Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, s. A12–1575

Decision Date10 September 2014
Docket NumberA12–1972.,Nos. A12–1575,s. A12–1575
Citation853 N.W.2d 713
PartiesAlice Ann STAAB, Respondent, v. DIOCESE OF ST. CLOUD, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Kevin S. Carpenter, Kevin S. Carpenter, P.A., Saint Cloud, MN; and H. Morrison Kershner, Pemberton, Sorlie, Rufer & Kershner, P.A., Fergus Falls, MN, for respondent.

Dyan J. Ebert, Laura A. Moehrle, Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A., Saint Cloud, MN, for appellant.

Richard J. Thomas, Bryon G. Ascheman, Corinne Ivanca, Burke & Thomas, PLLP, Saint Paul, MN; and Robert L. McCollum, Cheryl Hood Langel, McCollum, Crowley, Moschet, Miller & Laak, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

Wilbur W. Fluegel, Fluegel Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.

OPINION

WRIGHT, Justice.

This negligence dispute presents two questions of statutory interpretation. We first consider whether the reallocation-of-damages provision in Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2 (2012), applies to parties who are severally liable pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1 (2012). If the reallocation provision applies to severally liable parties, the second question is whether damages must be reduced to a judgment to be subject to reallocation under Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2. For the reasons addressed below, we hold that a party who is severally liable under Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, cannot be required to contribute more than that party's equitable share of the total damages award through the reallocation-of-damages provision in Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2. We, therefore, reverse and remand to the district court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

I.

Respondent Alice Staab was injured at Holy Cross Parish School when her husband Richard Staab pushed her wheelchair through an open doorway and over an unmarked five-inch drop-off. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab I), 813 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn.2012). Staab sued appellant Diocese of St. Cloud, which owns and operates Holy Cross Parish School, alleging that the Diocese failed to protect her from an unreasonable risk of harm created by the five-inch drop-off. Id. Richard Staab was not named as a party in the lawsuit. Id. At the close of the trial, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $224,200.70, attributing 50 percent of the negligence that caused Staab's injuries to the Diocese and 50 percent to Richard Staab. Id. Concluding that Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, which limits liability for a severally liable person, does not apply when only one defendant is named in a lawsuit, the district court entered judgment for $224,200.70 against the Diocese. Id. at 72. In Staab I, we held that Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1, “applies when a jury apportions fault between a sole defendant and a nonparty tortfeasor, and limits the amount collectible from the defendant to its percentage share of the fault assigned to it by the jury.” 813 N.W.2d at 80.

On remand, citing Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2, Staab sought reallocation of Richard Staab's equitable share of the damages award to the Diocese. The district court concluded that an uncollectible share of damages attributable to a nonparty tortfeasor can be reallocated under Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2. After determining that Richard Staab's equitable share is uncollectible, the district court entered judgment against the Diocese for the entire damages award.1

The court of appeals affirmed the reallocation. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud (Staab II), 830 N.W.2d 40, 47 (Minn.App.2013). The court of appeals concluded that Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2, applies to the Diocese because the Legislature did not expressly limit the application of subdivision 2 to jointly and severally liable parties. Staab II, 830 N.W.2d at 43–44. In support of its conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that, for purposes of Minn.Stat. § 604.02, a party includes all parties to the tort, and liability arises at the time of the injury. Staab II, 830 N.W.2d at 44. As a result, the damages attributable to Richard Staab are a party's “equitable share of the obligation [that] is uncollectible.” Id. at 46.

We granted the Diocese's petition for review.

II.

We first address whether Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2, can be applied to require a severally liable party to pay an uncollectible portion of another tortfeasor's damages. Both subdivision 1 and subdivision 2 of section 604.02 are relevant to our resolution of this issue. Subdivision 1 provides:

When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the whole award:
(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent;
(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that results in injury;
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or
(4) a person whose liability arises under [one of several environmental or public health laws].2

Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1. Subdivision 2, in turn, provides:

Upon motion made not later than one year after judgment is entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. A party whose liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.

Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2.

The Diocese argues that the district court erred by reallocating Richard Staab's equitable share of damages to the Diocese under subdivision 2 because applying subdivision 2 to parties who are severally liable under subdivision 1 is contrary to the definition of several liability and eviscerates our holding in Staab I. Staab counters that reallocation was proper because nothing in subdivision 2 limits its application to parties who are jointly and severally liable under subdivision 1.

Whether the district court properly reallocated Richard Staab's equitable share of damages to the Diocese under Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2, is a question of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. White v. City of Elk River, 840 N.W.2d 43, 52 (Minn.2013). The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn.2010) ; accord Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2012). If the Legislature's intent is clear from the unambiguous language of the statute, we apply the statute according to its plain meaning. State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 482 (Minn.2013). Judicial construction of a statute becomes part of the statute as though it were written therein. Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 836 (Minn.2012). But if a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the statute is ambiguous, and we will consider other factors to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Lietz v. N. States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn.2006).

A.

We first consider whether Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2, is ambiguous as to its application to severally liable parties. Subdivision 2 requires the district court to “determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party and to “reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault.” The term party in subdivision 2 “means all persons who are parties to the tort, regardless of whether they are named in the lawsuit.” Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 76 ; accord Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn.1986). A tortfeasor's liability “arises and exists independently of the tortfeasor's participation in a lawsuit and, therefore, is independent of the tortfeasor's obligation to contribute to any judgment entered in such a lawsuit.” Staab I, 813 N.W.2d at 76.

One reasonable interpretation of subdivision 2, which is advanced by Staab, is that severally liable parties are subject to reallocation. The text of subdivision 2 indicates that any party is subject to reallocation. Because the term party includes all parties to the tort, it is reasonable to interpret the phrase “a party's equitable share of the obligation” as referring to the amount of damages attributable to another person's negligence, even if that person is not a party to the lawsuit. The language of subdivision 2 also is mandatory—once the district court has determined that some portion of the damages attributable to a party to the tort is uncollectible, the district court shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault.” Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The Legislature could have provided an express exception to subdivision 2 for parties who are severally liable under subdivision 1, but it did not to do so.3

Another reasonable interpretation of subdivision 2, which is advanced by the Diocese, is that damages cannot be reallocated to parties who are only severally liable under subdivision 1. Subdivision 2 must be read in conjunction with subdivision 1. See A.A.A. v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 832 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn.2013) (explaining that this court examines the language of the statute as a whole when interpreting a statute); accord Minn.Stat. § 645.16. As we observed previously, subdivision 1 provides that [w]hen two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that” parties in four specific categories “are jointly and severally liable for the whole award.” Minn.Stat. § 604.02, subd. 1. Subdivision 1, like subdivision 2, uses mandatory language, stating that the contributions of a...

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