State ex rel. Steffen v. Myers
| Decision Date | 21 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. C-130550 |
| Citation | 2014 Ohio 2162 |
| Parties | STATE EX REL. DAVID J. STEFFEN, Relator, v. BETH A. MYERS, JUDGE, HAMILTON COUNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT, Respondent. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Original Action in Prohibition
Judgment of the Court: Complaint for Writ of Prohibition Dismissed
Randall L. Porter, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, Shawn P. Welch, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, and Massimino M. Ionna, for Relator,
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondent.
{¶1} The relator, David J. Steffen, has filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent, Judge Beth A. Myers, from resentencing him under R.C. 2929.06(B) for aggravated murder, after she had vacated the death sentence imposed for that offense. We dismiss the complaint.
{¶2} On August 19, 1982, Karen Range was found in her home, dead from slashing wounds to her throat. Her blouse and bra had been ripped apart to expose her breasts, and the crotch of her shorts had been torn. An autopsy disclosed semen and sperm in and around her vagina and in the crotch of her underwear.
{¶3} Steffen ultimately confessed to killing Range. And he admitted that he had torn her clothes. But he insisted, and consistently maintained, that his attempt at vaginal intercourse with Range after she was dead had been thwarted by his inability to get an erection.
{¶4} Steffen was indicted for rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02, aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11, and aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01. The aggravated-burglary count charged that he had entered Range's residence with the purpose to commit rape. The aggravated-murder count was accompanied by two death-eligible specifications, charging that the murder had occurred while Steffen was committing or attempting to commit rape and while he was committing or attempting to commit aggravated burglary.
{¶5} The charges were tried to a jury in April 1983. The jury found Steffen guilty as charged and recommended that he be sentenced to death for aggravated murder. The trial court adopted the jury's recommendation and imposed the deathpenalty for aggravated murder. And the court imposed consecutive prison sentences of seven to 25 years each for rape and aggravated burglary.
{¶6} Steffen unsuccessfully challenged his convictions in appeals to this court, the Ohio Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court, State v. Steffen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-830445, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 9575 (Dec. 11, 1985), affirmed, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 509 N.E.2d 383 (1987), certiorari denied, 485 U.S. 916, 108 S.Ct. 1089, 99 L.Ed.2d 250 (1988), and in two postconviction petitions. See State v. Steffen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-930351, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1973 (May 11, 1994), appeal dismissed, 69 Ohio St.3d 1492, 635 N.E.2d 381 (1994); State v. Steffen, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-900596, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 3718 (Aug. 7, 1991), appeal dismissed, 62 Ohio St.3d 1494, 583 N.E.2d 966 (1992). His federal habeas corpus petition remains pending.
{¶7} In 2006, Steffen learned that DNA testing had excluded him as the source of the sperm found in Range's vagina. And a former Hamilton County morgue employee subsequently confessed to, and was ultimately convicted of abuse of a corpse for, being the source of that sperm. Based on that newly discovered evidence, Steffen moved under Crim.R. 33(A)(6) for a new trial.
{¶8} In August 2013, Judge Myers entered her decision denying a retrial of Steffen's guilt of the offenses, but granting resentencing for aggravated murder. The judge's disposition in each instance turned on whether the newly discovered evidence could be said to disclose a strong probability of a different result. See State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, 76 N.E.2d 370 (1947), syllabus. Thus, while the newly discovered evidence disproved rape, the judge, on the authority of Crim.R. 33(A)(4), modified the rape verdict to accord with her finding that the evidence supported averdict of attempted rape. The judge denied retrial of the aggravated-burglary charge upon her finding that proof that Steffen had not raped Range did not disprove that his purpose in entering the residence had been to rape her. And the judge denied retrial of the aggravated-murder charge upon her finding that evidence proving attempted rape and aggravated burglary also proved the death-eligible specifications. But the judge ordered resentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.06(B) for aggravated murder, because she found that the jury, the trial court, and the appellate courts had all "based their recommendations and conclusions * * * on a finding" that Steffen had raped Range and had been lying when he denied it, and that that finding had effectively been "the difference between life and death."
