People v. Cruz, 2004 NY Slip Op 50004(U) (NY 1/5/2004)

• Citation: 2004 NY Slip Op 50004(U)
• Decision Date: 05 January 2004
• Docket Number: 1627/2000.
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. ERNESTO CRUZ, Defendant. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. ROHAN BROWN, Defendant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 1

2004 NY Slip Op 50004(U)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. ERNESTO CRUZ, Defendant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. ROHAN BROWN, Defendant.

1627/2000.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County.

Decided January 5, 2004.

ELIOT SPITZER, Attorney General of the State of New York, By: MELINDA CHESTER-SPITZER, ESQ., Assistant Attorney General, for the New York State Department of Parole.

CHEDA & SHEEHAN, By: THOMAS SHEEHAN, ESQ., for Ernesto Cruz.

ROBERT T. JOHNSON, District Attorney of Bronx County, New York, By: PAUL ROSENFELD, ESQ., Senior Trial Assistant District Attorney, for the People of the State of New York,

BENJAMIN HEINRICH, ESQ., for Rohan Brown.

DOMINIC R. MASSARO, J.

In each of these cases, which have been consolidated for decision only, a third party is moving for an order pursuant to CPL § 160.50 to unseal a trial record that was terminated in favor of the accused. The issue presented is whether the unsealing of such records is authorized. Under the particular pleadings of each prayer, the Court finds in the affirmative.

Factual Setting

People v. Ernesto Cruz, Indictment Number 1627/2000, was terminated in favor of the accused and sealed pursuant to CPL § 160.50. Mr. Cruz is now the petitioner in Cruz v. Ditucci-Capiello, Docket Number 03-CV-1686, in which he brings on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of New York. In his Federal civil suit, Mr. Cruz is alleging that he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure, false arrest and imprisonment, and false prosecution arising out of the incident that formed the basis of the criminal proceeding in which he was acquitted. The respondent in the pending Federal matter, who is represented by the Attorney General of the State of New York, moves here to unseal the record of the underlying criminal case on the ground that it is needed in order to properly investigate Mr. Cruz's claims and to prepare a defense. The Attorney General further claims that by bringing the aforenoted civil suit, Mr. Cruz has effectively waived the protections afforded to him by CPL § 160.50. Mr. Cruz takes no position on the motion.

People v. Karl L.,¹ Indictment Number 6852/98, was terminated in favor of the accused and sealed pursuant to CPL § 160.50. Both the defendant in that case and the defendant herein have been accused of murdering one James Bauer.² Mr. Brown is now moving to unseal the record from Indictment Number 6852/98 on the basis that the same witnesses are expected to testify about the same matters at his trial, and, therefore, it is vital to his defense that he be allowed to examine that record. In addition, counsel has represented that he has attempted to notify the acquitted defendant of the pending motion without success. The People take no position on the motion.

Statutory and Decisional History

Criminal Procedure Law Sections 160.50 states, in pertinent part, that:

160.50. 1. Upon the termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person in favor of such person, . . . unless . . . the court on its own motion . . . determines that the interests of justice require otherwise and states the reasons for such determination on the record, the record of such action or proceeding shall be sealed. . . . and not made available to any person or public or private agency; (d) such records shall be made available to the person accused or to such person's designated agent, and shall be available to . . . (ii) a law enforcement agency upon ex parte motion in any superior court, if such agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that justice requires that such records be made available to it.

As most recently explained by our Court of Appeals in Matter of Joseph M., 82 N.Y.2d 128, 131 (1993), "CPL § 160.50 was enacted in 1976 in the same reform legislation that added a provision to the Human Rights Law (now Executive Law § 296 [16]) . . . [which] protect[s] exonerated individuals from the unwarranted stigma that their employers or others could attach to dismissed criminal charges." See also People v. Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711 (1991). The high court based its decision, in part, on the Governor's Approval Memorandum in Support of S 9924-A, 1976 McKinney's Session Laws of New York, at 2451. In Matter of Harper v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 761, 766 (1997), the Court of Appeals further noted that the purpose of these laws is to:

lessen the adverse consequences of unsuccessful criminal prosecutions by limiting access to official records and papers in criminal proceedings which terminate in favor of the accused (see, Governor's Approval Mem, 1976 NY Legis Ann, at 408, 409 ["This legislation is consistent with the presumption of innocence, which simply means that no individual should suffer adverse consequences merely on the basis of an accusation, unless the charges were ultimately sustained in a court of law"]). As we have previously noted, a person's reputation and employment prospects may be adversely affected even from an unsuccessful criminal prosecution (Matter of Hynes v. Karassik, 47 N.Y.2d 659, 662 [1979]). Consequently, the ambit of the sealing requirement is broad.

