School Dist. No. 24 of St. Louis County v. Neaf

• Decision Date: 13 March 1941
• Docket Number: 37198
• Parties: School District No. 24 of St. Louis County, known as Lake School District: Raymond Burkhard, J. Edw. Kram and W. O. Frommer, as Taxpayers of St. Louis County and as Officers and Members of the School Board of said Lake School District of the County of St. Louis, Appellants, v. Martin L. Neaf, as County Assessor of St. Louis County; Willis W. Benson, Collector of St. Louis County; Maurice Dwyer, County Treasurer of St. Louis County
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

148 S.W.2d 554

347 Mo. 700

School District No. 24 of St. Louis County, known as Lake School District: Raymond Burkhard, J. Edw. Kram and W. O. Frommer, as Taxpayers of St. Louis County and as Officers and Members of the School Board of said Lake School District of the County of St. Louis, Appellants, v. Martin L. Neaf, as County Assessor of St. Louis County; Willis W. Benson, Collector of St. Louis County; Maurice Dwyer, County Treasurer of St. Louis County

No. 37198

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 13, 1941

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis County; Hon. John A Witthaus, Judge.

Reversed and remanded (with directions).

Joseph T. Davis for appellants.

(1) A law or a provision in the law which makes it applicable to a part of a class or to a part of the State, generally, is in violation of the Constitution of Missouri, which prohibits local and special laws, and is also in violation of the Federal Constitution. Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v Bank, 104 S.W.2d 385; Waterman v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 41 S.W.2d 575; State ex rel. v Knight, 21 S.W.2d 767; State ex inf. v. Armstrong, 286 S.W. 705; State ex rel. v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 72; State v. Logan, 268 Mo. 176; State ex rel. v. Roach, 258 Mo. 562; State ex rel. v. Kimmel, 256 Mo. 611; Bridges v. Mining Co., 252 Mo. 56; State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 576; Hays v. Mining Co., 277 Mo. 288, 126 S.W. 1051; State ex rel. v. Messerly, 198 Mo. 351, 95 S.W. 913; State v. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 612; Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 372; State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 176; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 314; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 449; State ex rel. v. Hermann, 75 Mo. 340; Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 46 L.Ed. 92; Mix v. Board of County Commrs., 18 Idaho 695, 112 P. 215, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 539; State ex rel. v. Mensching, 187 N.Y. 8, 79 N.E. 884, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 625; Mo. Const., Sec. 53, Art. IV, subsecs. 2, 19, 23, 28, 32, 33; Mo. Const., Sec. 3, Art. X; U.S. Const., Amends. 5, 14; 16 C. J. S., sec. 16, p. 51. (2) Evidence showing the history of a legislative enactment and the surrounding facts and circumstances prompting the act, as well as the facts and circumstances under which the law was enacted, is proper and should be admitted and considered. State ex rel. v. Forest, 162 S.W. 706, 177 Mo.App. 245; S.W. Mo. Light Co. v. Scuerich, 174 Mo. 235; Lexington ex rel. v. Bank, 130 Mo.App. 692. (3) In considering the constitutionality of the provision of the statute in question, as applied to water mains and pipes of a water company, the court errs in admitting evidence offered by defendants pertaining to gas companies when there is no issue in the case as to gas companies. Bacon v. Ranson, 58 S.W.2d 786; State v. Halbrook, 279 S.W. 395; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 241 Mo. 231. (4) The provision in Section 9977, Revised Statutes 1929, as amended, relative to mains and pipes of gas companies being assessed as personal property is unconstitutional.

Lashly, Lashly, Miller & Clifford, C. W. Detjen and Edwin F. Vetter for Martin L. Neaf, Assessor of St. Louis County; William J. Becker for Maurice Dwyer, County Treasurer; Walter Wehrle for Town School District of Clayton; Glen Mohler for City of Clayton.

(1) This court will affirm the judgment of the trial court in an equity case where it may be sustained upon any legal theory. Phoenix Brick & Const. Co. v. Gentry County, 257 Mo. 39, 166 S.W. 1034; Huttig v. Brennan, 328 Mo. 471, 41 S.W.2d 1054; State v. Gomer, 340 Mo. 107, 101 S.W.2d 57; Muth Realty Co. v. Timmerberg, 178 Mo.App. 654, 161 S.W. 589; Leer v. Continental Ins. Co. of New York, 250 S.W. 631; Ransom v. Potomoc Ins. Co., 226 Mo.App. 664, 45 S.W.2d 95; Lyvers v. Rutherford, 230 Mo.App. 921, 80 S.W.2d 729. (2) It appears from the record herein that plaintiff-appellants do not own the property affected by the tax in question. A bill for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of an alleged illegal tax can be maintained only by one whose own property is affected by the tax, no one being permitted to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed against another. Robins v. Latham, 134 Mo. 466, 36 S.W. 33; Board of Education of Hopewell v. Guy County Auditor, 64 Ohio St. 434, 60 N.E. 573; Board of Commrs. v. Featherstone, 26 Wyo. 1, 174 P. 192; Oakwood Independent School Dist. v. Liberty Common School Dist., 10 S.W.2d 174; Mo. Riv., Ft. Scott & Gulf Railroad Co. v. Wheaton, 7 Kan. 232; Center Township v. Hunt, 16 Kan. 430; Board of Supervisors of Du Page County v. Jenks, 65 Ill. 275; Norman v. Boaz, 85 Ky. 557, 4 S.W. 316; Eakins v. Eakins, 20 S.W. 285; High on Injunctions, sec. 573, pp. 544-545. (3) The Legislature has a wide discretion in selecting and classifying subjects of taxation. Royal Mineral Assn. v. Lord, 271 U.S. 577, 70 L.Ed. 1093; Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. v. Wilder, 36 F.2d 159; Ex parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S.W.2d 22; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 340 Mo. 1133, 104 S.W.2d 385; Southern Package Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 174 Miss. 212, 164 So. 45; Barker Bros., Inc., v. Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d 603, 76 P.2d 97; Bank of Miles v. Custer, 93 Mont. 291, 19 P.2d 885; Colgate v. Harvey, 107 Vt. 28, 175 A. 352.

