question of law that we consider de novo. Wharton v. District of Columbia, 666 A.2d 1227, 1230 (D.C.1995). We also review de novo a grant of judgment on the pleadings. Wilson Courts Tenants Ass'n v. 523-525 Mellon St., LLC, 924 A.2d 289, 292 (D.C. 2007).

B. Application to the DCHRA

Ms. Owens contends that § 12-309 does not apply to suits brought against the District of Columbia under the DCHRA. Although we have not previously addressed this issue, several Superior Court judges and judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia have held that § 12-309 applies "to statutory claims, including DCHRA claims." Byrd v. District of Columbia, 538 F.Supp.2d 170, 175-76 (D.D.C.2008) ("Plaintiffs' DCHRA claims — to the extent they seek unliquidated damages — are dismissed for failure to provide mandatory notice."; citing cases "holding that § 12-309 does apply to the DCHRA").²

993 A.2d 1088

The plain language of § 12-309 supports this conclusion. Section 12-309 provides:

An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages ... unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant ... has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section.

This broad language "applies to all claims for unliquidated damages," not distinguishing between common law and statutory claims. Byrd, 538 F.Supp.2d at 176 (emphasis added). Id.

As this court has previously explained, the general notice requirements of § 12-309 serve several important purposes: they (1) permit the District of Columbia to conduct an early investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding a claim, (2) protect the District of Columbia against unreasonable claims, and (3) encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims. Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C.1978) ("The section was designed to aid the District of Columbia in the defense of the public interest where claims are filed within the applicable statute of limitations but so long after the event that it is impossible for the city to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C.1977); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437, 438 (D.C.1975). These statutory purposes are equally served when the District is facing DCHRA claims.

We repeatedly have held that "compliance with the statutory notice requirement is mandatory," Pitts, 391 A.2d at 807, and that § 12-309 "is to be construed narrowly against claimants." Brown v. District of Columbia, 853 A.2d 733, 736 (D.C.2004); District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C.1995) (same). We have also "explained many times before that written notice under § 12-309 is a condition precedent to filing suit against the District." Tucci v. District of Columbia, 956 A.2d 684, 695 (D.C.2008) (internal citation omitted); Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378...