People v. Deason

• Decision Date: 17 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81SA370,81SA370
• Citation: 670 P.2d 792
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Wayne DEASON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 792

670 P.2d 792

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael Wayne DEASON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81SA370.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Oct. 17, 1983.

Terrance A. Gillespie, John E. Byron, Deputy Dist. Attys., Golden, for plaintiff-appellant.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave, III, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

QUINN, Justice.

In this case the People appeal ¹ from a judgment of dismissal entered pursuant to the speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). ² The district court dismissed multiple criminal charges pending against the defendant, Michael Wayne Deason, because, although timely brought to trial on the issue of his sanity, he was not tried on the issue of guilt within the statutory speedy trial period. We affirm the judgment of dismissal.

I.

On October 6, 1980, the defendant was arrested by Wheat Ridge police officers and charged by information with first degree burglary, ³ attempted first degree murder, ⁴ two counts of first degree assault, ⁵ and aggravated robbery. ⁶ A preliminary hearing was held on December 17, 1980, and probable cause was found on each count. ⁷ Immediately after the preliminary hearing the defendant was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The court appointed a psychiatrist to examine the defendant, and the psychiatric report of the examination was filed on January 27, 1980. The case was then continued at the defendant's request to February 2, 1981, for a trial setting.

At the trial setting defense counsel requested the court to set a date for both the sanity trial and the trial on the merits. Noting that a trial on the issue of guilt would be unnecessary in the event the defendant was found insane, the court refused to set both trials and instead set the sanity trial for April 30, 1981. On May 6, 1981, the jury found the defendant sane, whereupon the court set the trial on the issue of guilt for August 25, 1981. ⁸

On August 11, 1981, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the pending charges for violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The defendant's motion was argued on August 19, 1981. The defendant claimed that, after excluding the delay resulting from the psychiatric examination incident to his insanity plea and the brief continuance of the trial setting from January 27 to February 2, 1981, the six month speedy trial term expired on August 2, 1981. The prosecution contested the motion, arguing that the defendant's entry of an insanity plea and his subsequent trial on that issue extended the speedy trial period an additional six months from the date of the sanity trial. The district court concluded that the speedy trial statute mandated a trial on the merits within six months from the date of arraignment and consequently dismissed the charges. This appeal followed.

The People contend that in the case of an insanity plea the speedy trial statute requires only that an accused be brought to trial on the sanity issue within six months from the plea and, further, that the statute allows the prosecution an additional six months from the sanity verdict within which to try the defendant on the issue of guilt. We reject the People's argument.

II.

Section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), and our decisions construing this statute provide the foundation for our resolution of this matter. Subsection (1) of the statute provides as follows:

"Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode."

As pertinent here, the only exceptions "otherwise provided in this section" relate to the "period during which the defendant ... is under observation or examination pursuant to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity," section 18-1-405(6)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), and any period of delay "caused at the instance of the defendant," section 18-1-405(6)(f), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). ⁹

A.

The speedy trial statute is intended to implement the constitutional right to a speedy trial by requiring dismissal of the case whenever the defendant is not tried within the six month period and the delay does not qualify for one of the express exclusionary categories set out in the statute. ¹⁰ E.g., People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381 (Colo.1983); Harrington v. District Court, 192 Colo. 351, 559 P.2d 225 (1977); Carr v. District Court, 190 Colo. 125, 543 P.2d 1253 (1975). The six month term begins to run "from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty...." Section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). By both statute and rule a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity expressly includes a plea of not guilty. Section 16-8-103(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8); Crim.P. 11(e). A defendant is under no obligation to take affirmative action to notify the court of a speedy trial problem under the statute; on the contrary, it is the obligation of the court and the prosecution "to cause the case to be brought to trial within the time limits set out in Crim.P. 48(b) and section 18-1-405, C.R.S.1973." People v. Colantonio, 196 Colo. 242, 243, 244, 583 P.2d 919, 921 (1978). Accord People v. Bell, supra; People v. Peek, 199 Colo. 3, 604 P.2d 23 (1979) (per curiam).

B.

Relying on People v. Haines, 37 Colo.App. 302, 549 P.2d 786 (1976), the People claim that the commencement of the sanity trial on April 30, 1981, satisfied the statutory mandate that the accused be "brought to trial on the issues raised by the ... information ... within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty...." Section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). In Haines the court of appeals held that "when the defendant pleads 'not guilty by reason of insanity' and is thus entitled to a separate trial on the sanity issue, he must be brought to trial on that issue within six months from the date of entry of the plea," and that once a sanity finding is returned, the defendant "must then be brought to trial on the other issues of the crime charged within the statutory six months from the judgment in the sanity trial." 37 Colo.App. at 305, 549 P.2d at 789. We reject the holding of Haines for several reasons.

Proceeding from the assumption that a sanity trial involves a determination of the mental culpability essential to guilt, Haines concluded that a sanity trial is a trial on the "issues raised by the ... information" within the intendment of the speedy trial statute. The basic proposition assumed in Haines, however, misconstrues the nature and effect of a sanity proceeding. The Colorado Criminal Code provides that "[a] person who is insane ... is not responsible for his conduct defined as criminal." Section 18-1-802, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8). The plea of insanity thus raises the discrete issue whether at the time of the offense the defendant's mental state was such that he should be held legally accountable for his conduct. People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo.1981). The sanity trial, which is a separate proceeding conducted prior to a trial on guilt, section 16-8-104, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), resolves this question of mental capacity and nothing more. ¹¹ See People v. Renfrow, 193 Colo. 131, 564 P.2d 411 (1977); People v. King, 181 Colo. 439, 510 P.2d 333 (1973). While the prosecution bears the burden in a sanity trial of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, People v. District Court, 165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968), proof of legal sanity is not "a proxy for mens rea." Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 394 (Colo.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225, 103 S.Ct. 1232, 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1983). In our view the phrase "brought to trial on the issues raised by the ... information," as used in the speedy trial statute, refers to a trial which resolves the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused as to the charges filed against him. A finding of legal sanity in a sanity trial no more resolves "the issues raised by the ... information" than does a general plea of not guilty when sanity has not been placed in issue. See Hendershott v. People, supra. ¹²

Moreover, the very language of the speedy trial statute dispels any notion that the commencement of a sanity trial is the functional equivalent of a trial on the merits for purposes of satisfying the state's speedy trial obligation. The statutory terminology specifically addressing the insanity plea is found in subsection (6)(a), which states that "[a]ny period during which the defendant ... is under observation or examination pursuant to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity" shall be excluded from the six month period established in subsection (1). We construed subsection (6)(a) in People v. Renfrow, supra, and held that the exclusionary period consists of "the period from the time of commitment until the filing of the final psychiatric report, if filed within a reasonable time." ¹³ People v. Renfrow, 193 Colo. at 134, 564 P.2d at 413; see also People v. Brown, 44 Colo.App. 397, 622 P.2d 573 (1980). Subsection (6)(a) thus evinces a clear legislative choice to deal with the problem of delay resulting from a sanity trial by excluding from the six month term only that period of delay required for the sanity examination and the filing of a timely report with the court. Given this clear expression of legislative intent, it would be inappropriate for us to read some other meaning into the statute.

Finally, the Haines rationale was...