{¶9} Both the state of Ohio and Steffen challenged Judge Myers's decision in appeals to this court, which were ultimately dismissed, and in an array of motions. The state, in motions filed in November 2010 and June 2011, and Steffen, in a motion filed in May 2013, challenged Judge Myers's jurisdiction to resentence Steffen for aggravated murder under R.C. 2929.06(B). The statute, by its express terms, authorizes a trial court to impanel a new jury, conduct a new sentencing hearing, and impose a death sentence, only when a capital offender's death sentence has been vacated "because of an error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial." And Steffen's death sentence, they insisted, had not been vacated "because of an error that occurred in the sentencing phase of the trial," but because of newly discovered evidence. Therefore, the state asked Judge Myers to instead "reweigh" the evidence and determine whether the death penalty is appropriate, without submitting the matter to a jury or conducting a new sentencing hearing. And Steffen asked the judge to enter an order precluding the state from seeking the death penalty when he is resentenced.
{¶10} Judge Myers declined the state's invitation in its motions to reconsider her decision to grant a new sentencing hearing pursuant to R.C. 2929.06(B). And in overruling Steffen's motion, Judge Myers rejected Steffen's challenge to her jurisdiction under R.C. 2929.06(B) to again impose a sentence of death.
{¶11} In August 2013, Steffen here filed his complaint seeking a writ prohibiting Judge Myers from exercising the authority conferred by R.C. 2929.06(B) to "seat[] a jury that can consider recommending a sentence of death." Because Steffen has an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal, we dismiss his complaint.
{¶12} A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy. Its purpose is not to prevent or correct an error by a court in the exercise of its subject-matter jurisdiction, but to prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction that it does not have. State ex rel. Garrison v. Brough, 94 Ohio St. 115, 113 N. E. 683 (1916), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
{¶13} Article IV, Section 3(B)(1)(d) of the Ohio Constitution confers upon a court of appeals original jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition. The writ may issue only upon proof that the court or officer against whom the writ is sought is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and that denying the writ will result in injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Nolan v. Clendening, 93 Ohio St. 264, 270-271, 112 N.E. 1029 (1915).
{¶14} A writ of prohibition is not intended as a substitute for an appeal. State ex rel. Frasch v. Miller, 126 Ohio St. 287, 185 N.E. 193 (1933), paragraph one ofthe syllabus. A common pleas court, as a court of general jurisdiction, has the authority to determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal. State ex rel. Enyart v. O'Neill, 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110 (1995); State ex rel. Mansfield Tel. Co. v. Mayer, 5 Ohio St.2d 222, 223, 215 N.E.2d 375 (1966). But the availability and adequacy of a remedy in the form of an appeal is immaterial, and prohibition will lie to correct or prevent action by a court, when the court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. State ex rel. Adams v. Gusweiler, 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 329, 285 N.E.2d 22 (1972).
{¶15} An action in prohibition is civil in nature. See State ex rel. Scripps Media, Inc. v. Hunter, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130241, 2013-Ohio-5895, ¶ 31, citing Civ.R. 1(A) and 1(C). Therefore, a complaint for a writ of prohibition may be decided upon a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment. Scripps Media at ¶ 31. Or it may be dismissed under Civ.R. 12. State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 12. A prohibition action is subject to dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), when the relator has an adequate remedy at law, and the court does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction. State ex rel. Snead v. Ferenc, 138 Ohio St.3d 136, 2014-Ohio-43, ___ N.E.2d ___, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Halliday v. Court of Appeals, 134 Ohio St. 191, 191-192, 16 N.E.2d 260 (1938); State ex rel. Wehrung v. Dinkelacker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-000449, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4722 (Oct. 13, 2000).
{¶16} R.C. 2929.06(B) provides in relevant part as follows:
Whenever any court of this state * * * sets aside, nullifies, or vacates a sentence of death imposed upon an offender because of error thatoccurred in the sentencing phase of the trial * * *, the trial court that sentenced the offender shall conduct a new hearing to resentence the offender. If the offender was tried by a jury, the trial court shall impanel a new jury for the hearing. * * * At the hearing, the court * * * shall follow the procedure set forth in division (D) of...
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