Penner v. King

• Decision Date: 10 September 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 66657,66658,s. 66657
• Citation: 695 S.W.2d 887
• Parties: Franz H. PENNER and Katharina Penner, Lucille Penner, etc., et. al., Appellants, v. Richard A. KING, Director of Revenue, Respondent. Robert R. KING, Appellant, v. Richard A. KING, Director of Revenue, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 887

695 S.W.2d 887

54 USLW 2187

Franz H. PENNER and Katharina Penner, Lucille Penner, etc., et. al., Appellants, v. Richard A. KING, Director of Revenue, Respondent.

Robert R. KING, Appellant, v. Richard A. KING, Director of Revenue, Respondent.

Nos. 66657, 66658.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

Sept. 10, 1985.

Ezra Eli Borntrager, Kansas City, for appellants.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Weiler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

BLACKMAR, Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, appellants Penner and King seek to overturn decisions of the Circuit Courts of Barton and Clay Counties upholding the Director of Revenue's denial of appellants' applications for driver's licenses. Appellants refused to disclose their social security numbers in spite of § 302.181, RSMo Supp.1984, which requries that a Missouri driver's license "... bear the licensee's social security or tax identifying number, if the licensee has one...." Both appellants argue that the required disclosure violates federal statutes and infringes the constitutional right of privacy. Appellants Penner also allege that mandatory disclosure of social security numbers by driver's license applicants infringes their religious freedom, because compliance with the requirement is inconsistent with their sincerely held religious beliefs. ¹ We are of the opinion that our statute constitutes a valid exercise of the legislative power, not inconsistent with any federal statute or with federal or state constitutional rights. Nor are any further proceedings necessary to determine the constitutional issues. It follows that the judgments must be affirmed.

I. Constitutional Validity

There are cases in which individuals have been excused from complying with statutes and regulations of general application on account of their religious beliefs. In Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), the Supreme Court of the United States held that school children who regarded the flag of the United States as a "graven image" (Exodus 20:4, Deuteronomy 5:8) could not be compelled to salute the flag or to recite the pledge of allegiance. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Court held that children could not be compelled to attend accredited school past the ninth grade, when the religious views or those of their parents dictated other modes of instruction. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), it was held that a New Hampshire motorist could not be required to display the state motto, "Live Free or Die" on his license plate, in violation of his religious tradition.

Yet a person may not always avoid the impact of statutes which serve an important public purpose, within the legislative power, by interposing an individual religious belief. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890) held that the practice of polygamy could properly be proscribed by statute, even though sanctioned by religious belief. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905) the Court held that a person could be obliged to submit to vaccination against smallpox even though the procedure ran contrary to his religious views.

Governmental scrutiny of the sincerity of one's religious belief is offensive to our tradition of individual rights. A balancing of interests is nonetheless necessary when a claim of individual religious belief is set up in opposition to the police power. If a statute serves an important public interest, even those with religious scruples may be required to comply.

The Court, furthermore, is obliged to uphold legislative enactments, when challenged on constitutional grounds, unless the unconstitutionality is clearly demonstrated. The legislative power is plenary and residual, subject only to the limits of the federal and state constitutions. State ex rel. Holekamp v. Holekamp Lumber Co., 340 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. banc. 1960). This Court, therefore, must uphold a statute if there is any valid basis on which the legislature could have acted. It is no light matter to strike down an enactment of the people's representatives, or to excuse a particular person from compliance with a statute of general application.

By our recent holdings the courts are obliged to examine legislation which is claimed to infringe on civil liberties, and to determine from the face of the legislative enactments the nature and quality of the public interest involved. Evidence may be helpful in some cases, but is not essential. The principles of judicial notice may be freely utilized.

We do not agree with the suggestion that the importance of the public interest must be determined on the basis of recitals in the legislature's enactment, or evidence in the trial court. This Court rejected that approach in State ex rel. Gavin v. Gill, 688 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. banc 1985). See also, Pollard v. Board of Police Commissioners, 665 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 907, 105 S.Ct. 3534, 87 L.Ed.2d 657 (1985). The Missouri General Assembly has not followed the practice of including preambles or recitals to explain the legislative purpose. It does not preserve committee reports in documentary form. Transcripts of proceedings are not available. It is not for us to say whether a change in these procedures would be desirable or worth the expense. Judicial insistence on recital or evidence would put pressure on the legislature to depart from its established procedure.

We have no difficulty in perceiving the purpose behind the legislative requirement. The automobile dominates our society and our economy. Motor vehicle operators are properly subject to competency examination and licensing. The identification of the operator is important. The social security number serves to distinguish a person from others with the same or similar names. The disclosure, then, might inhibit a person in obtaining or using a license fraudulently or improperly. The legislative scheme might be impeded if persons could simply opt out by asserting religious inhibitions. The director acted properly in denying an individual exemption to the defendants.

The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that the regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Even if the requirement that the license show a social security number be considered an inroad, the state has shown ample justification. It is important for the state to identify drivers and to learn about a person's driving record in other states. To keep dangerous drivers off the road, driver's licenses may be denied to those who have bad driving records elsewhere. The use of the social security number provides the most efficient method of locating interstate driving records. It is apparent that the state has a compelling interest and no less restrictive means for accomplishing its purpose. The infringement on appellants' religious beliefs is justified.

Our conclusion is supported by Conant v. Hill, 326 F.Supp. 25 (E.D.Va.1971), in which the constitutional issues were found to be unsubstantial, and by Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 353 F.Supp. 1307 (E.D.Pa.1973). See also McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 434, 441 (7th Cir.1980); Greater Cleveland Welfare Rights Organization v. Bauer, 462 F.Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ohio 1978). The respondent adduces the opinion of Circuit Judge Forrest Hanna of our 16th Judicial Circuit in a similar case, in which he analyzes the issues astutely but, in our opinion, places undue restrictions on the state in view of his finding of "extra efficiencies." It is inappropriate for a court to relegate the legislature to a less satisfactory alternative.

The case of Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir.1984), affirmed by an evenly divided court Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478, 105 S.Ct. 3492, 86 L.Ed.2d 383 (1985), in which a person sought to avoid compliance with a state law requiring pictures on driver's licenses, involves arguably similar issues. ² We would reject the majority opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in favor of Judge Fagg's dissent demonstrating a proper public purpose. It appears that the Court majority simply substituted its judgment for that of the legislature as to the wisdom of and the necessity for the statutory requirement of a picture. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court of the United States was unable to resolve the problem, but rather divided evenly, the issue comes to us as an open one.

We also reject the plaintiff's claims of right of privacy under the federal and state constitutions. Constitutional rights of privacy are not well defined. This case is not at all like Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) or Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), which involved intrusion into intimate matters. Nor does it resemble Labor's Educational and Political Club Independent v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. banc 1977), in which political participation was subjected to the glare of publicity. The right of the state to maintain a complete and accurate roster of those authorized to operate motor vehicles justifies the minimum intrusion imposed by the statute.

The statute, furthermore, does not impede the defendants in the practice of their religion. Operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of the state is a privilege which is subject to conditions in the public interest. The plaintiffs may preserve their religious scruples intact by foregoing this privilege. It is for them to balance the resulting inconvenience.

II. Statutory Validity

Section 302.181.1, RSMo Supp.1984, initially enacted in 1971 (L.Mo.1971, p. 320, H.B. 365), reads in pertinent part as follows:

All licenses shall bear the licensee's social security or tax identifying number, if the...