People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 11 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. H013331,H013331
• Citation: 49 Cal.App.4th 1632,57 Cal.Rptr.2d 448
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7629, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,495 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard Carl WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 448

57 Cal.Rptr.2d 448

49 Cal.App.4th 1632, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7629,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,495

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard Carl WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H013331.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Oct. 11, 1996.

Certified for Partial Publication ^*

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1996.

Review Denied Jan. 28, 1997.

Deanna F. Lamb By Appointment of the Sixth District Appellate Program, Santa Clara, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Asst. Atty. General, Ronald S. Matthias, Supervising Deputy Atty. General, Martin S. Kaye, Deputy Atty. General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WUNDERLICH, Associate Justice.

I. Statement of the Case

Defendant Richard Carl Williams appeals from a judgment entered after he pleaded guilty to three counts of residential burglary and one count of receiving stolen property and the court found him guilty of a fourth count of residential burglary and also found true prior conviction allegations.

Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the burglary count that was tried. He claims the trial court failed to render a verdict on the prior conviction allegations. He claims the court erred in failing to strike an enhancement allegation because it was not a "prior conviction," in considering as a "strike" a prior conviction suffered before Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), the "three strikes" law, (hereafter § 667(b)-(i)) was enacted, and in not determining whether to strike the prior allegation convictions in furtherance of justice. ¹ He also claims the "three strikes" law is unconstitutionally vague, it was improperly passed as urgency legislation, and its limitation on the amount of conduct credit he can earn while in prison violates his right to equal protection. Last, he claims the limitation on the amount of custody credit he can earn in prison applies only to the term imposed for the burglary committed after the "three strikes" law became effective.

The People also appeal from the judgment. They claim that the court erred in staying a five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction.

We agree with defendant's claim that the credit limitation does not apply to offenses that pre-date the "three strikes" law. We find no merit to his other claims. We also agree with the People's claim and remand the case for a redetermination of the sentence.

II. Facts

Linda Broughton and William Red live in apartment 309 at 501 Camino Aguajito in Monterey. On March 14, 1994, Red left for work at 7:30 a.m. Broughton left at approximately 9 a.m., locking the door on her way out. At around that time Larry Schmidt, who lives above Broughton and Red, saw an African-American woman standing between Broughton's apartment and the next apartment. He asked what she was doing. She said she was waiting for someone in apartment number 311. Schmidt knew apartment 311 was empty and escorted the woman off the property.

That same morning, Nader Agha, who operates The Coin Treasure Shop, was driving on Sloat Street not far from Camino Aguajito. He saw defendant holding hands with an African-American woman. He recognized both because they had been in his store.

At noon, Broughton returned home to find the door ajar and a window broken. Various items of jewelry were missing. She called Red, and he returned also to discover jewelry and money missing. They called the police, who came and checked for fingerprints but found none. Later, Schmidt identified a photo of Loretta Wilson to Officer Steven Brownlee as the person he had seen near Broughton's apartment.

The next day, Brownlee saw defendant and Wilson walking together on Fremont Street in Seaside. Wilson entered the Peninsula Gem and Jewelry store by herself. She later rejoined defendant outside. Brownlee entered the store and spoke with Mike Green, who said the woman had wanted to sell a ring. Green made a sketch, which Broughton later said depicted a ring identical to one that was missing.

On March 16, Detective Steven McMahon saw defendant and Wilson in Seaside. Defendant was wearing a black leather jacket. The pair were headed toward the Driftwood Motel. On March 18, police searched their motel room pursuant to a warrant. In a closet, police found a black leather jacket with a pair of socks in an inner pocket. They did not find any jewelry. Defendant and Wilson were arrested for being under the influence of narcotics.

Later, Wilson led police to an alley behind an address defendant had been known to use and showed them where to find a paper bag, which contained items taken from Broughton's apartment. Wilson also said they would find a piece of broken glass in a planter in the apartment.

