State v. Atkins

Decision Date10 September 2018
Docket NumberS18A0770
Citation819 S.E.2d 28,304 Ga. 413
Parties The STATE v. ATKINS.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Linda Jeanne Dunikoski, A.D.A., Scott Franklin McAfee, Senior A.D.A., Fulton County District Attorney's Office, 136 Pryor Street, S.W., Third Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey Hurst Rudder, Deputy D.A., Kevin Christopher Armstrong, Fulton County District Attorney's Office, 136 Pryor Street, S.W., 4th Floor, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Appellant.

Tamara Natasha Crawford, Atlanta Circuit Public Defender's Office, 100 Peachtree Street, Suite 1600, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, Sandra Kay Wolfe, Atlanta Circuit Public Defender's Office, Suite 900, 44 Broad Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, for Appellee.

Peterson, Justice.

Denzel Atkins has been charged with murder in connection with the shooting death of Elijah Wallace in December 2015. The State filed a pretrial notice of its intent to introduce other acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) ("Rule 404 (b)"). After concluding that the other acts evidence met the criteria for admissibility under the Rule 404 (b) test, the trial court nevertheless excluded some of the evidence about a 2013 murder; it allowed other evidence that connected Atkins to the 2013 murder victim, including evidence that Atkins was involved in the victim’s kidnapping. The trial court stated that it excluded evidence of the 2013 murder "out of an abundance of caution." The State appeals from that ruling and argues that the trial court lacked a legal basis to exclude the evidence since the Rule 404 (b) test was satisfied.

Although the trial court has discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence, the requirements of Rule 404 (b) must guide that discretion. The trial court did not confine its analysis to the purposes for which the State sought to introduce the evidence, it applied a standard we now disapprove for determining whether sufficient proof existed to establish that Atkins committed the 2013 murder, and its reason for excluding the evidence—"an abundance of caution"—is not a permissible basis upon which the court may exclude evidence that is otherwise admissible under Rule 404 (b). We therefore vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

1. Background
(a) The proffered facts of this case.

According to the State’s factual proffer accepted by the trial court, Wallace’s body—shot 13 times—was discovered on the side of a Fulton County road. Wallace was last seen waiting to sell marijuana to someone and, when two men arrived in a grey Nissan Sentra, Wallace entered the back seat of the vehicle. The witness who saw Wallace get into the car said that he heard the sound of several gunshots shortly after the vehicle drove away.

A day after Wallace’s body was found, the police recovered a grey Nissan Sentra that had been set on fire and had evidence that an individual had been shot inside. Police interviewed the registered owner of the car, Makayla Ivey; she stated that her boyfriend, Harold Foster, and his friend, Atkins, borrowed her car the evening of December 21. When they returned her car, she noticed a bullet hole in the rear passenger door. Atkins told Ivey that he shot someone in her car and that they dumped the person’s body on the side of a road. Atkins said he would burn the car and instructed Ivey to report her car as stolen.

Foster surrendered to police and reported that Atkins reached out to him with the prospect of making some money. Foster said that he and Atkins took Ivey’s car to meet Wallace, Atkins and Wallace got into an argument in the car, and Atkins shot Wallace. After driving around for a few blocks, Atkins stopped the car and dumped Wallace’s body on the side of the road. As Foster and Atkins drove back home, Atkins threw his gun, the victim’s gun, and the victim’s cell phone out of the window.

Atkins was arrested and charged in this case with murder, three counts of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, criminal attempt to purchase marijuana, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The State filed notice of its intent to present other acts evidence under Rule 404 (b) to prove, among other things, intent, motive, identity, and lack of accident or mistake.

(b) The relevant other acts evidence at issue.

The other acts evidence at issue relates to the shooting death of another man, Perry Herbert, and formed the basis of a 2013 Candler County indictment against Atkins.1

Herbert was last seen waiting to complete a drug deal; his body was found on the side of a road in June 2013. Rasheen Jones came forward and told the police that he and Atkins were involved in Herbert’s death. Jones reported that Atkins arrived at Jones’s house in a Ford Explorer to help Jones buy two pounds of marijuana from Herbert. When they arrived at Herbert’s residence, Atkins produced a .45 caliber handgun, demanded that Herbert get into the back seat of the Explorer, and instructed Jones to drive while pointing a gun at Jones. According to Jones, Atkins eventually forced Herbert to leave the vehicle, shot him multiple times, threw Herbert’s cell phone out of the car during the drive back to Jones’s house, and threatened to kill Jones and his family if Jones said anything about what happened. Atkins was later arrested while driving a Ford Explorer, and a search of the car and a later search of his residence revealed two guns and some marijuana.

Jones and Atkins were subsequently charged with murder and other crimes related to Herbert’s death, and Jones pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and armed robbery and agreed to testify at Atkins’s trial. At his trial, Atkins argued that he was not present for the crime. The jury acquitted Atkins of murder, felony murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The court declared a mistrial on the remaining counts, which included armed robbery and kidnapping, after the jury was unable to reach a verdict on those counts.

(c) The trial court’s ruling on the State’s Rule 404 (b) motion.

