People v. Garcia
| Decision Date | 31 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | B276149 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANDREW GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. KA111703)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rogelio G. Delgado, Judge. Affirmed.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________ Defendant and appellant Andrew Garcia appeals the trial court's denial of his petition to designate his felony conviction of Vehicle Code section 10851 a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. Because Garcia committed his offense and was convicted long after Proposition 47's effective date, and because Vehicle Code section 10851 is not an offense eligible for redesignation under Penal Code section 1170.18,1 we affirm the trial court's order.
On January 30, 2016, El Monte Police Department Officer Avila saw Garcia driving a blue 1995 Honda Accord. Avila made a traffic stop after Garcia failed to use his turn signal. Garcia stopped in the middle of the street, exited the car without putting it in park, and charged toward the officer, "yelling incoherently." Garcia ignored Avila's command that he lie on the ground. Believing Garcia was going to physically attack him, Avila subdued Garcia with a kick and handcuffed him. A search of Garcia's person revealed a baggie containing a substance resembling methamphetamine. Avila also found a "shaved" key in the Honda's ignition. Once in custody, Garcia stated, " " The Honda's owner had not given Garcia permission to drive or take the vehicle.
On February 2, 2016, the People filed a complaint charging Garcia with unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, a felony (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); receiving stolen property, a felony(§ 496d, subd. (a)); possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a misdemeanor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377); and delaying or obstructing a peace officer, a misdemeanor (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).
On February 17, 2016, Garcia pled no contest to the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge as part of a plea agreement.3 Defense counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the plea based on the police reports. In accordance with the negotiated disposition, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Garcia on formal probation for three years, on condition he serve 180 days in jail, with credit for 37 days. The remaining three counts were dismissed pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.
On May 9, 2016, the trial court revoked Garcia's probation and issued a bench warrant for his arrest because he had failed to appear for his probation orientation appointment. Garcia was subsequently arrested. The hearing on the probation violation was ultimately continued to July 27, 2016.
On June 22, 2016, defense counsel filed a document entitled "Defendant's felony charge is now a misdemeanor charge." Therein, Garcia asserted that his crime was a misdemeanor because the value of the stolen vehicle was under $950, and he had no disqualifying prior convictions. Attached to the document were copies of the police report, which listed the value of the Honda as $500, and a police "Vehicle Report," which stated the Honda's owner valued the car at $900.
On July 13, 2016, the trial court considered Garcia's request for reduction of the offense to a misdemeanor, apparentlytreating it as the functional equivalent of a petition for redesignation pursuant to section 1170.18.4 While acknowledging that the law on the issue was unsettled, defense counsel argued that, based on language in section 490.2, violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 was a misdemeanor when the vehicle stolen was valued at $950 or less. The People countered that Vehicle Code section 10851 was "not an enumerated charge" subject to Proposition 47 redesignation. The trial court denied the petition, but observed that it would revisit the issue should the law be clarified in Garcia's favor.
On July 14, 2016, Garcia filed a notice of appeal stating he "appeals from the judgment rendered on July 13, 2016." (Cf. Teal v. Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595.)
On November 4, 2014 the voters enacted Proposition 47, which went into effect the following day. (People v. Morales (2016) 63 Cal.4th 399, 404; People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108.) Proposition 47 reclassified certain drug and theft offenses from felonies or wobblers to misdemeanors, unless committed by ineligible defendants. (People v. Lewis (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090; People v. Rivera (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1091; People v. Lynall, supra, at p. 1108.) One of the mechanisms by which Proposition 47 reduced theft crimes to misdemeanors was the enactment ofsection 490.2, which provides that thefts of property valued at $950 or less are petty theft.
Proposition 47 also enacted section 1170.18, which created a procedure whereby an eligible defendant who has suffered a felony conviction of one of the reclassified crimes can petition to have it designated a misdemeanor. (People v. Sherow (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 875, 879; People v. Lynall, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109.) A defendant who is currently serving a felony sentence for an offense now classified as a misdemeanor by Proposition 47 may petition to recall the sentence and request resentencing. (§ 1170.18, subd. (a); People v. Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1092, 1099.) If the petitioner meets the statutory eligibility criteria, he or she is entitled to resentencing unless the trial court determines, in its discretion, that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.18, subd. (b).) Eligible persons who have already completed their sentences may file an application to have their felony convictions designated as misdemeanors, without regard to their current dangerousness. (Id., subds. (f), (g), (h); People v. Lewis, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089, 1092; People v. Abdallah (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 736, 744; People v. Rivera, supra, at p. 1099.)
Where, as here, a trial court's denial of a Proposition 47 petition involves only questions of statutory interpretation, we independently review its ruling. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71; People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467; People v. Sherow, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 878.) When interpreting a ballot initiative, our primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the voters' intent. (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796; People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451, 459;Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901.) We apply the same principles that govern statutory construction. Thus, we look first to the language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning. (Park, at p. 796; Briceno, at p. 459.) The plain meaning of the statutory language controls, unless it would lead to absurd results the electorate could not have intended. (People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 231.) The statutory language must be construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme. (Briceno, at p. 459; Robert L., at p. 901.) When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it. (People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508, 512; People v. Vasquez (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 513, 519.)
Preliminarily, we address the People's contention that Garcia's appeal must be dismissed because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. A defendant may not appeal from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or no contest unless he has obtained a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5; People v. Cuevas (2008) 44 Cal.4th 374, 379; People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b).) Despite this broad language, the California Supreme Court has held two types of issues may be raised following a guilty or no contest plea without the need for a certificate: issues relating to the validity of a search and seizure pursuant to section 1538.5, subdivision (m), and issues regarding proceedings held subsequent to the plea for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed. (People v. Shelton, supra, at p. 766; People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 780;People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 43.) In making this determination, we look to the substance of the appeal. " (People v. French, at p. 44; People v. Cuevas at p. 381; People v. Buttram at pp. 781-782.) The certificate requirement is strictly applied. (People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1098; People v. Zuniga (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183.) When an appeal is predicated solely on grounds...
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