Pruitt v. State

• Decision Date: 27 April 2018
• Docket Number: CR–16–0956
• Citation: 272 So.3d 732
• Parties: Ashley Parkins PRUITT v. STATE of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

272 So.3d 732

Ashley Parkins PRUITT

v.STATE of Alabama

CR–16–0956

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 27, 2018

Rehearing Denied June 29, 2018

Certiorari Denied September 14, 2018

Alabama Supreme Court 1170956

Brett Ashley King, Locust Fork, for appellant.

Steve Marshall, atty. gen., and Laura I. Cuthbert, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

KELLUM, Judge.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the appellant, Ashley Parkins Pruitt, a school employee, pleaded guilty to two counts of engaging in a sex act or deviant sexual intercourse with a student under the age of 19 years, a violation of § 13A–6–81, Ala. Code 1975, and two counts of distribution of obscene material to a minor, a violation of § 13A–12–200.5, Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court sentenced Pruitt to 15 years' imprisonment for each conviction for engaging in a sex act or deviant sexual intercourse with a student under the age of 19 years; those sentences were split, and Pruitt was ordered to serve 1 year in jail and 2 years on house arrest followed by 3 years' supervised probation. For her convictions for distributing obscene material to a minor, the circuit court sentenced Pruitt to one year in jail; those sentences were split and Pruitt was ordered to serve six months in jail followed by three years' supervised probation. The court ordered that all four sentences were to run concurrently. The court further ordered Pruitt to pay $2,500 in fines, $250 to the crime victims compensation fund, and court costs.

During the guilty plea, the parties submitted an exhibit to the plea agreement in which they stipulated to the following facts:

"Ashley Pruitt (hereinafter ‘AP’) was employed with the Blount County Board of Education at various times as a teacher and coach from 2008 to 2015.

"At all times relevant to this case, AP resided in the Locust Fork community.

"AP was hired as a teacher and coach at Locust Fork High School, where she taught during the school years of 2012–2013 and 2013–2014. The school year runs from August through May.

"At all time pertinent to this case, Victim # 1, Victim # 2, and Victim # 3 were between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years old, student athletes, and enrolled as students at Locust Fork High School. All victims were in AP's classes, at some point, at Locust Fork High School during the school years of 2012–13 and/or 2013–14.

"In August 2014, the Blount County Board of Education hired AP to teach and coach at Appalachian High School where she remained employed as a teacher and coach until January 2015.

"Locust Fork High School and Appalachian High School are located in Blount County, Alabama, and are a part of the Blount County School System. Locust Fork High School and Appalachian High School are about 20 miles apart. There are a total of seven high schools in Blount County. Six of those seven high schools are a part of the Blount County School System.

"In October 2014, AP knowingly sent Victim # 1, who was 16 at the time, a nude photograph of her breasts and a nude photograph of her vagina via Snapchat [social-media platform] using an electronic device while in Blount County. Victim # 1 claims the photos did not ‘harm’ him. As to Victim # 1, the State would assert that harm is determined by the trier of fact based on community standards. Per the statute, the term ‘harmful to minors’ is defined as

"a. The average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of minors; and

"b. The material depicts or describes sexual conduct, breast nudity or genital nudity, in a way which is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community with respect to what is suitable to minors; and

"c. A reasonable person would find that the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political or scientific value for minors.

"In October 2014, AP engaged in deviant sexual intercourse with Victim # 2, who was 16 at the time, in Blount County, Alabama.

"In September 2014, AP engaged in sexual intercourse with Victim # 3, who was 18 at the time, in Blount County, Alabama.

"All acts between AP and the victims were consensual. However, it is the State's argument that under [§]13A–6–81, [Ala. Code 1975,] consent is not a defense to the crimes charged."

(C. 44–45.)

Before entering her plea, Pruitt filed a motion to dismiss the charges pending against her on the basis that the statutes under which she pleaded guilty were unconstitutional as applied to her. At the time she entered her guilty plea, Pruitt filed a renewed motion to dismiss all five counts against her in which she reasserted her constitutional challenge and during her guilty-plea colloquy reserved her challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes. This appeal followed.

I.

