People ex rel. B.D.

• Decision Date: 14 December 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19SC396
• Citation: 477 P.3d 143
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, IN the INTEREST OF B.D., Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

477 P.3d 143

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

IN the INTEREST OF B.D., Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 19SC396

Supreme Court of Colorado.

December 14, 2020

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Tara Jorfald, Lakewood, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Several boys broke into two homes, one of which was owned by a man old enough to be considered an "at-risk" victim. When that man returned home, he happened upon one of the boys holding the meager spoils of an ill-conceived, juvenile burglary. The others, including B.D., remained outside, oblivious to the elderly man's arrival. All the boys quickly fled, leaving in their wake an undoubtedly startled victim and, perhaps less predictably, a legal conundrum about complicitor liability.

¶2 In this opinion, we address the scope of complicitor liability for a fact that aggravates the punishment for theft; namely, an at-risk victim's presence. Based on the plain language of the controlling statutes, we conclude that a complicitor need not be aware that an at-risk victim is present because it is a strict liability sentence enhancer and not an element of the offense. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case for the district court to reinstate the adjudication and sentence.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 B.D. and two of his friends broke into two homes, stealing several items. At the second home, only one of the boys, K.K., was still inside when the seventy-seven-year-old owner returned. The boys fled, and the homeowner called the police. Officers soon found the three boys walking nearby. The homeowner identified K.K., and the boys were arrested.

¶4 B.D. was charged with one count of theft and two counts of second degree burglary. He was also charged with one count of theft in the presence of an at-risk person because the victim was over seventy years old. See § 18-6.5-102(2), C.R.S. (2020) (" ‘At-risk adult’ means any person who is seventy years of age or older ...."). After a bench trial, the juvenile magistrate adjudicated B.D. delinquent on all counts.

¶5 On appeal, the division, relying on People v. Childress , 2015 CO 65M, ¶ 29, 363 P.3d 155, 164, concluded that to be liable for theft in the presence of an at-risk victim, the prosecution had to prove that B.D. "had an awareness of [the at-risk victim's presence], even if such an awareness is not necessary to hold the principal accountable." People in Int. of B.D. , 2019 COA 57, ¶ 39, 479 P.3d 21. And because no such evidence was presented, the evidence was insufficient to sustain B.D.’s adjudication. Id. at ¶ 40.

¶6 We then granted the prosecution-sought certiorari review.¹

II. Analysis

¶7 After identifying the standard of review and revisiting familiar principles of statutory interpretation, we address the question before us. We approach that question by breaking it into two parts: (1) whether Childress ’s "dual mental state" requirement for complicity extends to sentence enhancers or is limited to the elements of the offense, and (2) whether the at-risk victim provision here is a sentence enhancer or an element.²

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Interpretation

¶8 Both parties have framed the question before us as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting B.D.’s adjudication. We review the record de novo to determine whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient both in quantity and quality to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63, 442 P.3d 379, 392. Determining the sufficiency of the evidence here requires us to review the division's interpretation of the relevant statutes, which we also do de novo. See Chavez v. People , 2015 CO 62, ¶ 7, 359 P.3d 1040, 1042.

¶9 In interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to discern legislative intent. Carrera v. People , 2019 CO 83, ¶ 17, 449 P.3d 725, 729. And because it is the legislature's prerogative to define crimes and prescribe the relevant punishments, Vensor v. People , 151 P.3d 1274, 1275 (Colo. 2007), we begin with the statutes’ plain language, giving words and phrases their plain and commonly understood meanings, Carrera , ¶ 17, 449 P.3d at 729. If the language is clear, we apply it as written. Id. at ¶ 18, 449 P.3d at 729.

¶10 With these concepts in mind, we first turn to Colorado's complicity statute, and we examine how it applies to sentence enhancers.

B. Whether the Dual Mental State Requirement for Complicitors Applies to Sentence Enhancers

¶11 Under the complicitor liability theory, "[a] person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the offense." § 18-1-603, C.R.S. (2020).

