Red Hill Coalition, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Com'n of Town of Glastonbury

• Decision Date: 22 August 1989
• Docket Number: 13666,Nos. 13665,s. 13665
• Citation: 563 A.2d 1347,212 Conn. 727
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: RED HILL COALITION, INC., et al. v. TOWN PLAN AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF GLASTONBURY et al.

Page 1347

563 A.2d 1347

212 Conn. 727

RED HILL COALITION, INC., et al. v. TOWN PLAN AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF GLASTONBURY et al.

Nos. 13665, 13666.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 8, 1989.

Decided Aug. 22, 1989.

Suzanne Y. Mattei, for appellant in the first case (plaintiff Connecticut Fund for the Environment).

Dwight H. Merriam, Hartford, with whom were Brian R. Smith and Norma Darshan Brach, Hartford, for appellants in the second case (named plaintiff et al.).

Richard R. Brown, with whom was Eric R. Gaynor, Hartford, for appellee in both cases (named defendant).

David F. Sherwood, Glastonbury, for appellee in both cases (defendant Red Hill Development Corporation).

Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Walsh, Asst. Atty. Gen., filed a brief for the commissioner of agriculture et al. as amici curiae.

David B. Losee, Farmington, and Holly Jean Bray filed a brief for the Home Builders Ass'n of Connecticut, Inc., as amicus curiae.

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The present appeal involves the development of a fifty acre parcel of land located in the Red Hill section of Glastonbury owned by the defendant Red Hill Development Corporation (corporation). The plaintiffs, the Red Hill Coalition, Inc. (coalition), ¹ Thomas P. Fitzgerald, a member of the coalition and a landowner whose property abuts the southern border of the land in question, Julianne Steffens, president of the coalition and a resident of Glastonbury, and the Connecticut Fund for the Environment (CFE), ² appealed from the decision of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant Glastonbury town plan and zoning commission (TPZ) conditionally approving the corporation's application for a thirty lot subdivision. ³ The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that the TPZ was not required to consider alternatives that would prevent or reduce the impairment or destruction of agricultural land pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19(b). ⁴ Further, the coalition, Steffens and Fitzgerald maintain that their due process rights were violated because the TPZ received new evidence after the close of the public hearings.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal: On December 13, 1985, the corporation filed an application with the TPZ for approval of a thirty-three lot subdivision. On January 6, 1986, both the Red Hill Coalition, Inc., and the CFE intervened in the administrative proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-19(a). According to the coalition and the CFE the subdivision and subsequent development of the land in question would result "in the irreversible elimination of major portions of prime agricultural land...." Public hearings were held by the TPZ on June 25, 1986, and July 15, 1986, at which it heard testimony regarding the proposed subdivision from the corporation, the plaintiffs and members of the general public. At the close of the public hearings, the TPZ did not take action on the corporation's application because it was awaiting a report from the Glastonbury conservation commission. ⁵ On September 3, 1986, having received a favorable report from the conservation commission concerning the development proposed by the corporation, the TPZ held a public meeting at which time additional comments were received from the corporation. Although the coalition and Fitzgerald were present at this final meeting, the CFE and Steffens did not attend. Subsequently, the TPZ conditionally approved the corporation's application, allowing the land to be subdivided into thirty lots.

On September 24, 1986, the plaintiffs appealed the decision of the TPZ to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 8-28(a), amended by Public Acts 1985, No. 85-284, §§ 4, 5. ⁶ In a memorandum of decision dated October 11, 1988, the trial court upheld the TPZ's approval of the corporation's subdivision application. Shortly thereafter, the coalition, Fitzgerald and Steffens filed a petition for certification to appeal in the Appellate Court. The CFE also filed a petition for certification. The Appellate Court granted both petitions on December 8, 1988. We subsequently transferred both appeals to ourselves pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and, because the issues involved are identical, have consolidated them for review.

