Vrooman v. St. Louis

• Decision Date: 02 November 1935
• Docket Number: No. 34687.,34687.
• Citation: 88 S.W.2d 189
• Parties: CLAUDE E. VROOMAN, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS ET AL.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

88 S.W.2d 189

CLAUDE E. VROOMAN, Appellant, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS ET AL.

No. 34687.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Court en Banc, November 2, 1935.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis. — Hon. Frank C. O'Malley, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Donnell & McDonald for appellant.

(1) Unless the Enabling Act be valid, the election and other proceedings pertaining to the bond issue were not valid. (a) Ordinance 40592 by its contents conclusively establishes that it is based on the Enabling Act. (b) Ordinance 40592 was published and voters understood it to be based on the Enabling Act, and presumably cast their ballots on the understanding that it was based on the Enabling Act. (c) Regardless of whether the city could have conducted an election on the bond issue independently of the Enabling Act, the fact is that it did not conduct an election on said bond issue independently of the Enabling Act, but on the contrary based its election on the Enabling Act. (2) Unless those facts, the prior existence of which is under the terms of the Enabling Act prerequisite to the calling of an election, existed prior to the calling of the election of September 10, 1935, and unless compliance was had with the requirements of the Enabling Act, the bond issue proceedings were not valid. (a) Notwithstanding the charter powers of the city, the Constitution of Missouri makes the charter of St. Louis subject to the law of Missouri. Art. IV, Sec. 1; Art. IX, Secs. 20, 23, 25, also 16, Const. of Mo.; State ex rel. v. Stobie. 194 Mo. 54; State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 891, 2 S.W. (2d) 713; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Tremayne v. St. Louis, 320 Mo. 133; McQuillin on Mun. Corp. (2 Ed.), secs. 215, 357; Wagner — Preface to Charter of St. Louis, 1926 Ed., p. 1233; Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 582. (3) Certain facts, the prior existence of which is under the terms of the Enabling Act prerequisite to the calling of an election, did not exist prior to the calling of the election of September 10, 1935, by the enactment of Ordinance 40592, consequently the election was invalid. "The United States, or any qualified authority thereof, shall propose to establish and improve ... a National Park or Plaza, intended and designed to commemorate any great event or movement in our National History, to be accessible to the public under Federal regulation, and to cover an area within such city of not less than One Million square feet." Shreveport Traction Co. v. Svara, 133 La. 900; Taylor v. Miller, 113 N.C. 340; Gem Oil Co. v. Callendar, 173 Pac. 822, 70 Okla. 214. (a) Taxation statutes when ambiguous or doubtful are construed strictly in favor of the taxpayer and against the taxing power; and this rule is to be applied in determining the meaning of "purpose to establish and improve" as used in the Enabling Act. State ex rel. Ford Motor Co. v. Gehner, 27 S.W. (2d) 1; State ex rel. v. Baker, 316 Mo. 853, 293 S.W. 399; State ex rel. v. Gehner, 315 Mo. 1126, 280 S.W. 416; State ex rel. v. Buder, 307 Mo. 253, 271 S.W. 770; 59 C.J. 1131. (b) It is necessary that, at the time the ordinance calling the election is enacted, there shall exist a law under which the United States or its authority has power to make an allotment, or agreement to make an allotment, of funds for the purpose of acquiring and establishing such a Park or Plaza under a plan by which the United States is to provide at least seventy-five per cent of the cost of such acquisition and establishment, for, unless there shall exist such power, it cannot be stated with certainty that any amount is "to be expended" (quoting the Enabling Act), for said purpose and under said plan, by the United States or its authority. The law in effect, either at the time of the enactment of Ordinance 40592, or now, gives no such power to the United States or its authority. Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, Chap. 48, 49 Stat. 115; U.S.C.A. (Aug., 1935, Supp.), Title 15, p. 230; Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388; Schechter v. United States, 79 L. Ed. 888; Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 581. (4) The Enabling Act violates the Constitution of Missouri. (a) By the provisions of Section 3, Article X, taxes may be levied and collected by a city for public purposes only. The payment of moneys to the United States Government to induce, and in consideration of, the location and establishment in said city of a Commemorative Park or Plaza to be accessible to the public under Federal regulation (or the payment of the principal of, or interest on, bonds sold to provide said moneys) is not a public purpose within the meaning of said section. Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.), secs. 126, 174, 175, 176, 178, 186, 189; Houck v. Drainage Dist., 248 Mo. 384; Halbruegger v. St. Louis, 302 Mo. 583; Art. IV, Sec. 3, Const. of United States; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 525; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 89; Utah P. & L. Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 403; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 99; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 536; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 563; 12 C.J. 910; United States v. Oregon, 55 L. Ed. 621; Wisconsin Railroad Co. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 504; Dysart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 521; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 664; Gray on Limitation of Taxing Power and Public Indebtedness, sec. 176; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 216 Mo. 90; Chapman v. New York, 168 N.Y. 80, 56 L.R.A. 849; Note in L.R.A. 1917E. 847; People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 483. (b) The taxing power may, under Section 1, Article X, be exercised by a city for only corporate purposes of said city. The payment of moneys to the United States Government to induce, and in consideration of, the location and establishment in said city of a Commemorative Park or Plaza to be accessible to the public under Federal regulation (or the payment of the principal of, or interest on, bonds sold to provide said moneys), is not a corporate purpose of the city. State ex rel. v. Ry. Co., 319 Mo. 308, 3 S.W. (2d) 381; Kennedy v. Nevada, 222 Mo. App. 462; Cooley on Taxation (4 Ed.), secs. 126, 127, 178; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 924; Smith v. Smythe, 197 N.Y. 457, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 524; Root v. Erdelmeyer, 37 Ind. 227; Nelson v. Town of Homer, 48 La. Ann. 258; Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; Drake v. Ogden, 128 Ill. 603; Gage v. Goudy, 131 Ill. 215; Weightman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 257; Livingston County v. Wieder, 64 Ill. 432; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 536. (c) The legislative power of the General Assembly and of municipal corporations of the State cannot under Section 1, Article IV and Article X be legally delegated. State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 904, 2 S.W. (2d) 713; Matthews v. City of Alexandria, 68 Mo. 115; Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353; St. Louis v. Clemens, 43 Mo. 395; Haag v. Ward, 186 Mo. 325. (d) By the terms of Section 6. Article IX, every municipality is prohibited from making appropriation or donation, and from loaning its credit, to or in aid of any railroad or other corporation or association, or to or in aid of any college or institution of learning, or other institution, whether created for or to be controlled by the State or others. These three sections clearly indicate the policy of the State to be opposed to, and affirmatively prohibit, a surrender by a municipality to any corporation, be it a private or public corporation, of the control of any part of the funds of such municipality. State v. Curators State University, 57 Mo. 182; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 216 Mo. 92. (e) The United States of America are a corporation. 65 C.J. 1252; United States v. Maurice, 26 Fed. 1216; United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 630; Respublica v. Sweers, 1 Dallas, 41; Deady v. Village of Lyons, 57 N.Y. Supp. 498; Gray's Limitations of Taxing Power and Public Indebtedness, sec. 429.