Pruitt contends that § 13A–6–81, Ala. Code 1975, is unconstitutional as applied to her. Specifically, Pruitt argues that her felony convictions should be overturned because, she says, the legislature never intended § 13A–6–81, Ala. Code 1975, to apply to teachers and students, 16 and older, who are not at the same school. Pruitt cites the United States Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), in support of her contention on appeal and contends that "[t]he Lawrence opinion, with Alabama's age of consent being sixteen, should protect Pruitt from prosecution for her sexual activities with Locust Fort students." (Pruitt's brief, pp. 9–13.)

"The interpretation of a statute involves a question of law and an appellate court reviews a trial court's interpretation de novo, without any presumption of correctness. Simcala, Inc. v. American Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So.2d 197 (Ala. 2001). " ‘[O]n appeal, the ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness, and this Court's review is de novo." Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Ala.1997).’ Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala. 1999)."

Girard v. State, 883 So.2d 717, 719 (Ala. 2003).

"It is well settled that a person challenging the constitutionality of a statute as applied to [her] ‘bears the burden of proving that [the statute] is unconstitutional as applied to [her] conduct.’ Powell v. State, 72 So.3d 1268, 1278 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). The Texas Court of Appeals has explained:

" ‘A statute may be found unconstitutional "as applied" to a specific set of facts or "on its face." See Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662, 665 n. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ; Bynum v. State, 767 S.W.2d 769, 773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Generally, a defendant must show that a statute is unconstitutional "as applied" to the conduct for which he was charged. See id. at 774. A claim that a statute is unconstitutional "as applied" is a claim that the statute operates unconstitutionally with respect to the claimant because of his particular circumstances. Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 536 n. 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).’

" State v. Johnson, 425 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. App. 2014)."

Wesson v. State, 208 So.3d 1160, 1162 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).

Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. In considering whether a legislative act is unconstitutional, we are guided by the following principles:

" ‘This Court " ‘should be very reluctant to hold any act unconstitutional.’ " Ex parte D.W., 835 So.2d 186, 189 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte Boyd, 796 So.2d 1092, 1094 (Ala. 2001) ). "[I]n passing upon the constitutionality of a legislative act, the courts uniformly approach the question with every presumption and intendment in favor of its validity, and seek to sustain rather than strike down the enactment of a coordinate branch of the government." Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 9, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944) (emphasis added). This is so, because "it is the recognized duty of the court to sustain the act unless it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that it is violative of the fundamental law." 246 Ala. at 9, 18 So.2d at 815 (emphasis added).’ "

Vann v. State, 143 So.3d 850, 854–55 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting McInnish v. Riley, 925 So.2d 174, 178 (Ala. 2005) ). In order to overcome the presumption of constitutionality, the party challenging the constitutionality of an act bears the burden of showing that the act is unconstitutional. State v. Worley, 102 So.3d 435, 449 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

Pruitt pleaded guilty to violating § 13A–6–81, Ala. Code 1975. At the time of the crime in this case, § 13A–6–81, Ala. Code 1975, provided, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person commits the crime of a school employee engaging in a sex act or deviant sexual intercourse with a student under the age of 19 years if he or she is a school employee and engages in a sex act or deviant sexual intercourse with a student, regardless of whether the student is male or female. Consent is not a defense to a charge under this section."¹

Pruitt does not dispute that she was a teacher at the time she engaged in a sex act or deviant sexual intercourse with the victims in this case. As a teacher, Pruitt was a school employee. See § 13A–6–80, Ala. Code 1975 ("For purposes of this article, school employee includes a teacher...."). Further, it is undisputed that the victims in this case were students. However, Pruitt argues that regardless of her status as a teacher, the facts of this case, namely, that the student victims were 16 years and older and attended a different school than the school in which Pruitt taught, resulted in the unconstitutional application of § 13A–6–81 in this case. Relying on Lawrence v. Texas, Pruitt argues that she engaged in sexual conduct with consenting parties under Alabama law who were "mature enough to consent to sexual relations." (Pruitt's brief, p. 13.) Pruitt's reliance on Lawrence, however, is unavailing.

In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Texas statute that provided: "A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual...