State v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 27 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-0708 |
| Citation | 944 N.W.2d 469 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Eric Joseph COLEMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David Hemming, Assistant County Attorney, Center City, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal, Judge.
A jury found appellant Eric Joseph Coleman guilty of third-degree murder, two counts of criminal vehicular homicide, two counts of criminal vehicular operation, and two counts of driving while impaired. The district court entered convictions for all seven offenses.
On appeal from his convictions, Coleman argues that (1) the district court plainly erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea element of third-degree murder; (2) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a prior alcohol-related driving incident; (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of third-degree murder; (4) the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during opening and closing arguments by inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury; and (5) the district court erred by entering convictions for both counts of criminal vehicular operation and both counts of driving while impaired.
We affirm Coleman's conviction of third-degree murder. But with regard to the criminal-vehicular-operation convictions and the driving-while-impaired convictions, we conclude that the district court erred by imposing two convictions, rather than one conviction, for each of these offenses because the convictions arose out of the same behavioral incident. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the district court to vacate one of the criminal-vehicular-operation convictions and one of the driving-while-impaired convictions.
On the night of January 26, 2018, Coleman drove his snowmobile at a speed of 58 miles per hour (mph) on a lake where people were ice fishing. Coleman did so after drinking several alcoholic beverages. Coleman struck an eight-year-old child with his snowmobile and then struck the child's father, injuring both father and son. The child later died.
Coleman was indicted by a grand jury on the following offenses: one count of third-degree murder; two counts of criminal vehicular homicide; two counts of gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation; and two counts of gross misdemeanor driving while impaired (DWI).
Before trial, respondent State of Minnesota filed notice of its intent to introduce evidence that, in November 2017, Coleman committed the offense of criminal vehicular operation. Over Coleman's objection, the district court granted the state's motion "to admit evidence of a prior alcohol-related crash."
At trial, evidence was presented that on January 26, 2018, a father (father) and mother, one of their daughters, and their eight-year-old son (hereinafter "son" or "the child") went to Chisago Lake to ice fish. It had been a "warm," 40-degree day and there were a number of people on the lake. The family drove their pickup truck onto the lake and arrived at their ice-fishing spot at about 7:30 p.m. The spot they picked was in an area of the lake just south of where "there's a lot of other fish houses and different stuff on the lake." Although it was "exceptionally bright" on the lake that night, the sun had set and it was "dark enough where you would have to turn your lights on." But not all of the fish houses and vehicles on the lake had lights on.
After arriving at their spot, father began to set up the family's portable ice-fishing house. According to father, the fish house is over six feet tall when set up, and has reflectors on all four corners. As father was inside the fish house setting it up, the family heard a snowmobile start "a little ways" from their pickup truck. Mother and son were outside near the truck. The child was "very interested" in snowmobiles, and "walked down to the end of the truck to watch the snowmobile go by." Mother then observed the snowmobile "coming right towards" them, and "tried to yell for her son to get out of the way." But "as soon as [mother] could tell him to get out of the way," the "snowmobile ... hit the truck and hit [the child] and went straight through the [fish] house." Both father and his son were injured. The child was airlifted to a hospital and died several days later from his injuries.
Responding officers testified that after arriving at the scene, they spoke with Coleman, who was injured after being thrown from his snowmobile. Coleman admitted driving his snowmobile and hitting the pickup truck. An officer testified that Coleman stated that the truck "basically came out of nowhere and he didn't have time to react." The officer also testified that Coleman displayed bloodshot and watery or glassy eyes, consistent with possible impairment. A blood test revealed that Coleman had an alcohol concentration of 0.165 approximately three hours after the incident.
Coleman testified at trial and acknowledged that he drove the snowmobile that struck father and the child. According to Coleman, he drank several higher-alcohol-content beers on January 26, 2018, at his house and made plans to see where his son was ice fishing. Coleman, who testified that he has done "a lot" of ice fishing, then drove his snowmobile out to the lake where his son and his daughter's boyfriend were fishing. The three talked for a while and Coleman's son and daughter's boyfriend each took a turn riding Coleman's snowmobile. Coleman's daughter's boyfriend testified that he and Coleman's son traveled in a southerly direction away from where they were fishing near a cluster of fish houses, and that there were numerous snowmobile tracks on the lake "crisscrossing all directions." Coleman consumed a beer, which he had brought with him, while talking with the others. Coleman then left on his snowmobile, heading in a southerly direction, and got up to speed. Coleman admitted that he operated the snowmobile at a speed of 58 miles per hour just before hitting the truck.
Coleman acknowledged that he had an alcohol concentration of more than twice the legal limit at the time of the crash. And Coleman admitted that he is aware that drinking and driving is dangerous, and that people die from drinking and driving, because that information is "general, public knowledge." Coleman further admitted that "[t]o a certain extent," he has a specific knowledge of the dangers of drinking and driving because on November 2, 2017, he was involved in an alcohol-related crash in which the driver of the other vehicle involved was injured. But Coleman testified that he does not remember anything from that crash because he had an alcohol concentration over 0.30, and was "blacked out" drunk.
The jury found Coleman guilty of all seven charged offenses. The district court then sentenced Coleman to 150 months in prison for third-degree murder and 365 days in jail for one count of gross misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation, to be served concurrently. Coleman was also convicted of, but not sentenced for, the remaining offenses.
This appeal follows.
I. Did the district court plainly err in instructing the jury on the mens rea element of third-degree murder?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Coleman's previous alcohol-related car accident?
III. Was the evidence sufficient to support Coleman's conviction of third-degree murder?
IV. Did the prosecution commit prejudicial misconduct by inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury?
V. Did the district court err by entering convictions for both counts of criminal vehicular operation and both counts of DWI?
We first address Coleman's argument that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the mens rea1 element of third-degree murder. Jury instructions, reviewed in their entirety, must fairly and adequately explain the law. State v. Peltier , 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). A district court has "considerable latitude" in selecting jury instructions. State v. Gatson , 801 N.W.2d 134, 147 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). A jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the law. State v. Kuhnau , 622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 2001).
Because Coleman did not object to the jury instructions at trial, he has forfeited appellate review of the jury-instruction issue. State v. Zinski , 927 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 2019). "But, under the plain-error doctrine, an appellate court has the discretion to consider a forfeited issue if the defendant establishes (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights." Id. "If the first three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court considers whether reversal is required to ensure the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 275 n.5 (quotation omitted). As explained below, we conclude that Coleman has established an error but the error was not plain.
We begin by examining whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the mens rea element for third-degree murder. A person commits third-degree murder when he "without intent to effect the death of any person, causes the death of another by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life." Minn. Stat. § 609.195(a). Thus, the third-degree murder statute required the state to prove that Coleman: (1) caused the death of another, (2) committed an act that was eminently dangerous to others, and (3) evinced a depraved mind without regard for human life. State v. Hall , 931 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 2019).
The district court instructed the jury with regard to the required mens rea or mental state as follows:
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