People v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 09 July 2018
• Docket Number: No. 156060,156060
• Citation: 502 Mich. 265,917 N.W.2d 577
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy L. BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

502 Mich. 265

917 N.W.2d 577

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Timothy L. BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 156060

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Decided July 9, 2018

Timothy L. Barnes in propria persona.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

Per Curiam.

In 2002, defendant Timothy Barnes was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and other offenses. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and this Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Barnes , 472 Mich. 866, 692 N.W.2d 840 (2005). In 2008, defendant moved in the trial court for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals and this Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Barnes , 488 Mich. 869, 788 N.W.2d 418 (2010). Defendant has now filed another motion for relief from judgment, arguing that, because his sentence was imposed when the legislative sentencing guidelines were mandatory, he should be resentenced now that this Court has held in People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), that the guidelines are advisory only.¹ Ordinarily, successive motions for relief from judgment are barred by MCR 6.502(G)(1), which allows, "after August 1, 1995, one and only one motion for relief from judgment [to] be filed with regard to a conviction." The trial court denied defendant's motion on that basis. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred and that his motion falls within one of the exceptions in MCR 6.502(G)(2), which allows a "subsequent motion [for relief from judgment] based on a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment...." As explained in this opinion, Lockridge does not have retroactive effect for sentences receiving collateral review under MCR 6.500, and so we affirm.

Ordinarily, "judicial decisions are to be given complete retroactive effect." Hyde v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents , 426 Mich. 223, 240, 393 N.W.2d 847 (1986). But judicial decisions which express new rules normally are not applied retroactively to other cases that have become final. "New legal principles, even when applied retroactively, do not apply to cases already closed," because "at some point, ‘the rights of the parties should be considered frozen’ and a ‘conviction ... final.’ " Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde , 514 U.S. 749, 758, 115 S.Ct. 1745, 131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995), quoting United States v. Estate of Donnelly , 397 U.S. 286, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1033, 25 L.Ed.2d 312 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, as to those cases that have become final, the general rule allows only prospective application. However, there are "certain special concerns—related to collateral review of state criminal convictions—that affect" how courts determine whether a case should be considered closed. Reynoldsville Casket Co. , 514 U.S. at 758, 115 S.Ct. 1745. In essence, these "special concerns" amount to exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity for closed cases, allowing a new legal rule to be applied on collateral review to an otherwise closed case. Both federal and state rules govern the retroactive application of new legal principles to criminal cases that are otherwise final but subject to collateral review.

The federal standard for retroactivity under these circumstances was most recently laid out in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 728, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) :

Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane , 489 U.S. 288 [109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334] (1989), set forth a framework for retroactivity in cases on federal collateral review. Under Teague , a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure does not apply, as a general matter, to convictions that were final when the new rule was announced. Teague recognized, however, two categories of rules that are not subject to its general retroactivity bar. First, courts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive rules include "rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct," as well as "rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 330 [109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256] (1989) ; see also Teague , [489 U.S.] at 307 .... Second, courts must give retroactive effect to new " ‘ "watershed rules of criminal procedure" implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.’ " [ Schriro v. Summerlin , 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) ]; see also Teague , 489 U.S. at 312-313 .

"Thus, the first question under Teague is whether the rule in [ Lockridge ] constitutes a new rule." People v. Maxson , 482 Mich. 385, 388, 759 N.W.2d 817 (2008). In Maxson , we surveyed the caselaw to summarize how to go about identifying a "new rule":

"[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 314, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (citation omitted). Deciding whether a rule is "new" requires a court to determine "whether ‘a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.’ " O'Dell v. Netherland , 521 U.S. 151, 156, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997) (emphasis added and citations omitted). If a reasonable jurist would not have felt compelled by existing precedent, then the rule is new. Beard v. Banks , 542 U.S. 406, 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504, 159 L.Ed.2d 494 (2004). In other words, the relevant question is not simply whether existing precedent might have supported the rule, but whether the rule "was dictated by then-existing precedent." Id . at 413, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (emphasis in original). [ Maxson , 482 Mich. at 388-389, 759 N.W.2d 817 (quotation marks omitted; alterations in original).]

We conclude that Lockridge articulated a new rule under this standard. Lockridge itself was based on Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). In Alleyne , id . at 103, 133 S.Ct. 2151, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled its previous decision in Harris v. United States , 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), so Alleyne clearly was not compelled by existing precedent. And we have previously stated that Alleyne established a new rule of law, albeit not while reviewing whether our Lockridge rule applies retroactively. See People v. Carp , 496 Mich. 440, 491, 852 N.W.2d 801 (2014) ("[Defendant's] argument relies on the new rule adopted in Alleyne ...."). Our decision in Carp was vacated on unrelated grounds, Davis v.Michigan , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1356, 194 L.Ed.2d 339 (2016), but we agree with the several federal courts that have concluded that Alleyne articulated a new rule.²

Having established that Alleyne created a new rule of law, we must determine whether either of the exceptions to the general rule of prospective-only application is applicable to this criminal case receiving collateral review. The first exception is whether the rule is a "substantive rule of constitutional law," defined as a rule forbidding certain primary conduct or a rule prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Montgomery , 577 U.S. at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 728. The rule here does not satisfy this exception because it applies neither to primary conduct nor to a particular class of defendants but rather adjusts how the sentencing process functions once any defendant is convicted of a crime. The second exception is whether the new rule is a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure. Id . at ––––, 136 S.Ct. at 728. "In order to qualify as watershed, a new rule must ... be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction ... [and] alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Whorton v. Bockting , 549 U.S. 406, 418, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007), quoting Schriro , 542 U.S. at 356, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (quotation marks omitted). The rule here does not satisfy this exception either, because it has nothing to do with the accuracy of a conviction.³ Our conclusion that Alleyne is not entitled to retroactive application under the Teague framework is consistent with our remarks in Carp , 496 Mich. at 491, 852 N.W.2d 801, that we were not "persuaded" "that Alleyne established a substantive rule entitled to retroactive application," meaning we "treat[ed] the rule in Alleyne as a procedural rule entitled only to prospective application." As noted, Carp was vacated on unrelated grounds, but federal courts have also consistently held that Alleyne is only prospective.⁴

Yet the fact that Alleyne (on which Lockridge was based) does not apply retroactively on collateral review does not end the analysis. "[T]he remedy a state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question of state law." Danforth v. Minnesota , 552 U.S. 264, 288, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008). Consequently, we must also consider whether our Lockridge decision applies retroactively on state-law grounds. Our state-law test was set out in People v. Hampton , 384 Mich. 669, 187 N.W.2d 404 (1971).⁵ We consider: "(1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice."⁶ As to purpose, the new rule "is not relevant to the ascertainment of guilt or innocence and does not implicate the integrity of the fact-finding process," meaning "it is amenable to prospective application."⁷

People v. Sexton , 458 Mich. 43, 62-63, 580 N.W.2d 404 (1998). Moreover, it is manifest that there was widespread, indeed statewide, reliance by the bench and bar⁸ on the mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme,...