People v. Nilsson

• Decision Date: 06 July 1987
• Citation: 517 N.Y.S.2d 558,132 A.D.2d 577
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent v. Kenneth NILSSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 558

517 N.Y.S.2d 558

132 A.D.2d 577

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent v. Kenneth NILSSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

July 6, 1987.

Schlachter and Mauro, Commack (Reynold A. Mauro, of counsel), for appellant.

Patrick Henry, Dist. Atty., Riverhead (Patricia A. Murphy, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and BROWN, WEINSTEIN, EIBER and HARWOOD, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Cacciabaudo, J.), rendered March 12, 1985, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of from two and one-half to seven and one-half years' imprisonment.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

We are satisfied that there was no reasonable basis for ordering psychiatric examinations of the defendant pursuant to CPL article 730 prior to acceptance by the trial court of the defendant's guilty plea (see, People v. Armlin, 37 N.Y.2d 167, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691, 332 N.E.2d 870; People v. Corwise, 120 A.D.2d 604, 520 N.Y.S.2d 223). Moreover, the trial court made proper inquiry to ensure that the defendant's waiver of, inter alia, his right to trial and to raise certain defenses (see, e.g., Penal Law § 15.25; Penal Law § 160.15) was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made (see, People v. Mitchell, 90 A.D.2d 854, 456 N.Y.S.2d 107; see also, People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330; People v. Wedgewood, 106 A.D.2d 674, 483 N.Y.S.2d 440) and the defendant may not here challenge the factual basis for his plea (People v. Riley, 120 A.D.2d 752, 503 N.Y.S.2d 71).

Finally, the trial court was not obligated to sentence the defendant to an indeterminate term of from two to six years incarceration, which had been promised upon acceptance of a plea of guilty the defendant was thereafter permitted to withdraw (cf., People v. Ifill, 108 A.D.2d 202, 488 N.Y.S.2d 464; People v. Grant, 99 A.D.2d 536, 471 N.Y.S.2d 325). The defendant pleaded guilty a second time with the understanding that he would receive the sentence which was thereafter actually imposed and shows no basis to complain that the sentence was excessive (see, People v. Kazepis, 101 A.D.2d 816, 475 N.Y.S.2d 351).