At trial, Wilson admitted she and defendant had previously burglarized a different apartment on February 18, 1994. The trial court took judicial notice of its files which revealed that defendant pleaded guilty to the February burglary and that Wilson pleaded guilty to the Broughton burglary.

III. Defendant's Appeal

A.-B. ^**

C. Defendant's plea established his prior conviction.

On December 6, 1993, defendant committed a burglary, and on March 2, 1994, he pleaded guilty--Case No. MCR9120. On March 14, he committed the Broughton burglary. On April 19, judgment was pronounced in MCR9120. The information in this case charged the prior burglary as a "strike" under section 667(b)-(i).

Defendant notes that section 667, subdivision (c), makes the harsher "three strikes" sentencing provisions applicable when (1) a defendant "has been convicted of a felony" and (2) "it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d)...." (Emphasis added.) He contends the burglary in MCR9120 cannot be considered a prior felony conviction. He argues that "prior felony convictions" in section 667, subdivision (c), is ambiguous because it can narrowly mean a verdict or guilty plea or more broadly include both the verdict or plea and the judgment pronounced thereon. (See People v. Vessell (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 285, 291, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 241; Boyll v. State Personnel Board (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1070, 1073-1074, 194 Cal.Rptr. 717.) He claims that under established rules of statutory construction, we must adopt that latter interpretation because it is more favorable to him. (See People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288.) Thus, because judgment in No. MCR9120 was not pronounced until after he committed the Broughton burglary, the court erred in treating the prior offense as a "strike." We disagree.

In People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 60, 270 Cal.Rptr. 266, the court recognized that "the term 'conviction' has no fixed definition and has been interpreted by the courts of this state to have various meanings, depending upon the context in which the word is used." Generally, however, where the existence of a prior conviction triggers increased punishments, courts interpret "conviction" to mean the factual ascertainment of guilt by verdict or plea.

For example, in People v. Rhoads, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 270 Cal.Rptr. 266, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of drugs, but before being sentenced, he committed additional offenses. The information alleged the first offense as a prior conviction. As here, the defendant claimed "conviction" included judgment and sentence. The court disagreed and opined that this interpretation would lead to " 'nonsensical results.' " (Id. at p. 59, 270 Cal.Rptr. 266.) "[A] person could commit and plead guilty to any number of violations within the purview of the statute, but so long as sentencing did not occur, the mandatory three-year enhancement would be avoided. The Legislature certainly did not intend to benefit a repeat offender such as defendant based solely on the fortuity of the timing of sentencing." (Ibid.) In this regard, the court noted that the purpose of the enhancement "is to deter repetition of the criminal conduct. [Citation.] In this context, i.e., statutes which impose more severe penalties for second and subsequent criminal offenses, 'conviction' means the ascertainment of guilt, whether by plea or verdict." (Id. at pp. 60-61, 270 Cal.Rptr. 266; see also People v. Shirley (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 40, 46-47, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 340; People v. Johnson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 316, 324-325, 258 Cal.Rptr. 347; People v. Loomis (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 594, 595-596, 42 Cal.Rptr. 124.)

We find Rhoads persuasive and applicable in the "three strikes" context. To determine the meaning of "prior convictions" in section 667, subdivision (c), we must "ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420.)

The purpose of section 667(b)-(i) is to deter and punish recidivism by making repeat offenders serve longer sentences. (See § 667, subd. (b).) The focus of the "three strikes" law is conduct: did the defendant commit a felony after having previously committed one or more serious or violent felonies. When a defendant pleads guilty to or is convicted of a felony, the law is satisfied factually that he or she committed it. When the deterrent effect of the law fails and the defendant subsequently commits another felony, he or she becomes a repeat offender and deserves harsher punishment, regardless of whether judgment and sentence have been pronounced on the initial offense.

Given the focus and purpose of section 667(b)-(i), we conclude that "prior felony convictions" in section 667, subdivision (c), falls within the general rule illustrated in Rhoads: when guilt is established, either by plea or verdict, the defendant stands convicted and thereafter has a prior conviction.

We are not bound by the rule requiring courts to adopt the more...