People v. Buxton

• Decision Date: 22 February 1978
• Parties: , 374 N.E.2d 384 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles A. BUXTON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 487

403 N.Y.S.2d 487

44 N.Y.2d 33, 374 N.E.2d 384

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles A. BUXTON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 22, 1978.

Donald L. Austin, Public Defender (Frank E. Blando, Utica, of counsel), for appellant.

Richard D. Enders, Dist. Atty., for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Judge.

The issue presented in this case is whether statements made by defendant are inadmissible because he had requested and was not provided with an attorney prior to questioning. After County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress, he was convicted, upon a plea of guilty, of attempted rape in the first degree and two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of convictions. We reverse and remit for further proceedings.

On January 11, 1973, at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, police entered upon the grounds of the Masonic Home in Utica, New York, to "pick up" defendant, who worked there and who was a suspect in a rape investigation. After identifying themselves, the policemen asked defendant to accompany them to police headquarters to talk with them concerning a case in which he was a suspect, but they did not advise him of the specific charges. When defendant refused to enter the police car, the officers attempted to force him into the vehicle. In the course of this struggle, defendant called out words to the effect that someone should call his lawyer.

After getting one handcuff on the defendant, who continued to struggle, the officers agreed to let him speak with his supervisor. There, as testified by an officer, in his presence defendant requested the supervisor to "Call my wife and call my lawyer." Then, apparently satisfied at having been permitted to have this conversation, defendant did not resist being placed in the police car and was taken away.

Upon arrival at police headquarters, defendant was informed of the nature of the charges against him and was advised of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. What occurred thereafter is in dispute, defendant claiming that he continued to request a lawyer and the police testifying otherwise. This factual issue was resolved against defendant by County Court which found that, after being advised of his Miranda rights and prior to being questioned, defendant made no request to call his wife or a lawyer. Nevertheless, despite this determination, the need for our further inquiry is manifested by other findings. ^*

The record reveals that shortly after 3 o'clock on the same day that he was apprehended and immediately upon his arrival at the police station, the police secured a Miranda waiver and began to question defendant. At the same time, complainants were brought to the station to view defendant and between 4 and 5 o'clock of the afternoon of his arrest, after having been told by the police that he had been identified by at least one of the complainants, defendant made both oral and written statements concerning the crimes for which he was charged. Thus, within a period of two hours, a recalcitrant suspect, who accompanied the police without a struggle only after he has been able to request that someone go about obtaining a lawyer for him, is questioned and gives written statements concerning crimes, without the presence of counsel.

The facts present two questions: the first, the effect to be given to defendant's request, made in the presence of police, that a third party take steps to obtain a lawyer for him; the second, the legal significance of a finding of a waiver of the right to, and in the absence of, an attorney within an hour of an indication by defendant that he desired such right to be honored.

As to the initial issue, the People assert that defendant's first and only request for an attorney was not made to the police but to his employer, and hence there is lacking from this case a specific and clear request to the interrogating officers that defendant did not wish to speak with them until he had consulted with an attorney. This argument is without merit.

(1)It is established that if a suspect "indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning" (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, supra ). That defendant's request was made to a third party is of little significance, since the request was made in the presence of police. Under these circumstances, it would be an absurd formality to hold that defendant had not sufficiently indicated his desire for a lawyer. Therefore, we conclude initially that, having been apprised of defendant's request for counsel, the police violated his constitutional rights by questioning him, in the absence of an attorney, within less than an hour of his request (see People v. Jackson, 22 N.Y.2d 446, 452-453, 293 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269-270, 239 N.E.2d 869, 872; see, also, People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 216 N.Y.S.2d 79, 175 N.E.2d 451; cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485-486, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977).

(2,3)There remains the question of the legal effect of the success of the police in obtaining defendant's subsequent waiver of the right to counsel. In this respect, it is recognized that "(a)ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence is, of course, admissible in evidence" (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, supra ). Moreover, that a suspect has once...