A.S. v. People
| Decision Date | 28 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 12SC396 |
| Citation | 312 P.3d 168 |
| Parties | A.S., Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Colorado Court of Appeals Case No. 11CA1747
Attorneys for Petitioner: The Stout Law Firm, LLC, Stephanie Stout, Greeley, Colorado, The Cooney Law Firm, William Cooney, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Attorneys for Respondent:Kenneth R. Buck, District Attorney, Nineteenth Judicial District, Anthea Leigh Carrasco, Chief Deputy District Attorney, David J. Skarka, Deputy District Attorney, Greeley, Colorado.
En Banc
¶ 1 A district court magistrate sentenced A.S., an aggravated juvenile offender, to two years of commitment to the Department of Human Services (“DHS”), suspended on the condition that A.S. successfully complete two years of probation. The district court reversed the magistrate's sentencing order, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing on the basis that subsection (5)(a)(I)(A) of section 19–2–601, C.R.S. (2013), authorizes only commitment to DHS, with no allowance for probation. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. We granted certiorari and reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.1
¶ 2 A court must sentence an aggravated juvenile offender as provided in section 19–2–601. § 19–2–908(1)(d), C.R.S. (2013). Subsection (5)(a)(I) of section 19–2–601 provides:
(A) For an offense other than an offense that would constitute a class 1 or 2 felony if committed by an adult, the court may commit the juvenile to the department of human services for a determinate period of up to five years;
(B) For an offense that would constitute a class 2 felony if committed by an adult, the court shall commit the juvenile to the department of human services for a determinate period of at least three but not more than five years;
(C) For an offense that would constitute a class 1 felony if committed by an adult, the court shall commit the juvenile to the department of human services for a determinate period of at least three but not more than seven years....
§ 19–2–601(5)(a)(I) (emphasis added).
¶ 3 We hold that subsection (5)(a)(I)(A) of section 19–2–601 grants a court discretion to suspend a commitment to DHS on a condition of successful completion of probation for an offense that would not constitute a class 1 or 2 felony if committed by an adult.
¶ 4 On January 27, 2011, the district attorney filed a Petition in Delinquency charging A.S., a juvenile, with four counts of sexual assault on a child, 2 four counts of sexual assault on a child as part of a pattern of abuse,3 two counts of aggravated incest,4 and one count alleging the sentence enhancer of “aggravated juvenile offender” pursuant to section 19–2–516(4)(a)(III), C.R.S. (2013). A.S. entered a guilty plea to one count of sexual assault on a child, a class 4 felony if committed by an adult, and the sentence enhancer that identifies A.S. as an aggravated juvenile offender.5 The parties stipulated to a sentence to DHS of three years or less, offense-specific treatment, and registration as a sex offender. The district court magistrate accepted A.S.'s plea. On May 24, 2011, consistent with the recommendations of the pre-sentence investigation report, the magistrate sentenced A.S. to two years in DHS's Division of Youth Corrections, suspended on the condition that A.S. successfully complete two years of probation.
¶ 5 On June 8, 2011, the prosecution petitioned the district court for review of the magistrate's sentencing order pursuant to C.R.M. 7. It alleged that the sentence violated laws that control sentencing for juveniles adjudicated as aggravated juvenile offenders because they cannot be placed on probation.
¶ 6 The district court reversed the magistrate's sentencing order on July 8, 2011, concluding that “[s]entencing juveniles adjudicated as aggravated juvenile offenders is provided for in C.R.S. 19–2–601(5),” and “[t]he only sentence authorized by that subsection is to the department of human services.” Viewing the Children's Code as a whole, the district court determined that the General Assembly's use of the word “may” in section 19–2–601(5)(a)(1)(A) should be construed as “shall”:
“[M]ay” as used in subsection (A) should not be interpreted to give sentencing courts the discretion whether to commit or not commit an aggravated juvenile offender to the department of human services. Rather “may” should be interpreted to give the courts discretion whether to commit the juvenile for the five years authorized or some period less than five years. “Shall” is used in subsections (B) and (C) because there is a minimum period of three years to the department of youth corrections that the court must impose. There are no minimum periods set in subsection (A). (Emphasis added).
