Richardson v. H & J Props., LLC
| Decision Date | 21 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. W2019-02082-COA-R3-CV,W2019-02082-COA-R3-CV |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CAROLYN RICHARDSON v. H & J PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL. |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
A residential tenant was injured after slipping on water that accumulated from a leak in the ceiling of her home. Prior to the accident, the tenant notified the owner of the residence and the property manager of the leak. The tenant brought suit for her injuries, alleging a common law negligence claim and a claim for the defendants' alleged failure to comply with requirements in the Tennessee Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on both claims, finding that the tenant had co-extensive knowledge of the dangerous condition, so the defendants were not liable for her injuries. The tenant appeals, primarily arguing that the common law rule on landlord non-liability is displaced by the Act. We affirm and remand.
CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B. GOLDIN and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.
Steven Marshall and Howard B. Manis, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Carolyn Richardson.
Lewis W. Lyons and Richard Glassman, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, H & J Properties, LLC, and Marathon Management, LLC.
OPINIONThis case involves a "slip and fall" accident at a residential property in Memphis, Tennessee. The accident occurred at a "triplex" building that is owned by H & J Properties and was managed by Marathon Management (collectively "Defendants"). Carolyn Richardson ("Plaintiff") was a tenant of a unit in the triplex when the accident occurred.
In March 2014, Plaintiff moved into the triplex, and shortly thereafter, she noticed multiple water leaks in the ceiling. In the following months, Plaintiff notified Defendants of the leaks on several occasions by submitting work orders that described the issue. Initially, there was a water stain in an "office" area of the unit near one of the leaks. After Plaintiff notified Marathon of the stain, the stain was remedied. Between March 2014 and September 2014, the work orders included descriptions of leaks coming from a "storage area" and a "laundry room." They also contained general descriptions such as, "[l]eak in wall and ceiling" and "[b]ad roof leak." On September 10, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a work order that stated, "[r]oof leaks - laundry room ceiling, and other room connected to laundry room." None of the prior work orders indicated that there was a leak in a place other than Plaintiff's laundry room or "storage area."
On September 11, 2014, a maintenance worker for Marathon was dispatched to Plaintiff's residence to remedy the leaks that she reported the day before. While Plaintiff was showing the maintenance worker the issues in her unit, a small pool of water caused Plaintiff to slip and fall. The water accumulated from a leak in an area that she described as her "office." Plaintiff stated that her "office" was a "room that was connected to the area in which the washer and dryer were located." Plaintiff sustained a fractured ankle from the fall.
In July 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants for the injuries that she sustained from the slip and fall. In her complaint, Plaintiff asserted two causes of action: (1) a common law negligence claim, and (2) a claim for violating Tennessee's codification of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act ("the URLTA"). Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that Defendants violated the requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-28-304(a)(2) to "[m]ake all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition." Several years of discovery, rescheduling, and extensions ensued.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on both of Plaintiff's claims on March 20, 2019. Accompanying Defendants' motion was a supporting memorandum of law and a statement of undisputed facts pursuant to Rule 56.03.1 Defendants argued that Plaintiff could not prove an essential element of her negligence claim; therefore, her claims fail as a matter of law. The trial court agreed.
After a hearing on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, on November 4, 2019, the trial court entered a written order granting Defendants' motion. The court found that the undisputed facts showed that Plaintiff was aware of the leak in her office prior to the fall. The court also found that the parties had co-extensive knowledge of the potentially dangerous condition, meaning Plaintiff would be unable to prove that she did not have knowledge of the condition prior to her fall. As a result of her knowledge of the leak prior to the fall, the court concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to establish essential elements of her common law and URLTA claims. Further, the court found that the URLTA provision that Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated did not displace the common law principles on a landlord's non-liability. In doing so, the court granted Defendants' summary judgment on both of Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff timely appealed.2
Plaintiff raises a single issue on appeal, which has been slightly reworded.
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants by finding that a residential landlord is not liable for injuries sustained by a tenant as a result of a dangerous condition on the property if the tenant had knowledge of the condition prior to sustaining injuries.
In response, Defendants raise five additional issues.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
A trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Kershaw v. Levy, 583 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Beard v. Branson, 528 S.W.3d 487, 494-95 (Tenn. 2017)). When reviewing such decisions this Court "make[s] a fresh determination about whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met." TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 887 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015)). Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.
When a party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may succeed on a motion for summary judgment "either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party's evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party's claim or defense." TWB Architects, Inc., 578 S.W.3d at 887 (quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264). In response, the nonmoving party must prove specific facts that "could lead a rational trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. at 889 (quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265). Evidence presented by the nonmoving party is accepted as true; we allow all reasonable inferences in its favor; and we resolve any doubts about the potential existence of a genuine issue of material fact in its favor. Id. at 887.
When a court engages in statutory construction, it must "give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." State v. Welch, 595 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tenn. 2020) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). Further, when a statute modifies or supplants common law, it is "strictly construed and confined to [its] express terms." Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Ezell v. Cockrell, 902 S.W.2d 394, 399 (Tenn. 1995)). "Thus, common law is not displaced by a legislative enactment, except to the extent required by the statute itself." Id. See also Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237, 257 (Tenn. 2010) (Koch, J., concurring in part). Issues involving the interpretation of a statute are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Hayesv. Gibson Cty., 288 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tenn. 2009).
To be successful on a negligence claim involving premises liability, the plaintiff must prove five elements: (1) duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of care owed to the plaintiff, amounting to a breach of the duty; (3) injury or loss by the plaintiff; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate cause. See King v. Anderson Cty., 419 S.W.3d 232, 246 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009)); Rice v. Sabir, 979 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998) (citing Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993)).
In cases involving a leased premises, this Court has stated, "[g]enerally, a landlord is not liable to a tenant or a third party for harm caused by a dangerous condition on the leased premises." Lethcoe v. Holden, 31 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). However,...
To continue reading
Request your trial