See also Joseph M., supra at 132 ("to effectuate this purpose, CPL § 160.50 employs language that is mandatory."); People v. Ellis, 184 A.D.2d 307 (1st Dept. 1992), lv. denied, 80 N.Y.2d 929 (1992); Matter of Wayne M., 121 Misc.2d 346, 348-49 (Family Ct. New York Cty. 1983) ("A motion to prevent sealing which states no special equities or unique facts peculiar to a particular prosecution at bar is in the final analysis, framed upon a disagreement with legislative articulation of the public policy of this State and is properly addressed to the Legislature rather than the court.").

However, in Harper, supra at 766-67, the Court of Appeals recognized that:

Notwithstanding these concerns, the Legislature has acknowledged the existence of countervailing considerations to the sealing of such records and papers. Thus, CPL § 160.50 contains "narrowly defined exceptions" which authorize the disclosure of sealed materials, under certain circumstances, to a limited group of third parties (Hynes, 47 N.Y.2d at 663). Consequently, a former defendant's interest in preventing the disclosure of official records and papers in a favorably terminated proceeding is not absolute.

It is well settled that CPL § 160.50 involves merely statutory, and not substantive or constitutional rights. As more fully explained in Patterson, (supra at 716), there is nothing in the legislative history of CPL § 160.50 conferring a constitutionally derived substantial right, "such that the violation of that statute, without more, would justify invocation of the exclusionary rule with respect to subsequent independent and unrelated criminal proceedings." Rather, the Legislature established procedures under the Executive Law to provide a civil remedy for a violation of a provision of CPL § 160.50. See also People v. Torres 291 A.D.2d 273, 274 (1st Dept. 2002) ("A photograph of defendant taken in connection with an unrelated arrest that had been sealed pursuant to CPL § 160.50 was properly received in evidence . . . [because] CPL § 160.50 did not implicate a constitutional protected right . . . [and] evidence obtained as the result of a statutory violation lacking constitutional implications has long been held admissible."), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 681 (2002); Grandal v. City of New York, 966 F.Supp. 197, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested."), citing, Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433, 442 (1979); Griffin v. Kelly, F.Supp.2d , No. 92 Civ. 8623 (LBS), 1994 WL 9670 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). This is in contrast to CPL § 240.45 (1) (a), the codification of the rule set forth under People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961), cert. denied, sub nom., Rosario v. New York, 368 U.S. 866, 82 S.Ct. 117, 7 L.Ed.2d 64 (1961), which is based upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. See also People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184, (1994) (purpose of Rosario is to insure that defense counsel, not judges, strategically view, weight and exercise a defendant's fair trial advocacy interests).

Further, in Joseph M., supra, the Court of Appeals held that because the exceptions to CPL § 160.50 are "narrowly defined," a court does not have the inherent authority to unseal such records for use in, among other things, a teacher disciplinary proceeding; and in Matter of Dondi, 63 N.Y.2d 331, 339 (1984), it further noted that "[c]onvenience alone will not justify an unsealing." Therefore, it is with the above statutory and decisional history in mind that a determination must be taken whether unsealing is authorized in these two cases.

Discussion

At the outset, it is noted that testimonial evidence constitutes an "official record" subject to CPL § 160.50. Harper, supra; Dondi, supra. Thus, it is clear that both movants are requesting materials that constitute part of the "official record," as both are seeking to unseal the transcribed proceedings of the respective cases.

The Request of the Attorney General

Initially, although the Attorney General does have law enforcement authority under Executive Law § 63, it is not applicable here, where the Attorney General represents a defendant in a Federal civil suit. Therefore, CPL § 160.50 (1) (d) (ii) does not apply because the Attorney General is seeking to unseal a record in order to defend and not to use in a criminal investigation. See New York State Police v. Charles Q., 192 A.D.2d 142, 144 (1st Dept. 1993) ("[I]n conducting a disciplinary proceeding concerning one of its own employees, petitioner is acting as a public employer, not a `law enforcement agency,' and is not entitled to obtain sealed records under CPL § 160.50 (1) (d) (ii)."), aff'd, 85 N.Y.2d 571 (1995); People v. Anthony R., 170 Misc.2d 626 (County...