R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield

• Decision Date: 08 February 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 5D17-2521
• Parties: R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant, v. Mary E. SHEFFIELD, Personal Representative of the Estate of Valton Sheffield, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

266 So.3d 1230

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant,

v.Mary E. SHEFFIELD, Personal Representative of the Estate of Valton Sheffield, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-2521

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed February 8, 2019

Rehearing Denied March 28, 2019

Troy A. Fuhrman, and Marie A. Borland, of Hill Ward Henderson, Tampa, Brian C. Lea, Pro Hac Vice, of Jones Day, Atlanta, and Charles R. A. Morse, of Jones Day, New York, for Appellant.

David J. Sales, and Daniel R. Hoffman, of David J. Sales, P.A., Sarasota, and Melvin B. Wright, and Lisa Thomas, of Colling, Gilbert Wright & Carter, LLC, Orlando, for Appellee.

EDWARDS, J.

The issue we address in this Engle -progeny¹ wrongful death case is whether to apply the punitive damages statute in place at the time of the decedent's death or to instead apply the punitive damages statute in place when the Engle class was recertified in 1996. Based on the statute's specific language and well-established Florida law, we hold that the applicable version of the punitive damages statute is the 1999 version of section 768.73, Florida Statutes, which was in effect when the instant wrongful death cause of action accrued on the date of decedent's death. We find the trial court erred by applying the pre-1999 version of that statute and reverse for further proceedings that may include a new trial on punitive damages. We are aware that three other district courts of appeal have reached a different conclusion on this issue; therefore, we certify express and direct conflict with those decisions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Valton Sheffield was first diagnosed with primary lung cancer

in 1994, nearly ten years after he quit smoking. He had a portion of the affected lung removed and then underwent radiation and chemical therapies, which purportedly cured him of that first cancer. In 2003, he was again diagnosed with lung cancer and underwent similar treatment. Three years later, in 2006, he was once again diagnosed with lung cancer and passed away in 2007.

His widow, Mary Sheffield, was named personal representative of his estate. On behalf of the Estate, she timely filed a wrongful death action seeking compensatory and punitive damages from several tobacco companies, including Appellant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, based on her claim that her husband's death was the result of smoking the defendants' addictive, harmful cigarettes. The Estate's complaint contained counts sounding in negligence, strict liability, fraud by concealment, and conspiracy to commit fraud, and further alleged that Mr. Sheffield was a member of the so-called Engle class.

Following trial, the jury returned one verdict finding liability against Reynolds and awarding $ 1.8 million in compensatory damages, and a second verdict awarding $ 5 million in punitive damages against Reynolds.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Prior to, during, and following trial, Reynolds argued that the punitive damages issues should be governed by the current version of section 768.73, which became law on October 1, 1999, but the trial court agreed with the Estate and applied the pre-1999 version of that statute. The 1999 version modified the prior law in several ways, including potentially barring punitive damages awards against a defendant if punitive damages were previously awarded against that defendant "in any action alleging harm from the same act or single course of conduct." § 768.73(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Given the numerous prior punitive damages awards against it, Reynolds argues that applying the 1999 version of the statute would have given it the opportunity to avoid punitive damages completely.²

We apply the de novo standard to our review of the trial court's ruling on which version of the statute applied. See Townsend v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 192 So.3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 2016).

Express statutory language controls

Section 768.73(5), Florida Statutes (1999), states: "The provisions of this section shall be applied to all causes of action arising after the effective date of this act." "When the statutory language is ‘clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.’ " McNeil v. State , 162 So.3d 274, 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ). "Likewise, ‘[a] court cannot construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications.’ " Casais v. State , 204 So.3d 969, 970 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (quoting Jefferson v. State , 927 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ).