The district court concluded that other sentencing options normally available for juvenile offenders, including probation, “specifically exclude juveniles adjudicated as aggravated juvenile offenders from such sentences.” It reasoned that the legislature provided juveniles charged as aggravated juvenile offenders with the “additional procedural protections” supplied by a twelve-person jury “because of the mandatory sentencing scheme for aggravated juvenile offenders.” Stating that the magistrate “may not impose a statutorily authorized sentence and suspend it upon completing a sentence that is not authorized,” the district court reversed the magistrate's sentencing order, vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 7 A.S. appealed the district court's decision to the court of appeals, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that his sentence to probation was illegal. Employing essentially the same reasoning as the district court, the court of appeals affirmed.
¶ 8 We hold that subsection (5)(a)(I)(A) of section 19–2–601 grants a court discretion to suspend a commitment to DHS on a condition of successful completion of probation for an offense that would not constitute a class 1 or 2 felony if committed by an adult.
¶ 9 To resolve the may/shall issue, this case requires us to invoke a range of statutory construction tools in effectuating the intent of the General Assembly. After addressing the standard of review, we examine the statutory context of the juvenile special offender sentencing provisions. Next we analyze which sentencing options the General Assembly intended to make available for aggravated juvenile offenders who are subject to subsection (5)(a)(I)(A), and we explain how the history of legislative amendments to the sentencing requirements for aggravated juvenile offenders supports the sentence the magistrate imposed in this case.
¶ 10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. See, e.g., Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo.2006). When construing a statute, we ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent, reading applicable statutory provisions as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts. People in the Interest of W.P., 295 P.3d 514, 519; Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 219 P.3d 1068, 1072 (Colo.2009). We give the language of the statute its commonly accepted and understood meaning. Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 662 (Colo.2010); see also§ 2–4–101, C.R.S. (2013). We liberally construe statutes to fully carry out the General Assembly's intent. § 2–4–212, C.R.S. (2013).
¶ 11 In harmonizing seemingly conflicting statutes, we look to legislative history, the consequences of a given construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. W.P., 295 P.3d at 519; Jenkins v. Panama Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238, 241 (Colo.2009); Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 811 (Colo.2004); see also§ 2–4–203, C.R.S. (2013) (). When the General Assembly chooses to legislate in an area, we presume it is aware of its own prior enactments. Anderson v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., 102 P.3d 323, 330 (Colo.2004). When interpreting a comprehensive legislative scheme, we construe each provision to further the overarching legislative intent. W.P., 295 P.3d at 519; Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 851–52 (Colo.2001); see also§ 2–4–203(1)(a), (g) (). When a statute is part of a complex of sentencing prescriptions, the entire scheme should be construed to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Fierro v. People, 206 P.3d 460, 461 (Colo.2009).
¶ 12 We do not presume the legislature uses language idly, with no intent that meaning should be given to it. People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159, 162 (Colo.2001) (citing McMillin v. State, 158 Colo. 183, 405 P.2d 672, 674 (1965)); see also§ 2–4–201(1)(b), C.R.S. (2013) (). When possible, we endeavor to reconcile potential conflicts between statutes that regulate the same conduct. W.P., 295 P.3d at 519; Moffett, 219 P.3d at 1072. We avoid statutory interpretations that would lead to absurd results. Frazier, 90 P.3d at 811; see also§ 2–4–201(1)(c) (); § 2–4–203(1)(e) ().
¶ 13 In this case, we examine a comprehensive legislative scheme in ascertaining the General Assembly's use of the words “may” and “shall” in section 19–2–601(5)(a)(I).
¶ 14 The General Assembly designed the juvenile justice system to promote the overriding purposes of the Children's Code—serving child welfare and...
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