People v. S.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1971
• Citation: 29 N.Y.2d 172,272 N.E.2d 558,324 N.Y.S.2d 58
• Parties: , 272 N.E.2d 558 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dwight S. (Anonymous), Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 58

324 N.Y.S.2d 58

29 N.Y.2d 172, 272 N.E.2d 558

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dwight S. (Anonymous), Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 7, 1971.

G. Jeffery Sorge, James J. McDonough and Matthew Muraskin, Mineola, for appellant.

William Cahn, Dist. Atty. (Henry P. DeVine, Mineola, of counsel), for respondent.

SCILEPPI, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a judgment adjudicating him a youthful offender upon his plea of guilty to acts, which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of reckless endangerment in the second degree.

Firstly, for the reasons stated in the majority opinion at the Appellate Division (People v. Dwight S. (Anonymous), 33 A.D.2d 1032, 309 N.Y.S.2d 70), there is no merit whatsoever to appellant's claim that his prior conviction for reckless driving requires the conclusion that he was placed in double jeopardy by the prosecution of the youthful offender information. Consequently, we have limited our comments to the question whether appellant has been unlawfully deprived of a right to a jury trial.

After appellant had been indicted for reckless endangerment in the first degree, he executed a consent to consideration for youthful offender treatment and to a nonjury trial. The District Attorney thereafter filed a youthful offender information and appellant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on ground of double jeopardy. Rather than submit to a trial, appellant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge and was subsequently sentenced to an unconditional discharge. Relying upon this court's decision in People v. Michael A.C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, appellant argues that a reversal is mandated because he was deprived of his right to a jury trial. We disagree. In Michael A. C., sections 913--g and 913--h of the Code of Criminal Procedure were held unconstitutional, insofar as they required a defendant to consent to a nonjury trial before he could be considered eligible for youthful offender treatment. At issue was not whether the consent was involuntary, but whether the State could constitutionally exact the choice. It was concluded that since the defendant was charged with an offense deemed serious under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, he had a right to a jury trial which could not be forfeited because he wished youthful offender treatment (People v. Michael A. C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 86--87, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 700--701, Supra). The court was, however, quick to add in People v. Jerome C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 87, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701, decided as a companion case to Michael A. C., that the scope of the rule then declared would be limited to those situations where the Duncan rationale would obtain. Thus, since the Supreme Court had decided in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633--635, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 that Duncan would only apply to those trials commenced after May 20, 1968, we sustained the youthful offender adjudication in Jerome C. because his trial had commenced some two months prior to that date (People v. Jerome C., 27 N.Y.2d 79, 88, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695, 702 Supra). This was so even though Jerome's actual adjudication did not occur until after Duncan had been decided. In the case before us both the guilty plea and the adjudication took place after May 20, 1968. It is, however, significant that as with Jerome C., appellant herein consented to nonjury youthful offender treatment at a time when there was no right to a jury trial. Thus, this case does not fall within the admit of Duncan and we conclude that the rule announced in Michael A. C. has no application to the matter at bar.

Apart from this problem of retroactivity, we note that in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, the Supreme Court recently sustained the rationale adopted by this court in Matter of D. (Daniel), 27 N.Y.2d 90, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, app. dsmd. cert. den. 403 U.S. 926, 91 S.Ct. 2244, 29 L.Ed.2d 705, holding that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Michael A. C., of course, involved a youthful offender adjudication. Appellant herein is not in an analogous position. He pleaded guilty. Inasmuch as a plea of guilty is, under prior decisions of our court, a waiver of all trials, jury and nonjury alike, it is our view that appellant may not now be heard to complain that he was denied the right to trial by jury. As we recently wrote in People v. Lynn, 28 N.Y.2d 196, 201--202, 321 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78, 269 N.E.2d 794, 797: 'A plea of guilty 'is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction (and) ...