In ruling on the State’s motion, the trial court considered the underlying facts of the Candler County case, including Atkins’s alibi defense, and ruled that the jury reasonably could have believed that Atkins was involved in the kidnapping and other charges for which the jury could not reach a verdict but not believed that Atkins was a party to Herbert’s murder. The trial court found that the other acts evidence was being offered for a legitimate purpose, including for reasons not asserted by the State, and that there was sufficient proof from which the jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that Atkins "committed some, if not all, of the prior acts." The trial court also concluded that the prejudicial impact of the other acts evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value, noting that the Candler County incident was so similar to the present crime that it "almost qualifie[d] as a signature crime." Based on these findings, the trial court permitted the introduction of evidence showing Atkins’s involvement in the drug deal with and kidnapping of Herbert but excluded evidence about Herbert’s murder "out of an abundance of caution."

2. Analysis of the trial court’s ruling

The State argues on appeal that the trial court found that the evidence met each of the prongs of the Rule 404 (b) test for admissibility and was, therefore, without a legal basis to exclude the evidence that Herbert was murdered. The State is incorrect. The trial court found that there was not sufficient proof that Atkins participated in Herbert’s murder. But this ruling was based on our precedent that we now overrule, the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence "out of an abundance of caution" was not a proper basis to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, and the trial court did not confine its analysis to the purposes sought by the State. Such errors require that we vacate and remand for the trial court to reconsider the matter under the proper framework.

Rule 404 (b) provides in part:

[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

For other acts evidence to be admissible, a three-part test must be satisfied.

Jones v. State, 301 Ga. 544, 545, 802 S.E.2d 234 (2017). The trial court must find that: (1) the other acts evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character, (2) the probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice under OCGA § 24-4-403 ("Rule 403"), and (3) there is sufficient proof that a jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the acts. Jones, 301 Ga. at 545, 802 S.E.2d 234 ; Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 656 (3), 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015).

We review a trial court’s decision regarding Rule 404 (b) evidence for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 159 (1), 773 S.E.2d 170 (2015). But even where a trial court’s ultimate ruling is subject to only an abuse of discretion review, the deference owed the trial court’s ruling is diminished when the "trial court has clearly erred in some of its findings of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree." State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 526 (2) (a), 705 S.E.2d 636 (2011).

Here, the trial court articulated its analysis in terms of Rule 404 (b). But the trial court’s findings did not fully align with the requirements of that...

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32 cases
  • Browne v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 7, 2022
    ... ... 2013). The doctrine of chances "is ... not an independent ground upon which to admit other acts ... evidence, but is instead a theory why other acts evidence may ... be relevant to prove intent, knowledge, or identity and ... disprove accident or mistake." State v. Atkins , ... 819 S.E.2d 28, 37 (Ga. 2018). Properly conceived, the ... doctrine of chances may offer "a ... permissible path" to a factual inference that "one ... or some events in a group of unlikely events were not the ... result of chance." State v. Jackson , 498 P.3d ... ...
  • State v. Jarman
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    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • July 6, 2020
    ...and the evidence otherwise complies with the four-prong test for admissibility under [Colorado evidence laws]."); State v. Atkins, 304 Ga. 413, 819 S.E.2d 28, 33–36 (2018) (holding that the Georgia Rules of Evidence and procedures therein govern the admissibility of other acts evidence, and......
  • Mulkey v. State
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 17, 2023
    ...accord Brown , 303 Ga. at 161 (2), 810 S.E.2d 145 ; McAllister , 351 Ga. App. at 81 (1), 830 S.E.2d 443.12 State v. Atkins , 304 Ga. 413, 423 (2) (c), 819 S.E.2d 28 (2018) (punctuation omitted); accord State v. Jones , 297 Ga. 156, 164 (3), 773 S.E.2d 170 (2015).13 See McAllister , 351 Ga. ......
  • Heard v. State
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    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 16, 2020
    ...three cases in which the defendants burned and abandoned the vehicles they used to commit the charged crimes. See State v. Atkins , 304 Ga. 413, 414, 819 S.E.2d 28 (2018) ; Stripling v. State , 304 Ga. 131, 133, 816 S.E.2d 663 (2018) ; Kemp v. State , 303 Ga. 385, 387, 810 S.E.2d 515 (2018)......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Character Evidence in the Civil Setting
    • United States
    • State Bar of Georgia Georgia Bar Journal No. 26-3, December 2020
    • Invalid date
    ...2d 468 (2018). [53] Brown v. Davis, 656 Fed. Appx. 920, 922 (2016). [54] 280 F. 3d 1358, 1364 (11th Cir. 2002). [55] See State v. Atkins, 304 Ga. 413, 423, 819 S.E. 2d 28, 36 (2018). [56] Cross v. State, 354 Ga. App. 355, 363, 839 S.E. 2d 265, 272 (2020). --------- ...
  • Evidence
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 71-1, January 2020
    • Invalid date
    ...321 Ga. App. 191, 193, 738 S.E.2d 716, 718 (2013)).28. Id. at 841, 824 S.E.2d at 704.29. Id.30. Id. at 842, 824 S.E.2d at 704.31. Id. 32. 304 Ga. 413, 819 S.E.2d 28 (2018).33. Id. at 413-14, 819 S.E.2d at 30.34. Id. at 415, 819 S.E.2d at 30-31.35. Id. at 422-23, 819 S.E.2d at 35-36.36. Id. ......

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