Smith v. State
| Decision Date | 03 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5D22-1663, Case No. 5D22-1688 |
| Citation | 348 So.3d 1208 |
| Parties | Lorenzo Keandre SMITH, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. Lorenzo Keandre Smith, Petitioner, v. State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert Wesley, Public Defender, and Robert Thompson Adams IV, Assistant Public Defendant, Orlando, for Petitioner.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Respondent.
Lorenzo Smith has filed essentially identical petitions for writ of prohibition seeking therein to prohibit the trial court from proceeding in his two underlying violation of probation cases for lack of jurisdiction.1 He contends that when his jail credit for time served awaiting disposition is correctly credited against the overall probationary term in each case, it is clear he was no longer serving probation at the time the affidavits of violation of probation were filed, leaving the trial court without jurisdiction over the violation of probation proceedings. We agree and grant the petitions.
We begin by observing that a writ of prohibition premised on a lack of jurisdiction is appropriate only where it is clear that the lower tribunal is without jurisdiction or attempting to act in excess of its jurisdiction. State v. Jackson , 306 So. 3d 936, 944 (Fla. 2020) (); Golub v. Golub , 325 So. 3d 164, 171 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021) .
It is established law that when a defendant has been placed on probation, the sentencing court loses jurisdiction over the defendant once the probationary period expires unless proceedings to modify or revoke probation have been instituted in the interim. See § 948.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2020) (); State v. Hall , 641 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 1994) . Thus, if the affidavits of probation violation were filed after Smith's probation ended, the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on the alleged violations, and Smith's motions to dismiss were erroneously denied.
We must thus determine the date Smith's probation concluded, which requires a review of the probation documents to determine precisely how the period of confinement was to be implemented vis-à-vis the period of probation. In both cases at issue here, the probation order imposes twenty-four months of supervised probation, with the condition that Smith complete a term of six months in jail with credit for time served. Smith maintains that the period of confinement was imposed as a condition of probation, as opposed to being a so-called probationary split sentence in which a period of confinement is followed by a period of probation. He is correct. The term of confinement was clearly a condition of probation, which arrangement is authorized by section 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (2020) ().2
Although the Legislature has expressly authorized incarceration as a condition of probation, it has not spoken on the proper application of jail time credit in an instance such as Smith's. No statute expressly directs that jail credit is to be applied to the entire probationary period. However, the courts have filled that void. Building upon the Florida Supreme Court's finding in Van Tassel v. Coffman , 486 So. 2d 528, 529–30 (Fla. 1985), that there is "a legislative intent to grant gain time to the prison punishment of all offenders, whether by the historic straight sentence, the now authorized split sentence, or probation which contains a condition of imprisonment," this Court, in Griner v. State , 523 So....
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