People v. Stone
| Citation | 471 P.3d 1159 |
| Decision Date | 13 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 16CA1348 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan Cole STONE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jud Lohnes, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD
¶1 Defendant, Ryan Cole Stone, appeals the trial court's restitution order. We affirm in part, and we reverse in part.
¶2 Defendant stole a car, and he led the police on a high-speed chase around the metro Denver area. In the process, he commandeered several other cars. Colorado State Patrol troopers tried to stop defendant using "stop sticks" — sticks with spikes on them designed to puncture a car's tires to disable it — on E-470, but he avoided the stop sticks by swerving around them onto the road's shoulder. In doing so, he hit one of the troopers with the car, causing the trooper serious injuries.
¶3 A jury convicted defendant of attempted manslaughter, first degree assault, vehicular eluding, criminal mischief, six counts of leaving the scene of an accident, two counts of robbery, two counts of child abuse, and three counts of aggravated motor vehicle theft. We affirm these convictions in a separate appeal. People v. Stone , 2020COA23.
¶4 Defendant objected to the prosecution's written restitution request, and he asked for a hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court granted most of the prosecution's request. The court asked the prosecution to submit a proposed written restitution order for its approval that reflected the amounts that it had orally ordered. The prosecution submitted, and the trial court signed, a written restitution order in the amount of $252,027.69.
¶5 Section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 2019, requires convicted offenders to pay restitution to compensate crime victims for the harm that they have suffered. "The purpose of restitution is to make the victim whole, and the Restitution Act is to be ‘liberally construed’ to accomplish that purpose." People v. McCann , 122 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Colo. App. 2005) (quoting § 18-1.3-601(2), C.R.S. 2004 ). A trial court must order restitution whenever a defendant's criminal conduct causes pecuniary damage to a victim. People v. Reyes , 166 P.3d 301, 302 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶6 The prosecution has the burden of proving restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. People in Interest of D.W. , 232 P.3d 182, 183 (Colo. App. 2009). Specifically, it must establish "the amount of restitution owed and, generally, that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's loss." People v. Henry , 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 15, 439 P.3d 33.
¶7 Generally, we review a court's restitution order for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 12. But, when the issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the order, we apply de novo review, evaluating "whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused that amount of loss." People v. Barbre , 2018 COA 123, ¶ 25, 429 P.3d 95 ; see also People in Interest of A.V. , 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 32, 446 P.3d 887.
¶8 This appeal also requires us to interpret statutes. Our review is de novo. People v. Jenkins , 2013 COA 76, ¶ 12, 305 P.3d 420.
¶9 When we interpret a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Colo. Dep't of Revenue v. Creager Mercantile Co. , 2017 CO 41M, ¶ 16, 395 P.3d 741. "We construe the entire statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all [of its] parts," and "[w]e give effect to words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning[s]." Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter , 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011). If a statute's language is clear, we apply it as written. Id.
¶10 Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously ordered restitution to the Crime Victim Compensation Board, which we shall call "the board."
¶11 In Colorado, each judicial district has its own "crime victim compensation board." § 24-4.1-103(1), C.R.S. 2019. To be eligible for compensation, a person must apply to the board. § 24-4.1-105(1).
¶12 The board made two payments that are pertinent to this appeal. First, the board paid a claim to the trooper's brother for his travel expenses to come to Colorado. Second, the board paid a claim to the trooper's girlfriend for her lost wages.
¶13 Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by awarding restitution to the board for the payments to the brother and to the girlfriend for two reasons: (1) they were not "victims" under the restitution statute; and, (2) even if they were, the prosecution did not prove that defendant's conduct proximately caused their losses. We disagree with both contentions for the following reasons.
¶14 Defendant first contends that the trial court could not order restitution to the board because neither the brother nor the girlfriend met the definition of a victim in the restitution statute. We are not persuaded.
