People v. Phinney

• Decision Date: 06 June 1968
• Citation: 239 N.E.2d 515,22 N.Y.2d 288,292 N.Y.S.2d 632
• Parties: , 239 N.E.2d 515 The PEOPLE of the State of New York Appellant, v. Ronald PHINNEY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 632

292 N.Y.S.2d 632

22 N.Y.2d 288, 239 N.E.2d 515

The PEOPLE of the State of New York Appellant, v. Ronald PHINNEY, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 6, 1968.

William J. McClusky, Dist. Atty., for appellant.

Mahlon T. Clements, Morristown, for respondent.

FULD, Chief Judge.

The defendant was convicted of speeding by a Justice of the Peace. On appeal, a County Court reversed the judgment and dismissed the information on the ground that a statement made to a police officer by the defendant was improperly received in evidence because the officer had failed to give him the warning required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

The facts are quickly told. During a snowstorm in November of 1966, a state trooper came upon a wrecked automobile belonging to the defendant's mother, resting against a tree, some 15 feet off the road. The tire marks on the highway indicated that the car skidded for about 300 feet, crossed the road and continued going until it was finally stopped by the tree. After questioning some witnesses, the trooper repaired to a nearby hospital to which defendant had been removed. The officer found him, injured, in an emergency room; his father was with him. The officer asked the defendant if he had been driving the car involved in the accident and when he admitted that he had, the officer gave him a traffic summons.

On the basis of this evidence, the defendant was convicted of operating a vehicle 'at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions' (Vehicle and Traffic Law, Consol.Laws, c. 71, § 1180 subd. (a)). On appeal, he contended primarily that there was no evidence of the speed at which he had been traveling. As indicated, the County Court reversed and conviction and dismissed the information on the sole ground that, since the trooper failed to warn the defendant of his rights--as the court thought necessary under Miranda (384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, supra)--before questioning him in the hospital, his statement that he was operating the automobile should have been excluded.

By statutory definition, a traffic infraction 'is not a crime' (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 155), and this court has held that not all the constitutional protections normally afforded to criminal defendants need be applied to those charged with such a minor offense. (See People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 311--312, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370--372, 213 N.E.2d 670, 671--672.) Nevertheless, a speeding conviction may have serious implications, including fine, imprisonment and possible suspension of a driver's license. Consequently, at least in the absence of any undue administrative hardships, we have generally held that such prosecutions are governed by the rules of the criminal law. (See, e.g., People v. Firth, 3 N.Y.2d 472, 474, 168 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950, 146 N.E.2d 682, 683; Squadrito v. Griebsch, 1 N.Y.2d 471, 476, 154 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41, 136 N.E.2d 504, 507; People v. Hildebrandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377, 44 A.L.R.2d 449.) Whether or not this includes the right to a warning under Miranda (384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, supra) is, however, a question which we need not decided in the present case, since under no view of the facts may it be said that this defendant was in the Custody of the authorities at the time he made his statement.

A person, not actually placed under arrest, is not deemed in custody when questioned by the police unless 'the questioning takes place under circumstances which are likely to affect substantially the individual's 'will to resist and compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. '' (People v. Rodney P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 11, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 234, 233 N.E.2d 255,...