In another Engle -progeny case, the Florida Supreme Court likewise held that where a statute expressly states to which cases it will apply, prospectively only or also retrospectively, the clear language of the statute governs. Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. , 232 So.3d 294, 301 (Fla. 2017). "When the statute is clear and unambiguous, we use the plain language of the statute and avoid rules of statutory construction to determine the Legislature's intent." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There, the supreme court applied the 2011 version of the comparative fault statute to Schoeff's Engle claim because that version specifically provided that "[t]his act is remedial in nature and applies retroactively." Id. Thus, when it comes to deciding which version of a statute shall be applied, Engle -progeny cases are no different than any other cases.

Statute in effect when cause of action arose will govern

In the absence of express statutory language to the contrary, Florida law generally holds that the applicable version of a statute is the version in effect at the time a cause of action accrues. D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice , 863 So.2d 311, 314 n.9 (Fla. 2003) (applying statutes regarding apportionment of fault and setoff for settlements that were in effect when cause of action arose); Estate of Despain v. Avante Grp., Inc. , 900 So.2d 637, 641 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (applying punitive damages statute in effect when cause of action arose, rather than when trial occurred); St. John v. Coisman , 799 So.2d 1110, 1113 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (applying punitive damages statute in effect when cause of action arose); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. MacDonald , 645 So.2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (applying wrongful death statute that was amended after decedent was injured but before her death, which amendment created parents' claim for the loss of adult children); Brodose v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cty. , 622 So.2d 513, 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (applying offer of judgment statutes in effect when cause of action accrued).

Wrongful death action accrues on date of death

Here, both parties agree that the statutory language as amended in 1999 is unambiguous so that it can be applied without need for further interpretation. Thus, both sides agree that it is to be applied to causes of action arising after October 1, 1999. However, they disagree as to when the Estate's wrongful death cause of action accrued. "Florida law does not distinguish between when a cause of action accrues and when a cause of action arises."

Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Martin , 262 So.3d 769, 773, 2018 WL 6566755 (Fla. 4th DCA Dec. 12, 2018) (quoting Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. August , 509 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), quashed on other grounds , 530 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1988) ). "[T]he terms ‘accrue’ and ‘arise’ are synonymous with respect to when a cause of action comes into existence ...." Id. ; see also Accrue , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("To come into existence as an enforceable claim or right; to arise.").

"The purpose of the Florida Wrongful Death Act is to provide a ‘separate and independent’ cause of action since the original cause of action for personal injury did ‘not survive’ the death of the injured party." Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC , 211 So.3d 340, 342 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citations omitted). "Wrongful death actions are brought on behalf of the survivors, not to recover for injuries to the deceased, but to recover for statutorily identified losses the survivors have suffered directly as a result of the death." DeVaughn v. DeVaughn , 840 So.2d 1128, 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Florida law is clear: a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of the decedent's death. See Fulton Cty. Adm'r v. Sullivan , 753 So.2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1999) ("In Florida, a cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of death."); Love v. Hannah , 72 So.2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1954) ("The plaintiffs' right of action under the wrongful death statute must be determined by the facts existing at the time of the death of decedent."); St. Francis Hosp. v. Thompson , 159 Fla. 453, 31 So.2d 710, 711 (1947) ("Plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue by reason of the wrongful act alone. It took a wrongful act and death to give plaintiff a cause. The statute of limitations commenced to run upon death."); Domino's Pizza, LLC, v. Wiederhold , 248 So.3d 212, 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) ("This conclusion is consistent with cases recognizing that wrongful death actions accrue on the date of the decedent's death."); MacDonald , 645 So.2d at 1057 ("A cause of action for wrongful death accrues on the date of decedent's death."); Bruce v. Byer , 423 So.2d 413, 414–15 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) ("The general rule is that a cause of action for wrongful death accrues upon the date of the decedent's death."); Moorey v. Eytchison & Hoppes, Inc. , 338 So.2d 558, 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ("The cause of action for wrongful death accrues upon the date of the decedent's death."); Fletcher v. Dozier , 314 So.2d 241, 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) ("The [wrongful death] cause of action accrues and the statute [of limitations] commences to run on the date of such death."); Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 320 So.2d 418, 420 (Fla. 3d...