People v. Colemanorange

• Decision Date: 07 June 2017
• Citation: 151 A.D.3d 738,55 N.Y.S.3d 439
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Tawana COLEMANORANGE, also known as Tawana Coleman–Orange, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

151 A.D.3d 738

55 N.Y.S.3d 439

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Tawana COLEMANORANGE, also known as Tawana Coleman–Orange, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

June 7, 2017.

Matthew W. Brissenden, Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Yael V. Levy of counsel; Matthew C. Frankel on the brief), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, and FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Carter, J.), rendered January 22, 2016, convicting her of assault in the second degree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that her plea of guilty was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is unpreserved for appellate review, since she did not move to withdraw the plea (see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 665, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 ; People v. Narbonne, 131 A.D.3d 626, 627, 14 N.Y.S.3d 917 ; People v. Canole, 123 A.D.3d 940, 996 N.Y.S.2d 922 ). In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit. Contrary to the defendant's further contention, there was nothing in the plea allocution that triggered the Supreme Court's duty to inquire into a potential affirmative defense to the charge based upon mental disease or defect (see Penal Law § 40.15 ; People v. Thomas, 139 A.D.3d 986, 31 N.Y.S.3d 591 ; People v. Serrano, 160 A.D.2d 745, 746, 554 N.Y.S.2d 55 ; cf. People v. Mox, 20 N.Y.3d 936, 939, 958 N.Y.S.2d 670, 982 N.E.2d 590 ). The fact that the defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia and was receiving medication did not trigger such a duty of inquiry (see People v. Gelikkaya, 84 N.Y.2d 456, 459, 618 N.Y.S.2d 895, 643 N.E.2d 517 ; People v. Gensler, 72 N.Y.2d 239, 244, 532 N.Y.S.2d 72, 527 N.E.2d 1209 ; People v. Thomas, 139 A.D.3d 986, 31 N.Y.S.3d 591 ).

Moreover, there is no support in the record for the defendant's contention that she lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings against her or that she was unable to assist in her defense (see CPL 730.30[1] ; People v. Narbonne, 131 A.D.3d 626, 627, 14 N.Y.S.3d 917 ; People v. Kelly, 121 A.D.3d 713, 993 N.Y.S.2d 169 ; People v. M'Lady, 59 A.D.3d 568, 873 N.Y.S.2d 331 ). To the contrary, the defendant's responses at the plea and sentencing proceedings were appropriate, and did not indicate that she was incapacitated (see People v. Thomas, 139 A.D.3d at 987, 31 N.Y.S.3d 591 ; People v. M'Lady, 59 A.D.3d at 568, 873 N.Y.S.2d 331 ; People v. Pryor, 11 A.D.3d 565, 566, 782 N.Y.S.2d 803 ). In addition, the two CPL 730.30 examinations conducted two months after the defendant pleaded guilty are not evidence of the defendant's capacity at the time of her plea (see People v. Gelikkaya, 84 N.Y.2d 456, 459–460, 618 N.Y.S.2d 895, 643 N.E.2d 517 ; People v. Coons, ...