People v. Platt

• Decision Date: 12 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03SA217.,03SA217.
• Citation: 81 P.3d 1060
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Bruce PLATT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

81 P.3d 1060

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Bruce PLATT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03SA217.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

January 12, 2004.

A. William Ritter, Jr., District Attorney, Robert J. Whitley, Chief Appellate Deputy

District Attorney, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David S. Kaplan, State Public Defender, Holly Lucas, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal, pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), 6 C.R.S. (2002), and C.A.R. 4.1, the prosecution challenges an order of the Denver County District Court granting defendant Bruce Platt's motion to suppress his oral and written statements to the police. With regard to all three statements, the trial court ruled that, as a result of Platt's drug usage, he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. We reverse the trial court's suppression order with regard to all of his statements to the police.

The trial court failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding Platt's Miranda waiver; it took only one factor into account, intoxication. The record does not support the trial court's finding and conclusion that Platt did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Rather, the record demonstrates, under the totality of the circumstances, that Platt voluntarily spoke to the police and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.

I.

The prosecution charged Platt with Sexual Assault pursuant to section 18-3-402(1)(b), 6 C.R.S. (2002), and Failure to Register as a Sex Offender pursuant to section 18-3-412.5(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2002). The charges stemmed from an incident occurring at approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 6, 2002, when Platt allegedly fondled his sleeping housemate, first caressing the outside of her underwear and then digitally penetrating her vagina.

Platt made three separate statements to the police concerning the incident. First, at approximately 4:00 a.m. on December 6, within an hour of the incident, one of the officers who interviewed the alleged victim contacted Platt via telephone. During their conversation, Platt admitted that he had sexually assaulted his housemate. He also stated that it was his fourth sexual assault and he was concerned about going to prison for the rest of his life. Platt then agreed to meet the officer in person. Upon meeting, the officer arrested Platt and advised him of his Miranda rights.

After arriving with Platt at the police station, approximately 4:30 a.m., the officer advised Platt of his rights a second time. Platt stated that he understood his rights and was not intoxicated. He signed a written advisement form listing his Miranda rights. After discussing the events of the assault with the investigating officer orally, a conversation not recorded, Platt made a written statement that consists of two parts: (1) a two-page narrative that Platt wrote, and (2) a five-page question and answer dialogue that the police officer wrote.

A day later, at approximately 9:00 a.m. on December 7, Platt made a third statement, recorded on audiotape, to a different police officer. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion that this statement was not preceded by a Miranda advisement, the audiotape clearly reveals that the police advised Platt of his rights before he waived them both orally and in writing:

Q: Your rights are as follows: You have the right to remain silent, okay. Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and have him present during questioning.

A: Uh-huh.

Q: If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you without cost to you before questioning.

Do you understand each of these rights I've read to you?

A: Yes.

Q: I signed there saying I did read you your rights. There's your answer that you did understand your rights; you said yes.

Here's the spot where you need to sign saying that the rights were read to you. If you want to read them again, you can; they're right there above your signature.

Okay, now knowing your rights and knowing what you are doing, do you now wish to voluntarily talk with me?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay, go ahead and sign there.

Platt then signed the written advisement form and proceeded to give details about the sexual assault yet again, essentially repeating what he had written the day before and supplying additional detail.

When giving the Miranda advisements before the written and the audio-taped statements, the police officers asked Platt whether he was intoxicated. Each time he said he was not, although he told the officer who took the audio-taped interview that he had been smoking marijuana several hours before the sexual assault.

At the suppression hearing, Platt testified that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the incident, as well as when he made the telephone and the written statements. He said that he was suffering from withdrawal during the audio-taped statement. According to his testimony, during the afternoon and evening before the sexual assault, he had consumed three lines each of cocaine and methamphetamine and smoked three "bowls" of marijuana, two of which were laced with opium.

Assuming the truth of Platt's drug use testimony, which the trial court found to be credible, he ceased ingesting the drugs at midnight and made the telephone statement four hours later and the written statement five to seven hours after the last drug use. He made the audio-taped statement at least thirty-three hours after ingesting the drugs.

The trial court ordered the suppression of all three statements, ruling in toto:

The statements made were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Court finds the defendant's statements regarding his drug use credible. Prior to making the statements in question, the defendant was under the influence of marijuana, opium, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Having reviewed the Exhibit 2, the Court finds the defendant's statements to have been incoherent, rambling and demonstrative of his lack of understanding as a result of the drug usage. The officer knew or should have known from the defendant's rambling statements and demeanor that the defendant was under the influence of drugs and, as a result, unable to understand his Miranda rights. Thus, the Court finds that the drugs impaired the defendant's ability to such a degree that the Court cannot say the statements were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The defendant's statement contained on the audiotape is also suppressed for the same reasons and additionally, because no Miranda advisement was given.

We reverse the suppression order with regard to all of the statements.

II.

The trial court failed to evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding Platt's Miranda waiver; it took only one factor into account, intoxication. The record does not support the trial court's finding and conclusion that Platt did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. Rather, the record demonstrates, under the totality of the circumstances, that Platt voluntarily spoke to the police and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.

A. Standard of Review

A trial court engages in both factfinding and law application when it rules on a motion to suppress. People v. Kaiser, 32 P.3d 480, 483 (Colo.2001). When a trial court determines whether a defendant has validly waived the Miranda rights, the court engages in both factfinding and law application. See People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 461 (Colo.2002)

. Although we defer to the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by competent evidence in the record, id. at 462, whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard to the facts established by the record is a mixed question of fact and law we review de novo. A trial court may not reach legal conclusions that are not supported by the record. People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348, 355 (Colo.2003).

Accordingly, if competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, we give deference to them; conversely, we set aside findings of fact that are clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. Kaiser, 32 P.3d at 483. We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. People v. Miller, 75 P.3d 1108, 1111-12 (Colo.2003).

B. Waiver of Miranda Rights

At the outset of custodial interrogation, the police must issue a Miranda advisement to inform a suspect of his or her constitutional rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); see also Minjarez, 81 P.3d at 352

. Suspects can waive their rights upon receiving a proper Miranda advisement; however, in order to be valid, the waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,

86 S.Ct. 1602. A Miranda waiver is considered voluntary unless "coercive governmental conduct—whether physical or psychological—played a significant role in inducing the defendant to make the confession or statement." People v. May, 859 P.2d 879, 883 (Colo.1993). A waiver is knowing and intelligent when made with full awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 851 (Colo.1989).

The prosecution must prove the validity of a defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Kaiser, 32 P.3d at 484. Courts evaluate a defendant's waiver of Miranda rights based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation. Kaiser, 32 P.3d at 484. A court is not limited in the number of factors it may consider, and no single factor is determinative. Minjarez, 81 P.3d at 353.

In assessing the validity of a Miranda waiver, factors a...