State v. Camp

Decision Date05 March 1980
Docket NumberNo. 83,83
Citation299 N.C. 524,263 S.E.2d 592
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Sammie Lee CAMP.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by William F. Briley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Jesse B. Caldwell, III, Asst. Public Defender, Gastonia, for defendant-appellant.

HUSKINS, Justice:

Defendant was convicted of bastardy and placed on probation for five years commencing 1 November 1973. Probation was revoked and the six months suspended sentence placed into effect on 7 December 1978. Defendant contends the five-year period of suspension and probation had expired and Judge Friday therefore had no jurisdiction to revoke the probation and activate the sentence. This constitutes defendant's first assignment of error.

G.S. 15A-1342(a) provides in pertinent part: "The court may place an offender on probation for a maximum of five years."

G.S. 15A-1344(d) (Supp.1979) provides in pertinent part: "If a defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation, the court, in accordance with the provisions in G.S. 15A-1345, . . . may revoke the probation and activate the suspended sentence imposed at the time of initial sentencing; . . . ."

G.S. 15A-1344(f) reads as follows:

"(f) Revocation after Period of Probation. The court may revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if:

(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written motion with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a revocation hearing; and

(2) The court finds that the State has made reasonable effort to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing earlier."

According to the Official Commentary subsection (f) provides that "probation can be revoked and the probationer made to serve a period of active imprisonment even after the period of probation has expired if a violation occurred during the period and if the court was unable to bring the petitioner before it in order to revoke at that time." (Emphasis added.)

The foregoing statutes are a codification of a portion of Section 1 of Chapter 711 of the 1977 Session Laws. Section 39 of that Chapter reads in pertinent part as follows: "This act shall become effective July 1, 1978 and applies to all matters addressed by its provisions without regard to when a defendant's guilt was established or when judgment was entered against him, . . . ." Hence these statutes are applicable to this case. See, Editor's Note to G.S. 15A-1341.

When a sentence has been suspended and defendant placed on probation on certain named conditions, the court may, at any time during the period of probation, require defendant to appear before it, inquire into alleged violations of the conditions, and, if found to be true, place the suspended sentence into effect. G.S. 15A-1344(d) (Supp.1979). Accord, State v. Pelley, 221 N.C. 487, 20 S.E.2d 850 (1942); State v. Shepherd, 187 N.C. 609, 122 S.E. 467 (1924). But the State may not do so after the expiration of the period of probation except as provided in G.S. 15A-1344(f). Accord, State v. Pelley, supra; State v. Gooding, 194 N.C. 271, 139 S.E. 436 (1927).

Although the record before us contains only two notices to defendant, one dated 14 September 1976 and the other dated 3 March 1978, to report to the court for a probation revocation hearing based upon his failure to make the payments required by the probation judgment, the record recites that defendant was so notified and actually appeared in Superior Court for a revocation hearing "some 23 times." Yet the hearing was always continued and a revocation hearing was never conducted until Judge Friday finally heard evidence, made findings, revoked defendant's probation and activated the six-months suspended sentence on 7 December 1978. The reason the revocation hearing was continued time after time after time appears from the testimony of the public defender who represented defendant: "No trial court I discussed the matter with expressed any desire to hear the matter. Usually what would happen, the Courts would just say they didn't want to send just didn't want to hear it, they didn't want to send the man off because ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • State ex rel. Utilities Com'n v. Nantahala Power and Light Co.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1985
  • State v. Pennell
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • August 6, 2013
    ...The Court also addressed this issue in State v. Hall, 160 N.C.App. 593, 586 S.E.2d 561 (2003), holding: Under State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 528, 263 S.E.2d 592, 594–95 (1980), to revoke a defendant's probation after the period of probation has expired, the trial court must find “that the Sta......
  • Wake County ex rel. Carrington v. Townes
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • September 15, 1981
    ...determined to be the father will be less likely to maintain support payments to a child he knows is not his. See State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 263 S.E.2d 592 (1980). Moreover, "(a)ppointment of counsel need not lead to protracted litigation.... Faced with strong scientific evidence of patern......
  • United States v. Stone
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
    • July 10, 2015
    ...a period of probation in lieu of physical confinement do not serve a period of post-release supervision. See e.g., State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 263 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1980) (holding that courts generally lack authority over a defendant once a probationary term expires). In such a case, a defe......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT