Pecan Valley Mental Health Mentalretardation Region Operating v. Doe
| Docket Number | 11-23-00114-CV |
| Decision Date | 02 November 2023 |
| Parties | PECAN VALLEY MENTAL HEALTH MENTALRETARDATION REGION OPERATING AS PECAN VALLEYCENTERS FOR BEHAVIORAL AND DEVELOPMENTALHEALTHCARE, Appellant v. JANE DOE, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 266th District Court Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23CVDC-00026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Appellant's plea to the jurisdiction that is based on the defense of governmental immunity. See Tex. Civ Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2022).
Jane Doe, Appellee, sued Pecan Valley Mental Health Mental Retardation Region operating as Pecan Valley Centers for Behavioral and Developmental Healthcare (the Center) Appellant, and others (who are not parties to this appeal) for negligence and gross negligence, which she alleged resulted in her being sexually assaulted on several occasions by her stepfather, Arran Spoede, while she was a patient at the Center. Doe alleges that Spoede was an employee of the Center when he committed the sexual assaults. The Center answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Doe's claims because (1) the Center is a unit of local government by statute and thus is entitled to immunity from liability and suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) and (2) the TTCA bars her claims as they are alleged in her original petition (the operative pleading). See Civ. Prac. & Rem. § 101.001 et seq. (West 2019). After a hearing, the trial court denied the Center's plea.
The Center raises a single issue on appeal: whether the trial court erred when it denied the Center's plea to the jurisdiction. Within this issue, the Center advances six arguments as to why it contends that the trial court erred: (1) Doe's operative pleading fails to acknowledge the Center's status as a local governmental unit, much less describe how the Center's immunity is waived under the TTCA; (2) Doe's implicit reliance on Section 101.021(2) of the TTCA does not waive the Center's immunity because Doe's alleged injury was not "caused" by the Center's "use" of tangible personal property, i.e., a cell phone; (3) even if it could be said that Doe's injury was "caused" by Spoede's "use" of a cell phone, the Center, were it a private person, would not be liable to her under Texas law; (4) even if the Center's immunity were otherwise waived by Spoede's "use" of the cell phone and the Center were liable to her if it were a private person, the intentional tort exclusion in Section 101.057(2) of the TTCA prohibits the imposition of liability against the Center for any injuries she sustained that arose from Spoede's sexual and other misconduct; (5) Section 101.024 of the TTCA prohibits the imposition of punitive damages against a governmental unit; therefore, Doe's gross negligence cause of action fails; and (6) Doe's operative pleading conclusively negates the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and she should not be allowed an opportunity to amend and re-plead because, based on these facts, she cannot allege any viable cause of action against the Center. Because we agree with the Center, we reverse and render.
The Center acknowledges in its brief that it disputes the underlying facts as alleged in Doe's operative pleading; however, the Center nonetheless assumes Doe's allegations are correct for the purpose of this appeal. In her operative pleading, Doe essentially alleges that: (1) she was a former patient at the Center; (2) while she was a patient there, Spoede was employed as the Center's Information Technology Systems Administrator and he sexually assaulted her on several occasions at the Center's facility in Stephenville; (3) because of his position at the Center, Spoede had unfettered access to information about the Center's patients and he worked in an unsupervised environment; (4) the Center issued "equipment" to Spoede for use in his position at the Center and he used this equipment (primarily a cell phone) to record the sexual assaults that he committed against her; and (5) she was injured as a result of Spoede's misconduct.
Doe filed her original petition on February 9, 2023, and asserted two causes of action against the Center and others: (1) negligence and (2) gross negligence. The Center answered and filed a plea to the jurisdiction on March 20, 2023, contending that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims that Doe alleged in her original petition against the Center because governmental immunity protected the Center from liability and suit, and thus barred her claims. The trial court held a hearing on the Center's plea on May 1, 2023, and signed an order denying the plea the same day. This appeal followed.
Before a court may decide a case, it is essential that the court possess subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea and a proper method by which to challenge a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 554. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a question of law that we review de novo. Harris Cnty. v. Annab, 547 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2018) (citing Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 317, 226 (Tex. 2004)); Ector Cnty. v. Breedlove, 168 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, no pet.). Because the Center challenges the denial of its plea, we review the trial court's ruling de novo. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002) (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998)).
The purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to defeat a pleaded cause of action without reaching the merits. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554. A plea to the jurisdiction can take two forms: (1) a challenge to the plaintiff's pleadings regarding the allegations of jurisdictional facts or (2) an evidentiary challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. Thus, the plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018); City of Merkel v. Copeland, 561 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2018, pet. denied).
When the plea only challenges the plaintiff's pleadings, as in the case before us, we must determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear and decide the case; in this regard, the plaintiff bears the burden to allege such facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. 2020); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Therefore, we must accept as true all factual allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings, construe them liberally in the pleader's favor, and look to the pleader's intent. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015); Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002); Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. City of Abilene, 551 S.W.3d 337, 342-43 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2018, pet. dism'd). If the allegations create a fact question regarding jurisdiction, a trial court may not grant the plea because the factfinder must resolve the fact issue. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d at 205; Tex. Ass'n of Sch. Bds. Risk Mgmt. Fund v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 660 S.W.3d 767, 771 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2023, no pet.). But if the pleader fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court may rule on the plea as a matter of law. Rangel, 595 S.W.3d at 205.
Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to protect the State, its agencies, and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006); IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 853. Governmental immunity is derived from the State's sovereign immunity. Therefore, the State's political subdivisions, which include units of local government, are afforded the same immunity protections as the State. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011).
In Texas, the TTCA is the only source for common-law recovery against a governmental unit, thus, all tort theories alleged against a governmental unit are assumed to be under and subject to the TTCA. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008). The Center is a local governmental community mental health and disabilities facility that operates pursuant to Chapter 534 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 534.001 et seq. (West 2017). Thus, as a governmental unit, and for purposes of our analysis, the Center is subject to the provisions of the TTCA and is afforded the protections, if applicable, of governmental immunity under the TTCA. See Health & Safety § 534.001(c)(1) (); Gulf Coast Ctr. v. Curry, 658 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Tex. 2022); Dallas Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998).
Governmental immunity embraces two concepts: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Reata, 197...
To continue reading
Request your trial