State v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 06 October 2016
• Docket Number: No. 33811–8–III,33811–8–III
• Citation: 196 Wash.App. 261,382 P.3d 729
• Parties: State of Washington, Appellant, v. Joshua M. Barnes, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

196 Wash.App. 261

382 P.3d 729

State of Washington, Appellant,

v.Joshua M. Barnes, Respondent.

No. 33811–8–III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

October 6, 2016

Nicole Hankins, Chelan County Prosecuting Attorney, Douglas J. Shae, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 2596, Wenatchee, WA, 98807–2596, for Appellant.

Eric J. Nielsen, David Bruce Koch, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, 1908 E. Madison St., Seattle, WA, 98122–2842, for Respondent.

Fearing, C.J.Someone says to me: “Shew the children a game.” I teach them gaming with dice, and the other says “I didn't mean that s ort of game.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Aphorism 69 from Philosophical Investigations (1953).

¶1 Is a riding lawnmower a motor vehicle? We entertain this question in the context of RCW 9A.56.065, the statute that criminalizes the theft of a motor vehicle. After reviewing the purposes behind RCW 9A.56.065, we answer the question in the negative. Those purposes trump the plain meaning of an appurtenant statute defining “motor vehicle.” We affirm the trial court's dismissal of charges against Joshua Barnes for theft of a motor vehicle.

FACTS

¶2 We present the facts in a light most favorable to the State of Washington. On June 22, 2015, Joshua Barnes and a female companion, Danielle Goodman, drove, in a white pickup, on to the property of Judy Fraker on Chumstick Highway near lovely Leavenworth. Fraker was then home. Barnes exited the pickup, mounted Fraker's riding lawnmower, and started the mower's motor. The mower was a Craftsman, gas-powered, self-propelled riding lawnmower, with a twenty-six horse power engine. We do not know the value of the lawnmower. We do not know the maximum speed of Fraker's riding lawnmower.

¶3 Joshua Barnes drove the lawnmower up a ramp and into the bed of the white pickup. Judy Fraker exited her home and confronted Barnes. Barnes claimed an unidentified person directed him to retrieve the riding lawnmower for “John” at a pumpkin patch. Fraker, unimpressed with the pumpkin patch story, ordered Barnes to remove the lawnmower from the back of the pickup and leave her premises. Barnes obeyed. Two days later, Joshua Barnes admitted to law enforcement that he attempted to steal the riding lawnmower.

PROCEDURE

¶4 The State of Washington, as a result of the June 22 incident, charged Joshua Barnes with theft of a motor vehicle, driving with license suspended in the third degree, and criminal trespass in the second degree. Barnes moved the court to dismiss the allegation of theft of a motor vehicle. Barnes argued the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove the offense because a lawnmower is not a “motor vehicle.” The trial court agreed and dismissed the charge of theft of a motor vehicle without prejudice. The State has delayed prosecution of the remaining charges to pursue this appeal.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

¶5 Under Washington law, a defendant may present a pretrial motion to dismiss a charge and challenge the State's ability to prove all of the elements of the crime. State v. Montano, 169 Wash.2d 872, 876, 239 P.3d 360 (2010). Judges and lawyers refer to such a motion as a Knapstad motion from the leading decision of State v. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986). The trial court has inherent power to dismiss a charge when the undisputed facts are insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d at 351, 729 P.2d 48. The court must decide whether the facts that the State relies on, as a matter of law, establish a prima facie case of guilt. Knapstad, 107 Wash.2d at 356–57, 729 P.2d 48. We review de novo a trial court's dismissal of a criminal charge under Knapstad.State v. Conte, 159 Wash.2d 797, 803, 154 P.3d 194 (2007).

¶6 The facts, on which the State relies, include Joshua Barnes taking, without the owner's permission, a powerful, self-propelled riding lawnmower. On these facts we face the legal question of whether the riding lawnmower can constitute a motor vehicle under the statute rendering taking a motor vehicle a crime.

¶7 The controlling statute, RCW 9A.56.065, declares in circularity:

(1) A person is guilty of theft of a motor vehicle if he or she commits theft of a motor vehicle.

(2) Theft of a motor vehicle is a class B felony.

Even if a riding lawnmower does not constitute a motor vehicle for purposes of RCW 9A.56.065, Joshua Barnes committed a crime by taking the lawnmower. Assuming the lawnmower had a value of between $750.01 and $5,000.00, Barnes' conduct constituted theft in the second degree, a class C felony. RCW 9A.56.040. Presumably the State charges Barnes with theft of a motor vehicle since it constitutes a higher level of crime, a class B felony.