A. U. Simmons for Willis W. Benson, Collector, etc., and City of Brentwood.

(1) Appellants under the law cannot raise or complain of the constitutionality of the statute herein involved, since: Appellant School District No. 24 or the Lake School District is merely a taxing district and political subdivision of the State of Missouri and so created and brought into existence by the Legislature. Appellants Burkhard, Kram and Frommer as directors are mere ministerial officers and have therefore no direct interest in the constitutional question, nor will they be injured or prejudiced by the outcome of the litigation. State ex rel. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Becker, 41 S.W.2d 188; 30 A. L. R., p. 387; State ex rel. v. Jones, 41 S.W.2d 393; City Council of City and County of Denver v. Board of Commrs. of Adams County, 33 Colo. 1; 16 C. J. S., sec. 242. (2) The Legislature of the State of Missouri has power to designate property as either realty or personalty, and to fix the situs for taxation, as long as there is no purely arbitrary discrimination in doing so. Shelbyville Water Co. v. The People, 140 Ill. 545; 1 Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.), p. 602, sec. 288; 3 Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.), p. 2145, sec. 1065; 61 C. J., p. 125, 127, secs. 57, 58; School Dist. of Plattsburg v. Bowman, 178 Mo. 654, 77 S.W. 880; State ex rel. K. C., St. J. & C. B. Railroad Co. v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378. (3) Evidence showing the history of a legislative enactment and the facts and circumstances prompting the legislation is not under the law admissible evidence, since courts cannot inquire into the motives of the Legislature in enacting the law. Glasgow v. St. Louis, 107 Mo. 198, 17 S.W. 743; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5 Ed.), p. 225. (4) A legislative classification does not violate the constitutional requirements unless it is plainly without any basis in reason -- that is, unless it is entirely arbitrary. And in determining whether or not it is arbitrary the following, among other, rules are to be applied: (a) A classification is not invalid merely because it affects only a few persons or corporations -- or even if it affects only one -- where it is broad enough to apply to others if they exist. (b) With respect to classification as with respect to other matters, a statute is presumed to be valid and constitutional, and a classification may not be held to be arbitrary unless shown to be so beyond a reasonable doubt. Thomas v. Buchanan County, 51 S.W.2d 95; Hull v. Baumann, 131 S.W.2d 721; State ex rel. Garvey v. Buckner, 272 S.W.2d 940; 1 Cooley, Taxation (4 Ed.), pp. 712-717, sec. 334; 61 C. J. 126-129, sec. 58; New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 82 L.Ed. 1024, 58 S.Ct. 721; Carmichael v. So. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 57 S.Ct. 868; Ex parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S.W.2d 22, 62 A. L. R. 95; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of K. C., 340 Mo. 1133, 104 S.W.2d 385, 111 A. L. R. 133; Hines v. Hook, 338 Mo. 114, 89 S.W.2d 52; State ex rel. Hollaway v. Knight, 323 Mo. 1241, 21 S.W.2d 767.

OPINION

Clark, J.

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis County. The plaintiffs (appellants) are School District No. 24 (a common school district), and the three directors of that district who sue in their capacity as directors and also as taxpayers. The defendants named in the petition are the following officers of said county: Neaf, the Assessor, Benson, the Collector, and Dwyer, the Treasurer. By leave of court others were permitted to intervene as defendants, to-wit: City of Clayton, Town School District of Clayton, and City of Brentwood. The petition, so far as pertinent here, states that the St. Louis County Water Company is a privately owned corporation, selling water to various municipalities, industries and persons in said county; that its pumping and distributing plant and reservoirs are located in the plaintiff school district; that its mains, pipes, conduits and hydrants, used in transporting water to various parts of the county, are attached to and a part of the company's plant, appurtenant to the land upon which the plant is situate, and a part of the realty; that the defendant county officers have treated and will continue to treat such pipes, conduits, etc., as personalty for taxation purposes by virtue of an Act of the General Assembly found in Session Acts of 1937, pages 545-547, the same being an amendment to Section 9977, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., sec. 9977, p. 8015); that said Act of 1937 is unconstitutional for certain stated reasons; that if such property is treated as personalty for taxation purposes, the plaintiff...