General Statutes § 22a-19(a) provides that "[i]n any administrative ... proceeding ... any person ... may intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, or which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state." (Emphasis added.) In the present appeal the plaintiffs claim as the basis for intervention that the land in question is prime agricultural land. Arguing that agricultural land is a natural resource, the plaintiffs contend that (1) they had a right to intervene in the TPZ proceedings under § 22a-19(a), and (2) by virtue of their intervention in those proceedings under § 22a-19(a), the TPZ was required under § 22a-19(b) to consider any unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the alleged agricultural land being subdivided, and to explore all feasible and prudent alternatives to the proposed subdivision that would preserve some or all of the agricultural land in question.

The defendants contend that the appeals of those plaintiffs whose standing is based solely upon their status as petitioners under § 22a-19(a) should be dismissed because (1) the statute does not authorize intervention in a subdivision application proceeding conducted by a municipal planning commission, and (2) the legislature never intended that the term "other natural resources," the alleged pollution, impairment or destruction of which authorizes intervention, include "prime agricultural land," the basis relied upon in the petitions to intervene filed by the plaintiffs. Although we agree with the plaintiffs that they had the right to intervene under § 22a-19(a) in order to raise the environmental issues alleged in their petitions, we agree with the defendants that the term "natural resources" as used in the statute does not include agricultural land. Accordingly, we conclude that the TPZ was not required to consider the plaintiffs' allegation of pollution, impairment or destruction of agricultural land pursuant to § 22a-19(b) or the availability of reasonable alternatives to the proposed subdivision.

I

Contrary to the defendants' position, § 22a-19(a) does authorize intervention in a subdivision review proceeding conducted by a municipal planning commission. It plainly provides that intervention is authorized in "any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, and in any judicial review thereof made available by law." (Emphasis added.) Proceedings before planning and zoning commissions are classified as administrative. See, e.g., Vose v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 171 Conn. 480, 483, 370 A.2d 1026 (1976). Accordingly, the plain and unambiguous language of § 22a-19(a) permits intervention in proceedings conducted by a municipal planning commission. Connecticut Hospital Assn. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 133, 141, 509 A.2d 1050 (1986). " 'It is well settled that a statute must be applied as its words direct....' 'Where the language used is clear and unambiguous, we will not speculate as to some supposed intention....' " (Citations omitted.) Id. ⁷ The defendants' additional argument that the plaintiffs were not entitled to intervene pursuant to § 22a-19(a) because agricultural land is not a natural resource puts the cart before the horse. Section 22a-19(a) makes intervention a matter of right once a verified pleading is filed complying with the statute, whether or not those allegations ultimately prove to be unfounded. We have declared that the statute "permits any person, on the filing of a verified pleading, to intervene in any administrative proceeding for the limited purpose of raising environmental issues." Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, 192 Conn. 247, 248 n. 2., 470 A.2d 1214 (1984). In Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 490, 400 A.2d 726 (1978), we concluded that one who filed a verified pleading under § 22a-19(a) became a party to an administrative proceeding upon doing so and had "statutory standing to appeal for the limited purpose of raising environmental issues." "It is clear that one basic purpose of the act is to give persons standing to bring actions to protect the environment." Belford v. New Haven, 170 Conn. 46, 53-54, 364 A.2d 194 (1975).

We agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs, being entitled under § 22a-19(a) to intervene for the purpose of raising environmental issues on the basis of the allegations of their verified pleadings, had standing to appeal from the action of the TPZ in approving the subdivision application.

II

The plaintiffs' claim that the TPZ failed to comply with the edict of § 22a-19(b) to "consider the alleged unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state," as well as feasible alternatives to the proposed subdivision, raises the issue of whether agricultural land or "prime agricultural land" as alleged, constitutes a natural resource within the intention of the statute. The duty of an administrative agency under § 22a-19(b) is limited to the consideration of the effects of a proposal upon "air, water or other natural resources."

In determining whether agricultural land is a natural resource under § 22a-19, we note that "[o]ur fundamental objective in construing a statute is to carry out the apparent intent of the legislature." Sutton v. Lopes, 201 Conn. 115, 118, 513 A.2d...