State v. Bugbee

• Decision Date: 05 November 1971
• Citation: 161 Conn. 531,290 A.2d 332
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Darryl A. BUGBEE.

Page 332

290 A.2d 332

161 Conn. 531

STATE of Connecticut v. Darryl A. BUGBEE.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Nov. 5, 1971.

Herbert Watstein, Bristol, for appellant (defendant).

Joseph D. Harbaugh, Special Asst. Chief Pros. Atty., with whom, on the brief, was R. Patrick McGinley, Asst. Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and COTTER, THIM, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.

COTTER, Associate Justice.

On December 1, 1969, the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of § 53-76 of the General Statutes, breaking and entering with criminal intent, and the case was continued by the court for the purpose of a presentence investigation and report. On February 9, 1970, the defendant, when he appeared for sentencing, moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and for an examination by a physician to determine drug dependency. Both motions were denied and a sentence of 180 days in jail was imposed. The defendant was represented by counsel of his own choice at all times during the proceedings. He took an appeal to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court. The defendant assigned error, inter alia, in that he was allowed 'to plead guilty to a charge of breaking and entering with criminal intent, § 53-76 General Statutes, without an affirmative showing on the record that the plea was offered voluntarily and understandingly and without the court's canvassing this matter with the defendant.' Error was also assigned in the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Further error, not applicable here, was also claimed by the defendant. The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court found no error in the judgment, proceedings and decisions of the trial court. The court held that the plea was voluntary and made with the defendant's knowledge of its consequence. This court granted the defendant certification for appeal from that decision, limited to the questions raised under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, and State v. Brown, 157 Conn. 492, 255 A.2d 612.

The defendant claims that there was no affirmative showing on the record that his plea was offered voluntarily and understandingly and with the court canvassing the matter with him. He relies on the holding in Boykin v. Albama, supra, 395 U.S. 242, 89 S.Ct. 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, which mandated the standard that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea intelligently, understandingly and voluntarily, and the statement of the court that: 'It was error, plain on the face of the record, for the trial judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.' Although the Boykin case does not state what the record must disclose for it to be considered sufficient in that regard, the United States Supreme Court stated (p. 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274) that several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a guilty plea is entered. These rights include the fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination, and the sixth amendment rights to a trial by jury and to confront one's accusers. These amendments now govern state court proceedings by virtue of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process portion of the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. That court held that these important federal rights cannot be presumed to be waived from a silent record and stated that the 'question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal standards.' That court further stated at page 244 of 395 U.S., 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 of the Boykin opinion that it is the function of the judge to canvass the matter with the accused to make certain he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence so that there is an adequate record for review. The plea of guilty by the defendant must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162.

A plea of guilty is in effect a conviction and the equivalent of a finding of guilty by a jury and a court should not allow a defendant to enter such a plea until the court is satisfied that it is freely made and that the party making it understands its purport and effect. State v. Carta, 90 Conn. 79, 81, 82, 96 A. 411; 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 486; see Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009.

At the time of the defendant's plea of guilty in this case the record discloses that the following took place: The clerk read to the defendant the statutory title of the crime with which he was charged and the defendant said: 'Guilty.' The defendant's counsel then requested that the clerk read the section number of the statute which the defendant was charged with violating. The clerk thereupon read the section number and asked the defendant: 'How do you plead?' The defendant replied: 'Guilty.' No questions...