Phillips v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. S08A1500.,S08A1500.
• Citation: 675 S.E.2d 1,285 Ga. 213
• Parties: PHILLIPS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

285 Ga. 213

675 S.E.2d 1

PHILLIPS v. The STATE.

No. S08A1500.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

February 9, 2009.

Reconsideration Denied April 9, 2009.

Ross & Pines, Noah H. Pines, Atlanta, for appellant.

Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, John S. Melvin, Barbara B. Conroy, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sheila E. Gallow, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Renaldo Tramone Phillips was found guilty of the 2002 malice murder and armed robbery of Mamadou Bah and sentenced to life imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively.¹ On appeal, he contends reversible legal error was committed during his trial and maintains he was not afforded effective assistance from defense counsel. After examining appellant's enumerated errors, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

1. The State presented evidence that Mamadou Bah suffered fatal gunshot wounds from a bullet that entered his left upper arm, went through his left lung and his heart, and lodged in his right lung. The forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy on the body of the victim testified the fatal shot was fired from a distance of 12-24 inches. The victim was found slumped over in the front seat of his vehicle which was parked near the mailboxes of the apartment complex in which he resided. He was wearing a shirt, underwear, and socks, and his shoes were found on the parking surface outside his vehicle, at the driver's door. Appellant's fingerprints were found on the back door on the driver's side of the victim's vehicle. There was evidence that a bullet had been fired through the window of the back door on the driver's side into the vehicle.

Appellant's co-indictee, who had pled guilty to robbing the victim, testified that appellant drove to the co-indictee's house on the day the victim was killed and asked the co-indictee to drive appellant in appellant's vehicle to an apartment complex. When they arrived, the co-indictee parked at the complex's mailboxes and appellant walked over to the victim's vehicle as the victim was entering it and ordered the victim to "give it up." Appellant hit the victim in the head with a gun and had the victim remove his shoes and pants. According to the co-indictee, as appellant and the co-indictee walked away from the victim, appellant turned back and fired several shots at the victim's vehicle. The victim's wallet was found a month later on school property located between the site of the murder and appellant's home.

Also admitted into evidence were letters received by the co-indictee while he was in jail after having been arrested in connection with the murder of Mr. Bah. The co-indictee identified the letters as having been written by appellant while he was in jail awaiting trial on these charges. The writer of the letters repeatedly addressed the co-indictee with a racial epithet ("my n___"), expressed regret for what he had done, revealed that he dreamt "about him killing me instead ... [,]" and discussed the weakness of the State's case against the two of them.

The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of malice murder and armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it did not suppress a statement appellant made to the lead investigating detective after appellant was arrested and before he was informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

The detective began the post-arrest interview by informing appellant of the charges against him and that appellant's friend (and, ultimately, his co-indictee) had implicated appellant in the murder and identified him as the triggerman. Using a racial epithet, appellant responded, "my n—wouldn't do anything like that to me, I don't believe you." The detective then administered the Miranda warnings and appellant invoked his right to remain silent. After conducting a hearing, the trial court ruled that appellant's statement was admissible because it was a spontaneous utterance and was not an incriminating statement. During the State's case-in-chief, the detective testified to appellant's remark and the State introduced into evidence incriminating letters purportedly written by appellant to his co-indictee while both were incarcerated and awaiting trial, in which letters the writer used the same racial epithet to refer to the co-indictee, the recipient of the letters.

"[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A statement obtained in violation of Miranda is inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief, regardless of whether said statement is incriminating, because Miranda covers "any response—whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302, n. 5, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). See Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Fla.1997) (Miranda is not limited to the use of incriminating statements made by an accused during custodial interrogation, but applies to the use of all statements made by an accused during custodial interrogation); State v. Primus, 312 S.Ct. 256, 258, 440 S.E.2d 128 (S.C.1994) (Miranda covers defendant's statements whether exculpatory or inculpatory). See also 2 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, Sec. 6.5(b), p. 705 (3d ed.2007).

Miranda warnings must be administered to an accused when the accused is in custody and subjected to interrogation or its functional equivalent, i.e., "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682; Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713(4), 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997). "Voluntary statements made by unwarned suspects in custodial interrogation are presumed to be compulsory and are inadmissible at trial." Waters v. State, 281 Ga. 119(4), 636 S.E.2d 538 (2006). On the other hand, a spontaneous and unsolicited statement not made in response to any form of custodial interrogation is not subject to the strictures of Miranda and is admissible without the warnings having been given. Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 857(3), 452 S.E.2d 494 (1995).

Appellant's statement was in response to the detective's summary of incriminating evidence against appellant. Because it is undisputed that appellant was under arrest at the time he uttered the statement at issue and appellant's statement was not in response to an express question posed to him, the issue is whether appellant was subjected to the functional equivalent of interrogation when he made the statement. More specifically, focusing "primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police" (Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682), were the detective's words and action of informing appellant that his friend had implicated appellant as the triggerman in a murder something the detective should have known were reasonably likely to elicit a response from appellant that could be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief? In Gardner v. State, 261 Ga.App. 10, 11, 582 S.E.2d 7 (2003), our Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court erred when it did not suppress a defendant's un-Mirandized statements made in response to a detective's summary of evidence against him because the detective "should have known that if he advised [the defendant] of the incriminating evidence against him, it was reasonably likely that [the defendant's] response would prove incriminating to some degree." Gardner is in keeping with appellate decisions holding that the disclosure of incriminating evidence to a suspect constitutes interrogation within the meaning of Rhode Island v. Innis. See State v. Sawyer, 156 S.W.3d 531 (Tenn.2005) (placing defendant in an environment where defendant could reasonably believe he was to be interrogated and informing him of charge and that accomplice had given a statement was the functional equivalent of interrogation); Hill v. United States, 858 A.2d 435 (D.C.App. 2004) (detective telling defendant that defendant's friend told police what had happened was the functional equivalent of interrogation); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 567 Pa. 415, 787 A.2d 394 (2001) (officer engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation when officer told defendant he had been implicated in shootings and told him the contents of witness statements concerning his involvement). But see State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 944 A.2d 947 (2008) (officer's comment to defendant that his blood was found at scene was a response to the defendant's implicit question regarding the basis for his arrest); People v. Haley, 34 Cal.4th 283, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170(2004) (detective's statement informing defendant of the evidence against him was not the functional equivalent of interrogation); State v. Maraschiello, 88 S.W.3d 586, 603 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2000) (disclosure of incriminating evidence to a suspect does not necessarily constitute the functional equivalent of interrogation. See also 2 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, Sec. 6.7(c), pp. 781-785).

The trial court did not make a determination as to whether the detective's words and actions constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation under Innis. However, even if we were to assume the trial court erred when it did not find the detective's words and actions to be the functional equivalent of interrogation, the...