Charles M. Hay, E.H. Wayman and Benjamin H. Charles for respondents.

(1) An act of the Legislature must appear to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt before the judiciary will pronounce it invalid for that reason. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; and numerous subsequent cases. (a) "And the courts are not justified in interfering except when it clearly appears that the Constitution will be violated." Jennings v. St. Louis, 332 Mo. 178. (2) The court will not enlarge on the prohibitions clearly stated in the Constitution. (a) In the absence of express and definite prohibitions, the General Assembly has unlimited power in the exercise of the State's sovereignty. Hannis v. Bond Co., 244 Mo. 687; State ex rel. v. Sheppard, 192 Mo. 506; State ex rel. v. Warner, 197 Mo. 656; and other Missouri and Illinois cases. "The Legislature may pass any law upon any subject not forbidden by the State or Federal Constitutions." State ex rel. v. Lollis, 326 Mo. 648; State ex rel. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 270 Mo. 547. "Every intendment must be made in favor of the power of the Legislature." State v. Wilson, 265 Mo. 13; State ex rel. v. Clayton, 226 Mo. 292; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 572. Upon the principle that this State is a representative republic there exists an inherent power in the General Assembly "to legislate at will on any subject and to any extent when, in so doing, neither the State nor the National Constitution is overridden." Wire Company v. Wollbrinck, 275 Mo. 350. (3) There is no provision in either the Missouri Constitution or statutes, nor in the St. Louis charter, prohibiting the city from issuing these bonds "by way of assistance" to the United States, in the carrying out of this project. The issuance of the proposed bonds would not violate any constitutional prohibition. (a) Section 1, Article X of the Missouri Constitution is not violated, because the establishment of a Memorial Plaza within the city is a public purpose, and the proceeds of the bonds will be used in aid of that purpose. (4) It is not essential to the validity of municipal bond proceedings that such proceedings refer to the act or charter provisions under which the bonds...