Raschid v. News Syndicate Co. 

• Decision Date: 03 July 1934
• Citation: 265 N.Y. 1,191 N.E. 713
• Parties: AL RASCHID v. NEWS SYNDICATE CO., Inc.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

265 N.Y. 1

191 N.E. 713

AL RASCHID

v.NEWS SYNDICATE CO., Inc.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 3, 1934.

Action by Mohammed Al Raschid against the News Syndicate Company, Incorporated. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (239 App. Div. 289, 267 N. Y. S. 221) affirming an order of the Special Term dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff appeals.

Judgment modified, and, as modified, affirmed.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

Francis Dean, Stewart W. Bowers, and Vahan H. Kalenderian, all of New York City, for appellant.

Arthur A. Moynihan, of New York City, for respondent.

CRANE, Judge.

By a divided court the Appellate Division has held the complaint bad. Whether it be an action for malicious prosecution or for injury caused by a malicious act or for neither is difficult to determine. In substance the complaint states that the plaintiff is a native-born citizen of the United States; that the defendant wickedly and maliciously and without probable cause gave false information to the immigration officials, which caused them to prosecute, arrest, and deport the plaintiff for alleged violations of the immigration laws in 1922, 1924, 1925, 1928, 1929, 1930, and 1931, and that the proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor. Here are the usual allegations of an action for malicious prosecution.

We agree with the Appellate Division that proceedings before the immigration authorities are not judicial proceedings. The administration of the immigration laws is vested in a Commissioner General of Immigration who is an officer in the Department of Labor and performs his duties under the direction of the Secretary of Labor. U. S. Code Annotated, tit. 8, §§ 101, 102. The duties of the Commissioners of Immigration and other immigration officials are administrative in character to be prescribed in detail by regulations prepared under the direction or with the approval of the Secretary of Labor (section 108). Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 12 S. Ct. 336, 35 L. Ed. 1146;White v. Gregory (C. C. A.) 213 F. 768;United States v. Greenawalt (D. C.) 213 F. 901. See, in point, Hayashida v. Kakimoto, 132 Cal. App. 743, 23 P.(2d) 311;Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 379, 15 Am. Dec. 228;Burt v. Smith, 181 N. Y. 1, 73 N. E. 495,2 Ann. Cas. 576.

Neither does the plaintiff say that the defendant instigated or prosecuted any action even if the proceeding were of a judicial nature; merely that it gave false information. This is not enough. Barry v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 51 App. Div. 385, 64 N. Y. S. 615.

So much for the appellant's insistence that this is an action for malicious prosecutions.Whatever we may call it an action does lie, however, if the complaint states any facts showing a wrong which the law recognizes and will redress. One may not be liable for malicious prosecutions and yet be legally responsible for maliciously circulating or giving false information resulting in intentionalinjury to another. Even a lawful act done solely out of malice and ill will to injure another may be actionable. Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203, 27 A. L. R. 1411. ‘A man has a right to give advice, but advice given for the sole purpose of injuring another's business and effective on a large scale, might create a cause of action.’ American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U. S. 350, 358, 41 S. Ct. 499, 500, 65 L. Ed. 983. An action will lie for knowingly and intentionally and without reasonable justification or excuse inducing a breach of contract. Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817;Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674, 84 A. L. R. 1;Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914. Where one set up a barber shop for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff's business and driving him out of it-the wrongdoer being wealthy and not interested in the business itself-and diverted customers from the plaintiff solely for the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, an action lies against him. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946,22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 131 Am. St. Rep. 446,16 Ann. Cas. 807.

So, also, in Ratcliffe v. Evans, [1892] 2 Q. B. 524, 527, it was decided: ‘That an action will lie for written or oral falsehoods, not actionable per se nor even defamatory, where they are maliciously published,...