State v. Baker
| Decision Date | 16 October 2013 |
| Docket Number | NO. 12-12-00092-CR,12-12-00092-CR |
| Parties | THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT v. TERRY SHANNON BAKER, APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM THE 173RD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting a motion to suppress evidence filed by Terry Shannon Baker, Appellee. In three issues, the State argues that a blood draw was obtained lawfully from Appellee, that exigent circumstances existed warranting the taking of an involuntary blood sample, and that Appellee consented to the blood draw. We affirm.
Appellee was indicted for intoxication assault. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the evidence was unlawfully obtained. At the suppression hearing, the evidence showed that on June 13, 2009, Texas Parks and Wildlife Game Wardens Shawn Smith and John Thorne responded to a 911 call concerning a jet ski accident on Cedar Creek Lake. There were several people at the scene, and the game wardens interviewed witnesses.
Warden Smith was advised by paramedics that the injured party "was not in good shape." The game wardens described the scene as a "bad situation," and said they were unsure whether the victim would survive. Appellee was on a boat in the water with other people when the game wardens arrived. Witnesses pointed at Appellee and identified him as the operator of the jet ski involved in the accident. At approximately the same time, the boat docked. Appellee tied the boat down, walked over to the game wardens, and admitted that he had been operating the jet skiat the time of the incident. The game wardens detected the strong odor of alcohol on Appellee's breath, and noted that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Appellee admitted to Warden Smith that he had consumed "four or five" beers that day. Warden Thorne saw a trash bag full of beer cans on the side of the pier, and he was "told" that they came from the boat Appellee was on. But Warden Thorne did not name the person who made the statement. However, the game wardens stated that they interviewed other witnesses and Appellee was the only person who smelled of alcohol. Warden Thorne also observed blood inside the boat that Appellee had just tied to the pier, but he did not identify the blood's source.
Based on this information, Warden Smith told Appellee that he needed to accompany them to East Texas Medical Center (ETMC) to provide a mandatory blood specimen for testing. Appellee asked to give a breath sample, and Warden Smith told him that a blood specimen was required. Appellee acquiesced and was placed in Warden Smith's vehicle. He was not read his constitutional rights or the "DIC 24" statutory warning. While Appellee was at ETMC, a nurse presented him with an ETMC-supplied form, which stated that "this form is to be completed when blood sample(s) are taken from a patient, at the request of the Law Enforcement Agency, for the purpose of testing the blood for alcohol content." Appellee signed the form. A blood sample was taken, and the test showed that he had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.09. Warden Thorne then conducted field sobriety tests (FSTs) on Appellee and concluded that Appellee exhibited four out of six clues on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, zero out of four clues on the one-leg stand, and two out of eight clues on the walk and turn test.1 At that point, Warden Smith informed Appellee that he was "formally" under arrest and read his rights.
After the suppression hearing, the trial court granted the motion. The trial court also made express findings of fact and conclusions of law, including that (1) the game wardens lacked probable cause to effect the arrest when the blood sample was taken, (2) Appellee was not placed under arrest until after he performed the FSTs, (3) the game wardens failed to follow the statutory procedures in obtaining mandatory blood draws without warrants and misstated the law to Appellee concerning involuntary blood samples, (4) the State failed to present evidence ofexigent circumstances justifying the warrantless acquisition of the blood sample, and (5) the State failed to prove that Appellee voluntarily consented to the procedure. The State appealed.
In its first issue, the State contends that the game wardens had probable cause to arrest Appellee and that he was under arrest at the time the blood specimen was requested. Consequently, its argument continues, Chapter 724 governing warrantless mandatory blood draws applies, the game wardens complied with the statute, and the trial court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The trial court is given almost complete deference in its determination of historical facts, especially if they are based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The same deference is afforded the trial court with respect to its rulings on application of the law to questions of fact and to mixed questions of law and fact, if resolution of those questions depends on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. However, for mixed questions of law and fact that do not fall within that category, a reviewing court conducts a de novo review. Id.
At a suppression hearing, a trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Accordingly, a trial court may choose to believe or to disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. State v. Kurtz, 152 S.W.3d 72, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, a failure by a trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.
We view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Therefore, the prevailing party is entitled to "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that maybe drawn from that evidence." Id. Since all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we are obligated to uphold its ruling on a motion to suppress if that ruling is supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856; Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327; State v. Ballard, 987 S .W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Maysonet v. State, 91 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd).
Moreover, if, as here, the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to his ruling and determine whether the evidence supports those factual findings. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Then, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo and uphold the ruling so long as it is supported by the record and correct under any legal theory applicable to the case. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Banda v. State, 317 S.W.3d 903, 907-08 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
The taking of a blood sample is a search and seizure under both the federal and Texas constitutions. Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). However, under certain circumstances, a blood sample taken without a warrant is not an unreasonable search and seizure, and therefore comports with constitutional requirements. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). Police officers may constitutionally obtain a blood sample without a warrant or consent if they have probable cause, exigent circumstances, and a reasonable method of extraction. Id.; see Aliff, 627 S.W.2d at 169-70.
In Texas, there are also statutory requirements that may apply when a person is arrested for an intoxication related offense. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 724.011-.013 (West 2011), 724.015 (West Supp. 2012); State v. Laird, 38 S.W.3d 707, 713-14 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). Texas's implied consent statute governs the state's ability to obtain a breath or blood sample from a person arrested for an intoxication related offense and provides that an arrested suspect has impliedly consented to the taking of a sample in certain circumstances. State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Particularly, the statute provides in relevant part as follows:
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