People v. Adams
| Decision Date | 21 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 14SC94 |
| Citation | 384 P.3d 345,2016 CO 74 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Curtis Gordon ADAMS, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Cory D. Riddle, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 A jury found respondent, Curtis Adams, guilty of assaulting a correctional officer. The presumptive sentencing range for that offense is two to six years, but because Adams committed the assault while serving a sentence for a prior felony conviction, the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence—twelve years in the Department of Corrections to be served consecutively to Adams's remaining sentences.
¶2 This case arises at the intersection of two sources of sentence enhancement. One requires an aggravated term-of-years range; the other requires consecutive sentencing. The court of appeals concluded Adams was not subject to the term-of-years enhancement applied by the trial court. The People now urge us to reverse the court of appeals; they contend the trial court was required to apply both enhancements.
¶3 Based on the plain language of the statutes, we conclude both enhancements apply. Because the two provisions do not conflict, we give effect to both. Therefore, we reverse the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the defendant's sentence.
¶4 While serving a sentence in Colorado State Penitentiary for a prior felony conviction, Adams kicked and head-butted a correctional officer. As a result of that altercation, the People charged Adams with second degree assault.
¶5 The statute defining that offense provides in relevant part:
§ 18–3–203(1)(f), C.R.S. (2016)
. Paragraph (f) further provides that a sentence imposed for this form of second degree assault “shall be served in the department of corrections and shall run consecutively with any sentences being served by the offender.” Id. As a class four felony, the presumptive sentencing range for second degree assault is two to six years. See§§ 18–1.3–401(1)(a)(V)(A); 18–3–203(2)(b), C.R.S. (2016).
¶6 The People also filed a notice of extraordinary aggravating circumstances. Specifically, they alleged that when Adams committed the assault he “was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon.” See§ 18–1.3–401(8)(a)(IV), C.R.S. (2016)
. The general sentencing statute provides that the presence of an extraordinary aggravating circumstance “shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of a felony.” § 18–1.3–401(8)(a), C.R.S. (2016). Thus, for a class four felony, proof of this extraordinary aggravating circumstance shifts the sentencing range upward to between four and twelve years.
¶7 Following the lead of the parties and the court of appeals, we refer to the enhancement found in the second degree assault statute (requiring consecutive sentencing) as the “special” enhancement to distinguish it from the “general” enhancement for extraordinary aggravating circumstances found in the general sentencing statute (requiring a sentence of midpoint to twice-max presumptive).
¶8 A jury convicted Adams of the second degree assault charge. Applying the general enhancement, the trial court sentenced Adams to twelve years in the Department of Corrections. The court also ordered this sentence to be served consecutive to his remaining sentences.
¶9 Adams appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence. See People v. Adams, No. 10CA2454, 2014 WL 68911 (Colo. App. Jan. 9, 2014)
(). Adams argued he was not subject to the general enhancement because the jury never found the extraordinary aggravating circumstance proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But the court of appeals did not reach this contention because it concluded Adams was not subject to the general enhancement for a different reason: The court of appeals looked to one of its prior decisions in which another division, faced with the same issue, concluded the general enhancement in section 18–1.3–401(8)(a)(IV) does not apply to second degree assault under section 18–3–203(1)(f). See People v. Willcoxon, 80 P.3d 817, 821–22 (Colo. App. 2002). The Willcoxon court, relying on our decision in People v. Andrews, 871 P.2d 1199 (Colo. 1994), determined the General Assembly did not intend for the general enhancement to apply to this form of second degree assault because the assault statute contains its own sentencing enhancement—the requirement for consecutive sentencing. 80 P.3d at 822. Persuaded by Willcoxon, the court of appeals vacated Adams's sentence and remanded for resentencing.
¶10 We granted the People's petition for certiorari.1
¶11 We begin our analysis with the statutory text. Because the provisions at issue concern different aspects of Adams's sentence and can be applied together without conflict, we give effect to both. We then address Adams's argument that Andrews
compels a different result and conclude it does not. We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the defendant's sentence.
¶12 The proper interpretation of a sentencing statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Chavez v. People, 2015 CO 62, ¶ 7, 359 P.3d 1040, 1042
. “Our primary goal in construing a sentencing statute is to give effect to the legislative intent.” Lehnert v. People, 244 P.3d 1180, 1186 (Colo. 2010) (citing Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274, 1275 (Colo. 2007) ). To do this, we first look to the language of the statute. Id. We read statutes “as a whole in order to accord consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all their parts.” A.S. v. People, 2013 CO 63, ¶ 10, 312 P.3d 168, 171 ; see also People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 621, 624. “If the statute is unambiguous and does not conflict with other statutory provisions, this court looks no further.” Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo. 2004). Where there exists an irreconcilable conflict between a general statutory provision and a special or local provision, the special or local provision typically prevails, but we strive to give effect to both provisions. See§ 2–4–205, C.R.S. (2016).
¶13 The People argue this case can be resolved based on the plain language of the statutes. They contend the trial court imposed a legal sentence by selecting a term of between four and twelve years as required by section 18–1.3–401(8)(a)(IV)
and by ordering consecutive sentencing as required by section 18–3–203(1)(f). They argue these two statutes can be read together and applied without conflict. We agree.
¶14 The statutes before us concern different aspects of sentencing. The special enhancement under section 18–3–203(1)(f)
addresses when a sentence will be served. A prison sentence imposed for this form of second degree assault “shall run consecutively with any sentences being served by the offender.” § 18–3–203(1)(f). This provision seeks to deter assaults against correctional officers and other personnel; the statute mandates that offenders who commit such assaults face an additional penalty and guarantees a new sentence will not be incorporated into the time an offender must already serve. See Diaz, ¶ 20, 347 P.3d at 625
(discussing legislative purpose).
¶15 The general enhancement under section 18–1.3–401(8)(a)(IV)
addresses another aspect of a sentence, namely its duration. When an extraordinary aggravating circumstance is present, the General Assembly has chosen to expose defendants to a more severe sentencing range—the midpoint of the presumptive range up to twice the presumptive maximum. One such circumstance is the commission of a felony by a defendant who was “under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon.” § 18–1.3–401(8)(a)(IV).
¶16 The plain language of these two statutes permits us to give effect to both provisions. A specific or local provision may apply to the exclusion of a general provision, but that rule only applies where “the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable.” § 2–4–205
; see also People v. Mojica–Simental, 73 P.3d 15, 18 (Colo. 2003) (). Here, there is no such conflict. A defendant can be sentenced to a greater number of years based on the general aggravator, and he can be made to serve that sentence following completion of his other sentences. We therefore apply both provisions.
¶17 That would close this case, but Adams also argues that the special enhancement provision applies to the exclusion of the general enhancement based on our decision in Andrews
. We turn to that contention now.
escaped from a community corrections facility. 871 P.2d at 1200. Police apprehended him a few weeks later and...
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Chapter 20 - § 20.2 SPECIAL ISSUES
...their understanding of legal terminology. People v. Willcoxon, 80 P.3d 817 (Colo. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds, People v. Adams, 2016 CO 74. Federal ➢ Discretion of Trial Court. Submission of papers, documents, or articles, whether or not admitted into evidence, to the jury for vi......
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Chapter 6 - § 6.2 JUROR NOTES
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