¶12 This court has interpreted the complicity statute to require that a complicitor hold a dual mental state; meaning, the complicitor must have both

(1) the intent, in the commonly understood sense of desiring or having a purpose or design, to aid, abet, advise, or encourage the principal in his criminal act or conduct, and (2) an awareness of those circumstances attending the act or conduct he seeks to further that are necessary for commission of the offense in question.

Childress , ¶ 29, 363 P.3d at 164. By "circumstances attending the act or conduct," we mean "those elements of the offense describing the prohibited act itself and the circumstances surrounding its commission." Id. Thus, under Childress , complicitor liability requires awareness of all circumstances necessary for the commission of the offense. See Butler v. People , 2019 CO 87, ¶ 12, 450 P.3d 714, 717 ("Assessing whether a defendant may be found liable as a complicitor therefore requires a determination of the requisite elements of the principal's offense.").

¶13 An individual commits an offense when he completes all the statutory elements of that offense. See Doubleday v. People , 2016 CO 3, ¶¶ 23–24, 364 P.3d 193, 197 (discussing that proving the commission of a crime "requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of that crime").

¶14 Sentence enhancers attach only after the prosecution has proven that the defendant committed the offense. People v. Eggers , 196 Colo. 349, 585 P.2d 284, 286 (1978) (concluding that sentence enhancers are "triggered only after a defendant has been found guilty of the substantive crime" (quoting Brown v. Dist. Ct. , 194 Colo. 45, 569 P.2d 1390, 1391 (1977) )), superseded on other grounds by statute , Ch. 211, secs. 1 & 2, §§ 8-1-105(9)(a) & 16-11-309(1), 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 970–71.

¶15 Accordingly, because sentence enhancers are not elements of the offense, Childress ’ s dual mental state requirement does not extend to them. See Garcia v. People , 2019 CO 64, ¶¶ 30–32, 445 P.3d 1065, 1070 (concluding that where a sentence enhancing provision contains no mens rea requirement, none is required for the sentence enhancer to apply); Whitaker v. People , 48 P.3d 555, 559 (Colo. 2002) (interpreting the relevant statutes as setting "forth the drug quantity separately from the elements, with no mens rea requirement and with the apparent design of separating the applicable punishment from the creation and definition of the offense").

¶16 B.D. asserts that because the statute makes a complicitor accountable only for the principal's "criminal offense," a complicitor can't be subject to sentence enhancers because they aren't part of the offense. However, because complicity is a theory of liability, not an offense, once a defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense, he "is legally accountable as principal ... for [the] criminal offense," § 18-1-603, including any sentence enhancers related to the nature of the offense. See People v. Ramirez , 997 P.2d 1200, 1207 (Colo. App. 1999) ("[P]unishment is imposed for the underlying crime and not for complicity. ... Thus, an offense exists to which the [sentence enhancement] provisions may apply."), aff'd by an equally divided court , 43 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2001) (mem). The complicity statute puts B.D. on equal footing with his principal regarding the circumstances accompanying the commission of the offense, which then allows any relevant sentence enhancers to apply by their own force. Thus, B.D. is liable as a complicitor if he intended to aid in the theft and was aware of the circumstances constituting the elements of the offense, notwithstanding his ignorance of any sentence-enhancing facts.

¶17 Next, we turn to the statutes at issue here to determine whether the at-risk victim provision is an element that B.D. needed knowledge of under the complicity statute or is instead a strict liability sentence enhancer.

C. Whether the At-Risk Victim Provision Is a Sentence Enhancer or an Element

¶18 The plain language and structure of the controlling statutes make clear that the legislature intended the at-risk victim provision to be a sentence enhancer.

¶19 Section 18-4-401(1), C.R.S. (2020), sets forth the ways an individual can commit theft. As relevant here, an individual commits theft "when he or she knowingly obtains, retains, or exercises control over anything of value of another without authorization ... and ... [i]ntends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value." § 18-4-401(1)(a). Subsection (2) then provides for increasing penalties based on the value of the stolen items. Thus, subsection (1) contains the essential elements that a jury must find to convict a defendant of theft,...