Sosa v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 29 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | HHBCV155026807S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Andres Sosa v. I. Anderson Ms. Correctional Officer et al |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The plaintiff in this action, Andres Sosa, is an inmate in the custody of the Connecticut Department of Corrections. He has brought an action against I. Anderson, a corrections officer Carol Chapdelaine, the warden of MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution and Scott Semple, the commissioner of corrections, State of Connecticut (collectively, " the defendants") in both their individual and official capacities.
The February 4, 2016 amended complaint is the operative complaint and it asserts civil rights violations upon the plaintiff by the defendants stemming from an incident which apparently occurred in August 2014. The plaintiff describes the incident as " relieving myself while looking at a magazine in the privacy of my cell, " conduct which was observed by Anderson and reported to her lieutenant. As a result, the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation. A subsequent strip search resulted in physical injury and damage to the plaintiff's personal property. He was removed to the restrictive housing unit and given discipline for Class A public indecency.
The plaintiff states that his cell, shower and living quarters are not public places of the institution and that he has an expectation of privacy in those areas. He asserts that his constitutional right of privacy was violated. He further asserts that having to wait fifteen to thirty minutes to perform various bodily functions until the corrections staff completes its tour constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. He claims that the discipline he received was too harsh. He claims that his physical injuries caused him extreme mental and emotional injury. Lastly, the plaintiff asserts that the department of corrections has a policy forbidding male staff from observing or interfering with female inmates engaging in personal activities but does not have a similar policy forbidding female staff from observing male inmates.
Although the complaint does not conform to Practice Book § 10-26 it can be distilled into several distinct causes of action implicating both state and federal claims. State claims include battery (" misuse of force") and infliction of emotional distress (" extreme emotional stress disorder"). Federal claims include 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of the fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States constitution. The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages.
The defendants moved to dismiss claims made against them individually for lack of service of process. The defendants also moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for monetary compensation. The defendants did not address the federal claims of the plaintiff at all in their motion and memorandum.
The plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion which did not address the issues of service of process or monetary compensation. When the parties provided argument in support of their positions on May 25, 2016, the plaintiff conceded that he did not serve the defendants individually and conceded that he could not successfully seek monetary damages, as the state has not waived sovereign immunity. The plaintiff orally withdrew his claims against the defendants individually and his claim for monetary compensation. Therefore, the court does not address these immunity grounds for dismissal.
In his objection, the plaintiff correctly pointed out that the defendants failed to address his federal claims. Not only did the defendants fail to initially address these issues, they did not respond to the plaintiff's objection until the May 26, 2016 oral argument. At that time, the defendants argued, summarily, that state sovereign immunity bars federal constitutional claims. The court disagrees with the defendants' assertion. " [W]hen sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law." Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007). Nevertheless, " whenever it is found . . . that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the judicial authority shall dismiss the action, " the court is obligated to address issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Practice Book § 10-33. Thus, the following analysis is warranted.
Practice Book § 10-31 provides that a motion to dismiss may assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction. " [T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002). " A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henriquez v. Allegre, 68 Conn.App. 238, 242, 789 A.2d 1142 (2002). " Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong . . . In other words, [s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action . . . It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New England Pipe Corp. v. Northeast Corridor Foundation, 271 Conn. 329, 334-35, 857 A.2d 348 (2004).
" [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic R.R. Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). " A motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Henriquez v. Allegre, 68 Conn.App. 238, 242, 789 A.2d 1142 (2002). " [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
" The source of sovereign immunity power in the state of Connecticut is the constitution, and it is recognized that a sovereign is immune from suit on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morneau v. State, 150 Conn.App. 237, 246 n.14, 90 A.3d. 1003, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 926, 95 A.3d 522 (2014). " The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed under our jurisprudence . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 246-47. See also Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 349-51, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
The plaintiff seeks extraordinary relief in this action based only on the second exception, claiming that the state's officers violated, and continue to violate, the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution against the defendants in their official capacity.[1]
Because the state has not waived its sovereign immunity, the plaintiff's state and common-law claims are barred and the exceptions do not apply. The defendants are entitled to dismissal of these claims. Therefore, the remaining analysis will focus on whether the remaining federal claims are also barred by sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Braham v. Newbould, 160 Conn.App. 294, 310, 124 A.3d 977 (2015) (court affirmed dismissal of plaintiff's state law claims).
The plaintiff asserts violation...
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