¶8 The Washington Legislature enacted RCW 9A.56.065 in 2007. The bill responded to rising automobile thefts on the nation's west coast, and the enactment contained extensive findings. These findings explore the purposes behind the 2007 law. We consider these findings important to our decision. LAWS OF 2007, ch. 199, § 1 declares, in part:

AN ACT Relating to auto theft; ... Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington: NEW SECTION. Sec. 1. (1) The legislature finds that:

(a) Automobiles are an essential part of our everyday lives. The west coast is the only region of the United States with an increase of over three percent in motor vehicle thefts over the last several years. The family car is a priority of most individuals and families. The family car is typically the second largest investment a person has next to the home, so when a car is stolen, it causes a significant loss and inconvenience to people, imposes financial hardship, and negatively impacts their work, school, and personal activities. Appropriate and meaningful penalties that are proportionate to the crime committed must be imposed on those who steal motor vehicles ;

(b) In Washington, more than one car is stolen every eleven minutes, one hundred thirty-eight cars are stolen every day, someone's car has a one in one hundred seventy-nine chance of being stolen, and more vehicles were stolen in 2005 than in any other previous year. Since 1994, auto theft has increased over fifty-five percent, while other property crimes like burglary are on the decline or holding steady. The national crime insurance bureau reports that Seattle and Tacoma ranked in the top ten places for the most auto thefts, ninth and tenth respectively, in 2004. In 2005, over fifty thousand auto thefts were reported costing Washington citizens more than three hundred twenty-five million dollars in higher insurance rates and lost vehicles. Nearly eighty percent of these crimes occurred in the central Puget Sound region consisting of the heavily populated areas of King, Pierce, and Snohomish counties;

(c) Law enforcement has determined that auto theft, along with all the grief it causes the immediate victims, is linked more and more to offenders engaged in other crimes. Many stolen vehicles are used by criminals involved in such crimes as robbery, burglary, and assault. In addition, many people who are stopped in stolen vehicles are found to possess the personal identification of other persons, or to possess methamphetamine, precursors to methamphetamine, or equipment used to cook methamphetamine;.... and

(e) A coordinated and concentrated enforcement mechanism is critical to an effective statewide offensive against motor vehicle theft. Such a system provides for better communications between and among law enforcement agencies, more efficient implementation of efforts to discover, track, and arrest auto thieves, quicker recovery, and the return of stolen vehicles, saving millions of dollars in potential loss to victims and their insurers.

(Emphasis added.) Note that the findings interchangeably use the nouns “auto,” “automobile,” “motor vehicle,” “car,” and “vehicle.”

¶9 Our sole task is determining whether a riding lawnmower is a “motor vehicle” under RCW 9A.56.065. The legislature holds the prerogative of defining and classifying crimes. Therefore, our fundamental purpose in construing a criminal statute is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wash.2d 353, 363, 268 P.3d 215 (2011).

¶10 Washington follows the plain meaning rule. To determine legislative intent, this court looks first to the language of the statute.

Lacey Nursing v. Dep't of Revenue, 128 Wash.2d 40, 53, 905 P.2d 338 (1995). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, the court will give effect to that plain meaning as the expression of what was intended. Tracfone Wireless, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 170 Wash.2d 273, 281, 242 P.3d 810 (2010). Unambiguous language must be applied as written. State v. Smith, 117 Wash.2d 263, 270–71, 814 P.2d 652 (1991). When the statute is clear, courts may not engage in statutory construction. State v. Hahn, 83 Wash.App. 825, 832, 924 P.2d 392 (1996). Plain words do not require construction. City of Kent v. Jenkins, 99 Wash.App. 287, 290, 992 P.2d 1045 (2000). We assume the legislature means what it says. Vance v. XXXL Dev., LLC, 150 Wash.App. 39, 41, 206 P.3d 679 (2009). Only if the language of the statute gives rise to two reasonable interpretations, will the court look outside the language of the statute and employ rules of construction. Cerrillo v. Esparza, 158 Wash.2d 194, 203–04, 142 P.3d 155 (2006).

¶11 Under the plain meaning rule, Washington courts may look to other language in the same statute and even language in other statutes. In Washington, courts determine the plain meaning of a statute's language by simultaneously examining the language of the entire statute and related statutes. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 10–12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ; In re Estate of Lyons, 83 Wash.2d 105, 108, 515 P.2d 1293 (1973) ; CJC v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash.2d 699, 708–09, 985 P.2d 262 (1999). A court deciphers meaning based on the context of all statutes. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d at 10,...