¶15 Under the restitution statute, a "victim" is "any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender." § 18-1.3-602(4)(a), C.R.S. 2019. As is pertinent to this appeal, the restitution statute allows compensation to a "sibling" or a "significant other," as that term is defined in section 24-4.1-302(4), C.R.S. 2019, of a victim, if the victim is "deceased or incapacitated." § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(V). Defendant asserts that, because the trooper was not "deceased or incapacitated," the definitions of "sibling" and "significant other" are inapplicable to the brother and girlfriend.
¶16 But the restitution statute also provides that "victim" means "[a]ny victim compensation board that has paid a victim compensation claim." § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(IV). In this case, the board paid for the brother's travel expenses and the girlfriend's lost wages. So, under that statute, the board was the victim. See id. ; see also People v. Bohn , 2015 COA 178, ¶¶ 10-11, 381 P.3d 334, superseded by statute as stated in Henry , 2018 COA 48M, 439 P.3d 33.
¶17 There are three reasons why we are not persuaded that the person whom the board reimburses must also meet one of the definitions in section 18-1.3-602(4)(a) for the trial court to award restitution to the board.
¶18 First, the plain language of section 18-1.3-602(4)(a) does not go that far. It begins by stating that the word " ‘[v]ictim’ means any person aggrieved by the conduct of an offender and includes but is not limited to the following ...." Id. (emphasis added).
¶19 Second, when looking at the statutes that govern crime victim compensation boards, we see that a victim includes "any person who is a relative of a primary victim." § 24-4.1-102(10)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2019. A "primary victim" is "[a]ny person against whom a compensable crime is perpetrated or attempted." § 24-4.1-102(10)(a)(I). A "[r]elative" includes a "brother" or "any person who has a family-type relationship with a victim." § 24-4.1-102(9).
¶20 When reading these statutes together, our first obligation is to harmonize the definitions of "victim" in section 18-1.3-602(4)(a) and in section 24-4.1-102(9) and (10). § 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2019. We can do so by concluding that (1) the specific definition of "victim" in section 24-4.1-102(9) applies to crime victim compensation board decisions and to trial court decisions awarding restitution to such boards; while (2) the definition of "victim" found in section 18-1.3-602(4)(a) applies to all other trial court decisions to award compensation.
¶21 But, third, even if we were to conclude that these two statutes conflict, we would reach the same result because "[a] primary rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over general legislation." People v. Weller , 679 P.2d 1077, 1082 (Colo. 1984) ; see also § 2-4-205, C.R.S. 2019. And the definition of "victim" in section 24-4.1-102(9) is more specific than the definition in section 18-1.3-602(4)(a) because it deals with only one part of the universe of restitution cases: awards made by crime victim compensation boards. So defendant's assertion — the board could not compensate the brother or the girlfriend because they were not victims for the purposes of the general restitution statute under section 18-1.3-602(4)(a) — is rebuffed by the express language of the statute that governed the board's decisions in this case.
¶22 The prosecution must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant proximately caused the victim's loss. People v. Henson , 2013 COA 36, ¶ 11, 307 P.3d 1135. This legal principle brings us to defendant's second contention.
¶23 In 2015, the General Assembly amended the restitution statute to address cases in which a compensation board seeks reimbursement for assistance provided to a victim. See Henry , ¶ 16. "A crime victim may seek compensation from a compensation board [and,] [i]f the board pays such a claim, a court may order the defendant to reimburse the board for the amount of assistance that it paid to the victim." Id. (citation omitted).
¶24 Under this statute, "the amount of assistance provided and requested by the crime victim compensation board is presumed to be a direct result of the defendant's criminal conduct and must be considered by the court in determining the amount of restitution ordered." § 18-1.3-603(10)(a). This statute creates a rebuttable presumption that the prosecution has satisfied its burden of proving "that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victim's loss." Henry , ¶ 18. So, "[o]nce a compensation board has established that it paid a victim a set amount, the defendant has the...
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